UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


/J 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     The  Inevitable  War 3 

II.     The  Significance  of  1870  ...  7 

III.  France  and  Russia 11 

IV.  France  and  England 17 

V.     Russia  and  England 23 

VI.     The  Triple  Alliance 29 

VII.     The  Mediterranean  Agreements  35 
VIII.     The  Franco- Japanese  and  Russo- 
Japanese  Agreements    ...  41 
IX.     The  Policy  of  Germany  and  the 

"Encerclement" 45 

X.     Plans  Frustrated 59 

XI.     The  Various  Interests  Encount- 
ered    65 

XII.     Servia's    Aspirations    and    Aus- 
tria's Crime 79 

XIII.  The   Violent   Method   and   Its 

Results 89 

XIV.  Ante  Bellum  Public  Opinion     .  101 

i 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

XV.     Efforts  of  the  Various  Govern- 
ments       115 

XVI.     The  General  Conflict  ....  135 
XVII.     The  Violation  of  the  Neutral- 
ity of  Luxemburg 145 

XVIII.  England  and  the  Violation  of 

Belgian  Neutrality    .     .     .     .  155 

XIX.  The    Ultimatum    and    England's 

Declaration  of  War  .     .     .     .  185 

XX.     Turkey  and  the  Conflict  .     .     .     .  191 

XXI.     Italian  Neutrality 199 

XXII.     Italy's  Participation 223 

XXIII.     Belligerent  and  Neutral  Balkan 

States 233 

XXIV.     Belligerents   and   Neutrals   in 

Latin  America 279 

XXV.     Spanish  Neutrality 291 

XXVI.     Greece's  Double  Attitude  .     .     .  307 


CAUSES  AND  PRETEXTS 
OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  WORLD  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    INEVITABLE    WAR 

THE  famous  maxim  si  vis  pacem,  para  helium  * 
appeared  until  recently  to  have  found  its  most 
complete  application  in  Europe;  but  now  it  is  evident 
that  Europe's  tranquillity  was  only  an  external  sem- 
blance. Based  on  a  supposed  equilibrium,  it  was  dic- 
tated by  exigency  and  by  nothing  else.  Armed  peace 
was  bound  to  lead  to  war.  A  pretext,  not  even  a 
cause,  sufficed  to  unchain  it. 

Just  as  in  the  physiological  system  an  organ  must 
function,  so  in  the  social  system  must  an  army.f 
Therefore  it  was  natural  that  the  conflagration  should 
soon  spread  to  all  countries  which  possessed  an  armed 


*  Colonel  H.  Frobenius  in  "The  German  Empire's  Hour  of 
Destiny"  (translated  from  the  German),  demands  that  this 
rendering  be  substituted  for  that  over  the  door  of  the  great 
hall  in  the  Peace  Palace  which  reads  si  vis  pacem,  para  justitia. 

t  Arturo  Labriola ;  "International  Disarmament,"  in  the  Forum, 
January  I,  1915. 

3 


4  THE  WORLD  WAR 

force  to  put  in  the  field;  but  later,  since  our  civiliza- 
tion is  a  collectivity  with  overlapping  relations  be- 
tween its  various  elements,  the  conflict  became  a 
general  one. 
n-  -  Innumerable  times  has  war  been  avoided  because 
the  presumed  combatants  found  a  solution.  Within 
the  last  twenty  years  the  cases  of  Fachoda,  Agadir, 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  have  followed  each  other 
and  each  time  diplomacy  has  prevented  war  merely 
because  the  probable  combatants  had  not  reached  the 
necessary  degree  of  preparation.  But  more  recently, 
in  spite  of  peace  conferences,  diplomatic  declarations, 
and  sovereigns  exchanging  visits  and  embraces;  in 
spite  of  internal  problems,  financial  penuriousness,  in- 
sistent pacifism,  threatening  socialism,  and  antipatriotic 
syndicalism — in  spite  of  all  this,  the  increase  of  arma- 
ments kept  presaging  the  proximity  of  war.  Finally 
a  deed  sad  in  itself  but  unimportant  from  the  inter- 
national point  of  view  precipitated  the  stupendous 
conflict;  and  the  proportions  this  has  assumed  make 
us  ask  if  civilization  is  a  myth.  Did  the  great  retro- 
gressions of  the  past  have  the  same  simple  causes 
and  follow  the  same  direction  as  this  of  today?  And 
ought  this  to  serve  as  a  future  warning  to  Europe? 

The  civilization  of  that  older  part  of  the  globe  has 
extended  to  this  fertile  America  which,  more  secure, 
with  a  higher  conception  of  human  existence  and  a 
more  ample  spirit  for  social  activity,  hoped  to  defend 
unmenaced  the  brilliant  legacy  of  prosperity  which 
the  unflagging  labor  of  past  generations  left  her;  but 


THE  INEVITABLE  WAR  5 

the  strong  inclination  of  American  opinion  toward 
those  combatants  whose  ideal  was  liberty,  who  were 
least  prepared  to  resist  brute  force  and  found  them- 
selves the  possible  prey  of  the  more  vigorous  and  less 
scrupulous  combatant,  finally  crystallized  into  action. 
The  European  War  became  a  World  War. 


FY/ 


To 

The  Memory 

of  the 

Honorable  Niel  Primrose 

who   so   frequently 

discussed  with  the  author 

the  ideas  for  which 

he  laid  down 

his  life. 


107934. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  1870 

THEjwar  of  1870  turned  Germany  and  France  into 
natural  enemies.  The  victory  of  the  former  was 
so  ostentatious  and  complete  that  it  offended  the  public 
sentiment  of  the  latter.  On  the  other  hand,  although 
the  conqueror  did  not  realize  it,  the  conquered  was  by 
no  means  annihilated.  Bismarck,  Teutonic,  without 
pity  or  mercy,  believed  that  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort 
would  destroy  the  national  wealth  and  the  integrity 
of  the  patrie;  but  this  was  not  so.  True,  for  France 
the  humiliation  was  enormous,  the  loss  of  territory 
appreciable,  the  payment  of  the  exorbitant  war  in- 
demnity not  less  serious.  It  is  no  wonder  that  the 
glassy  eyes  of  the  septuagenarian  Thiers  shed  tears  of 
grief  on  the  night  when  he  and  Jules  Favre  returned 
from  Versailles  to  Paris  after  the  interview  with  Bis- 
marck.* But  resurrection  was  possible  and  it  came 
unexpectedly  soon.  Bismarck  could  not  deny  that  he 
had  miscalculated. 

Looking  back  from  this  distance  we  can  see  how, 

*  G.  Hanotaux ;  "Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine,"  Vol.  I. 

7 


8  THE  WORLD  WAR 

with  her  three  victorious  wars,  Germany  accelerated 
her  union,  acquired  new  territories,  covered  herself 
with  laurels,  and  prepared  her  hegemony  over 
Europe.  But  these  same  successes  were  creating  for 
her  an  implacable  enemy  whose  existence  must  neces- 
sarily be  dedicated  to  preparing  her  ruin  and  putting 
onto  her  shoulders  the  weight  of  too  great  a  glory. 

When  one  examines  the  political  history  of  Europe 
for  the  past  century  it  is  easy  to  trace  the  upward 
course  of  the  little  kingdom  of  Prussia  since  1815,  and 
to  see  that  even  though  Sadowa  and  Sedan  followed 
each  other  quickly  it  was  not  necessarily  these  deeds 
of  blood  which  brought  about  the  unity  of  the  Empire, 
for  this  had  been  a  Napoleonic  conception  before  ever 
it  became  an  aspiration  of  the  states  composing  it. 
It  was  one  of  Bismarck's  exaggerations  to  believe,  as 
Prokesch-Osten  ironically  put  it,  that  Prussia  was  the 
centre  of  the  universe;  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  decline  of  Austria  (whose  policy  was  in  feeble 
hands  and  whose  armies  were  not  living  up  to  past 
glories)  along  with  the  careful  Prussian  policy  and 
the  intellectual  and  scientific  movement  of  1850,  gave 
Prussia  the  right  to  claim  the  inheritance  of  Frederick 
the  Great. 

The  personal  temperament  of  Bismarck  and  the 
inconceivable  errors  of  the  Second  Empire  as  to  its 
foreign  policy  rapidly  forced  events  out  of  their  nor- 
mal course  into  abrupt  moves  and  finally,  war.  Nor 
is  this  surprising  when  these  same  French  errors 
caused  Thiers  to  publicly  exclaim  during  the  famous 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  1870  9 

discussion  of  1867  that  Napoleon  III  was  "the  real 
author  of  German  unity" ;  and  when  they  caused  King 
William  of  Prussia  to  say  something  even  more  in- 
criminating, namely:  that  Napoleon  III  "had  been 
working  his  own  ruin  ever  since  1866  because  he  had 
failed  to  attack  the  Prussian  army  in  the  rear."  Thus 
the  Franco-Prussian  War  came,  and  France  paid  dear 
for  her  blunders.  But  Germany's  decisive  victory,  her 
glory  acquired  through  an  injury  that  completely 
crushed  the  enemy,  could  not  do  otherwise  than  dis- 
til a  spirit  of  revenge  in  the  soul  of  every  Frenchman, 
and  at  the  same  time  arouse  in  other  nations  a  senti- 
ment of  distrust  and  even  of  fear. 

Sedan  in  1870  left  behind  it  a  sediment  of  profound 
hatred,  of  undying  bitterness,  which  Leipzig  in  18 13 
had  not  caused.  The  great  Prussian  triumphs  had  been 
excessively  easy. 


CHAPTER  III 

FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA 

CONQUERED  and  isolated,  France's  first  dutywas 
to  establish  her  new  republican  institutions,  rein- 
force  her  army,  and  reorganize  her  finance..  All  this 
she  did  more  rapidly  than  was  expected.  Next  she 
sought  to  establish  alliances  and  in  short  to  isolate  her 
terrible  enemy.  How  well  she  succeeded  is  demon- 
strated by  present  events. 

France's  most  powerful  neighbors  were  Germany, 
Italy  and  England.  Of  these  the  first,  ever  since  she 
defeated  Austria  at  Sadowa,  had  bound  that  nation 
to  her  by  skilful  international  policy  of  the  only  sort 
that  Germany  ever  practiced  with  success ;  their  union, 
moreover,  rested  upon  common  racial  origin.  The 
second,  Italy,  had  twice  improved  her  prospects  of 
unity,  thanks  to  Bismarck.  The  third,  England, 
though  she  appeared  indifferent  to  Continental  affairs 
and  was  absorbed  in  great  work  elsewhere,  was  never- 
theless considered  the  hereditary  enemy.  France  con- 
sequently could  only  turn  her  eyes  to  Russia  and  offer 
her  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  The  idea  was 
not  without  precedent.  It  had  been  advanced  by  men 
2  II 


12  THE  WORLD  WAR 

like  Chateaubriand  and  the  Duke  of  Richelieu ;  but  the 
interior  regime  of  both  countries,  along  with  the  polit- 
ical mistakes  of  the  Second  Empire  and  the  Third 
Republic,  had  excluded  all  possibility  of  union.  The 
Crimean  War  and  the  intervention  in  Polish  affairs 
for  instance  could  hardly  serve  as  links  to  bind  the 
two  nations.  .  As  to  the  Polish  intervention,  Napoleon 
III  himself,  as  an  excuse  for  not  contracting  one  of 
the  best  alliances  on  the  Continent,  had  to  affirm  that 
the  Polish  cause  was  very  popular  in  France.*  In 
addition  there  was  the  grave  crisis  of  the  Commune, 
the  new  form  of  government  adopted  after  1871,  the 
popular  French  approval  when  Berezowski  shot  at  the 
Czar  on  his  visit  to  Paris  in  1867,  the  subsequent  tol- 
erance which  the  Republic,  respectful  of  its  own  laws, 
manifested  to  the  Nihilists.  All  this  would  never  have 
permitted  accord,  much  less  real  alliance,  between  the 
two  great  powers  of  Eastern  and  Western  Europe. 

In  Bismarck's  attitude  toward  Russia  there  was  a 
marked  contrast.  He  could  be  flexible  when  necessity 
required  (as  witness  his  trips  to  Biarritz  before  1866  in 
order  to  insure  Napoleon  Ill's  abstaining  from  the  war 
he  was  planning  against  Austria)  and  he  now  used  all 
his  arts  upon  the  Czar  to  bring  about  the  alliance  which 
he  designated  "of  the  Three  Emperors" — German, 
Austrian,  and  Russian.  This,  to  be  sure,  did  not  in- 
cline Russia  toward  Francophilism ;  nor  did  the 
Russophobia  of  French  politicians,  products  mostly  of 
the  revolution — men  like  Grevy,  or  like  Floquet,  who 


*  Discourse  of  the  Crown,  November  5,  1863. 


FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA  13 

in  1867  greeted  the  Czar  in  the  Palace  of  Justice  with 
the  cry,  Long  live  Poland!  In  face  of  all  this  one  can 
understand  the  difficulty  of  throwing  a  bridge  across 
Germany  and  uniting  the  Muscovite  Empire  with  the 
French  Republic. 

But  necessity  is  superior  to  human  wishes.  It  hap- 
pened that  Russia  was  able  to  do  France  a  signal 
service  and  this  became  the  first  step  toward  reciprocal 
sympathy  and  awakened  a  gratitude  of  the  kind  which 
countries  long  cherish.  In  1875  Germany,  noting  her 
rival's  recuperation,  and  seeing  her  reorganize  her 
army  which  both  the  Peace  preliminaries  of  Versailles 
and  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  had  failed  to  definitely 
limit,  wished  again  to  assault  her  brutally.  Bismarck 
became  more  threatening  than  ever;  his  official  organ, 
the  Post,  spoke  openly  of  war,  and  other  German  pa- 
pers followed  its  lead.  Marshal  MacMahon  received 
warning  from  two  European  personages  that  war  would 
break  out  in  the  spring.  But  the  Czar  understood  that 
the  moment  had  come  when  he  could  no  longer  remain 
passive ;  through  Prince  OrlofT,  Russian  Ambassador  in 
Paris,  and  more  directly  through  General  Le  Flo, 
French  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg,  he  gave  hope 
and  encouragement  to  the  French  cabinet.  It  was 
then  that  Prince  Gortschakoff,  commenting  on  the 
Czar's  words  to  Le  Flo  and  underlining  them,  first 
hinted  at  a  common  action  should  Germany  wantonly 
attack  France.* 


♦Gabriel  Hanotaux;  "Histoire  de  la  France  Contemporaine/ 
Vol.  III. 


i4  THE  WORLD  WAR 

But  neither  the  good  intentions  of  Czar  Alexander 
II,  nor  the  sympathetic  expressions  of  GortschakofT, 
nor  the  enigmatic  words  of  diplomats  of  the  old  school, 
were  sufficient  for  an  alliance.  France  had  to  learn 
that  she  could  expect  no  benefit  from  the  quixotic  spirit 
for  sentimental  intervention  which  had  animated  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  Second  Empire.  Such  chivalry 
left  her  lonely,  for  no  other  nation  was  willing  to 
commit  a  similar  fatal  error.  Russia,  with  all  her 
good  intentions,  could  not  be  expected  to  draw  her 
sword  at  the  opportune  moment  unless  she  had  a  motive 
of  self-interest  or  a  previous  promise  of  reciprocal 
utility.  While  this  was  slowly  dawning  on  France, 
Bismarck,  who  knew  well  this  egoism  of  international 
politics  and  who  besides  was  a  good  gambler,  hastened 
to  offer  that  which  soon  might  have  been  demanded — 
a  free  hand  to  Russia  in  Eastern  Europe  while  he 
claimed  the  same  in  Western. 

France's  uneasiness  and  consequent  desire  for  a 
union  were  easy  to  understand;  but  Russia's  pro- 
French  proposals  did  not  go  beyond  mere  words.  For 
them  to  do  so  the  two  nations  must  feel  a  common 
necessity.  Such  a  necessity  confronted  them  when  the 
Austro-German  Treaty  of  alliance  was  celebrated.  It 
directed  German  policy  toward  the  Orient,  or  at  least 
prevented  it  from  ignoring  that  question,  and  the  fact 
was  intelligently  exploited  by  French  politicians,  dip- 
lomats, and  financiers.  An  alliance  de  facto  was  begun 
in  1880.  This  culminated  in  the  formal  treaty,  dated 
August  22,  1 89 1,  and  signed  by  Ribot  and  De  Moren- 


FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA  1 5 

heim  representing  the  two  respective  countries.  Bis- 
marck had  been  dismissed  the  year  before,  for  the  new 
Emperor  wished  no  leading-strings ;  and  the  old  tiger, 
from  his  retirement,  kept  clawing  at  his  successors 
because  of  this  alliance;  but  he  himself  could  not 
have  prevented  it.  From  the  day  its  need  first  became 
apparent  in  1878,  when  Russia  came  out  worsted  from 
the  Congress  of  Berlin,  it  had  been  shaping  itself  as  a 
treaty  in  the  minds  of  all.* 

With  France  and  Russia  allied,  the  equilibrium 
broCen  in  1870  by  the  Franco-Prussian  War  was  now 
re-established,  and  Germany  ceased  to  be  the  arbiter 
of  the  destinies  oT  Europe.f 

-  The  rejoicing  in  France  was  extraordinary  and  has 
been  sustained  with  but  few  intermissions.  In  fact 
the  jubilation  was  exaggerated  to  such  a  point  that 
Count  de  Witte,  who  should  have  been  far  from  dis- 
pleased by  it,  said  one  day  to  the  distinguished  French 
publicist  Andre  Tardieu:  "For  ten  years  now  you 
have  been  making  Franco-Russian  manifestation  both 
in  season  and  out  of  season." 

These  explosions  of  popular  sentiment  expressed 
how  persistent  had  been  the  past  nightmare  and  how 
useful  was  the  new  union  implying  supreme  defense ; 
but  nevertheless  there  arose  in  the  course  of  twenty 
years  two  moments  of  suspicious  reserve.  The  first, 
when  Muscovite  prestige  was  humbled  on  the  plains 

♦Gabriel  Hanotaux;   "La  Politique  de  l'equilibre,"  page   124. 

f  Andre  Tardieu ;  "Les  questions  actuelles  de  la  politique  etran- 

gere  en  Europe" ;  also  "La  politique  exterieure  de  l'Allemagne." 


1 6  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  Manchuria  and  thereby  weakened  in  all  Europe. 
Immediately  the  event  proved  to  France  the  impor- 
tance of  a  strong  ally,  for  in  the  period  that  followed 
she  again  had  to  suffer  Teuton  impertinences.  The 
second,  and  more  transitory,  during  the  last  Balkan 
War  when  France  followed  her  own  policy  independent 
of  her  ally;  that  is  to  say,  she  furthered  her  own 
Eastern  interests  without  stopping  to  think  that  how- 
ever considerable  these  may  have  been,  Russia's  only 
reason  for  keeping  up  the  alliance  was  that  her  con- 
cern lay  in  Eastern  Europe,  just  as  France's  lay  prin- 
cipally in  Western.  On  both  these  occasions  the  en- 
thusiasm for  the  Franco-Russian  accord  waned  some- 
what, but  adjustments  and  explanations  were  soon 
forthcoming.  Russia  began  the  reorganization  of  her 
army  and  the  costly  change  of  her  war  material,  and 
the  two  nations  with  new  zest  bent  themselves  toward 
the  common  defense.  If  Prussian  militarism  provoked 
it,  they  would  be  prepared  to  attack  their  vigilant  rival 
at  the  opportune  moment. 


CHAPTER  IV 

FRANCE   AND   ENGLAND 

f  4/npHE  Englishman  is  our  hereditary  enemy."  Un- 
A  til  recently  this  classic  dictum  was  on  the  lips  of 
every  Frenchman ;  this  was  the  opinion  which  the  two 
nations  separated  by  the  Channel  had  of  each  other. 
And  the  fact  is,  however  much  they  have  tried  to  ex- 
plain since  the  Entente  Cordiale  that  the  idea  was 
erroneous,*  it  is  none  the  lesslrue  that  long-standing 
rivalry  had  kept  up  intermittent  war  between  them. 
This  condition  constituted  the  inheritance  of  both 
countries  and  there  was  no  reason  why  the  past  should 
not  foretell  the  future.  The  Hundred  Years  War  ter- 
minated in  1453 ;  the  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg, 
from  1688  to  1693;  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succes- 
sion, from  1701  to  1713;  of  the  Austrian  Succession, 
from  1744  to  1748;  the  Seven  Years  War,  from  1756 
to  1763;  the  American  troubles  from  1778  to  1783; 
the  Continental  Wars  from  1793  to  1802,  and  again 
from  1803  to  181 5— this  long  list  together  with  the 

*  Ives  Guyot ;  "L'Entente  Cordiale  ail  point  de  vue  economique  " 
in  the  Journal  des  Economistes,  May  15,  I9M- 

n 


18  THE  WORLD  WAR 

friction  and  threats  of  the  Restoration  Period,  the 
Monarchy  of  July,  the  Second  Empire,  and  the  Third 
Republic,  justifies  the  old  belief  in  hereditary  enmity; 
nor  could  suspicion  be  dissipated  by  brief  periods  of 
friendship  such  as  occurred  in  1830,  1840,  and  1872, 
'74,  and  '75. 

The  attitude,  moreover,  is  explicable  on  other 
grounds.  Because  of  her  geographical  situatjpnJEng- 
land's  safety  demanded  the  supremacy  of  the  seas. 
This  she  had  maintained  by  fighting  against  Spain, 
Holland,  and  France;  to  maintain  it  to-day  she  must 
fight  against  Germany.  Back  in  1762  after  the  Dutch 
and  Spaniards  had  lost  their  naval  power  and  Ger- 
many's had  not  yet  loomed  on  the  horizon,  the  Earl  of 
Chatham  outlined  England's  policy  in  unequivocable 
terms  when  he  declared:  "His  Majesty's  ministers 
must  never  forget  this  great  principle — this  directing 
principle  of  all  our  policy;  namely:  the  only  thing  that 
England  need  fear  in  the  world  is  that  France  should 
become  a  maritime,  commercial,  and  colonial  power." 

These  words  have  always  expressed  English  public 
spirit,  for  supremacy  on  the  seas  also  meant  political 
strength  and  national  wealth. 

In  proportion  as  France  increased  her  colonial  acqui- 
sitions and  her  maritime  strength,  the  hereditary  ene- 
my's aversion  to  her  increased.  It  was  considerably 
aggravated  when  the  minister  Jules  Ferry  launched 
his  country  on  the  road  to  conquest,  an  initiative  which 
even  Bismarck  favored,  being  only  too  delighted  to 
see  the  French  armies  turn  in  some  other  direction 


FRANCE  AND  ENGLAND  19 

than  the  eastern  frontier.  Although  French  prudence 
sought  to  make  known  the  national  projects  to  Eng- 
land and  to  obtain  from  her  a  certain  approbation, 
still  every  acquisition  was  fraught  with  danger.  It  is 
known  that  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Lord  Salisbury 
almost  counseled  the  conquest  of  Tunis  to  Waddington, 
First  French  Plenipotentiary  (or  at  least  he  counseled 
intervention  which  in  African  affairs  is  the  same 
thing).  The  taking  over  of  Madagascar  was  recog- 
nized by  England  in  the  treaty  of  August  5,  1890. 
The  same  with  Senegal,  Dahomey,  and  the  Congo, 
where  "French  interests  were  in  constant  opposition 
with  British  and  where  peace  was  established  only 
with  difficulty."  *  Yet  there  were  moments  of  grave 
crisis,  produced  apparently  by  insignificant  causes,  but 
whose  real  roots  ran  deep  in  the  colonial  policy  in  gen- 
eral and  the  African  in  particular.  'Tor  twenty  years 
the  world  watched  a  veritable  steeplechase;  especially 

between  France  and  England."! Africa,  considered 

the  res  nullius  of  political  law,  was  marked  off  by 
geographers,  explorers,  and  above  all  by  officials 
charged  with  important  missions.  Every  aspiration 
grew  into  an  interest  and  every  interest  into  a  right. 
England  won  the  steeplechase,  but  was  not  able  to 
prevent  her  rival  from  occupying  those  portions  of 
second-rate  quality  or  which  were  not  included  in  the 
preestablished  imperial  plan.     France  had  to  suffer 


*  E.  Lemonon ;  "L'Europe  et  la  politique  brittanique,"  Paris, 
19 1 2,  page  87. 
fRene  Millet;  "Politique  exterieure,"  1898-1905,  page  155. 


20  THE  WORLD  WAR 

humiliations  such  as  Fachoda,  which,  though  no  more 
serious  than  others,  is  better  known  because  of  the 
enormous  noise  made  over  it  in  the  French  press. 

In  1898  when  Delcasse  replaced  the  eminent  Gabriel 
Hanotaux  as  foreign  minister,  there  was  a  radical 
change  in  French  policy.  This  statesman  succeeded, 
whenever  an  opportune  moment  presented  itself,  in 
pacifying  animosities  and  drawing  nearer  to  the  cab- 
inet of  St.  James;  thus  he  turned  international  rela- 
tions into  another  channel  and  rescued  France  from 
her  traditional  policy  of  troublesome  aggressions,  petu- 
lant reservations,  and  never-ending  discussions.  Del- 
casse it  was,  also,  who  dedicated  his  efforts  to  the 
isolation  of  Germany,  leaving  her  the  only  ally  con- 
grous  with  racial  affinity  and  geographical  situation. 

The  ultimate  state  of  things  was  a  triumph  for  this 
minister  and  King  Edward  VII. 

Little  by  little  England  saw  France,  while  not  re- 
linquishing colonial  transactions,  resigned  to  accept- 
ing her,  England's,  vast  imperial  horizons.  A  sympa- 
thetic policy  was  initiated  in  1898  which  culminated 
in  the  treaty  of  April  8,  1904.  This  treaty  regulated, 
or  we  might  say  liquidated,  all  colonial  difficulties  and 
permitted  the  union  of  the  two  countries.  France  had 
finally  comprehended  that  England's  friendship  in 
Europe  was  worth  more  than  any  strip  of  African  or 
Asiatic  territory,  and  those  nationalists  who  had  in- 
tended to  protest  on  Edward  VIFs  arrival  in  Paris  in 
1903,  instead  applauded.  The  hereditary  enemy  had 
been  converted  into  a  sincere  friend;  but  this  could 


FRANCE  AND  ENGLAND  21 

never  have  happened  had  not  Germany  acquired  a  mar-, 
iffme  and  commercial  power  greater  and  more  danger- 
ous than  France's;  and  the  friend  could  never  have 
been  changed  into  an  ally  had  not  the  Russian  troops 
suffered  one  defeat  after  another  on  the  wide  plains 
of  Manchuria. 

To-day  the  immutable  field  of  Waterloo  gazes  with- 
out amazement  on  other  allies  than  those  of  a  century 
ago. 


CHAPTER  V 

RUSSIA  AND  ENGLAND 

THE  Anglo-French  entente  encountered  one  very 
grave  obstacle.  France  had  an  ally,  Russia,  who 
nursed  no  end  of  grievances  against  England  and  Eng- 
land against  her.  With  the  whole  question  of  Asia 
' between  them  it  was  impossible  to  be  opposed  to  each 
other  there  and  allied  to  each  other  in  Europe.  In  the 
Mediterranean,  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  in  far-off  India, 
Muscovite  power  threatened  British ;  England  saw  that 
all  that  immense  Asiatic  empire  which  she  had  consoli- 
dated with  so  much  labor  might  be  lost.  Hence  her 
traditional  attitude  of  distrust  toward  Russia.  Al- 
though the  more  direct  struggle  for  Asiatic  influence 
developed  between  1894  and  1907  it  can  be  said  that 
Russia  was  competing  there  ages  before.  In  Persia  she 
had  been  able,  through  London's  blunder,  to  establish 
a  clever  and  profitable  policy  about  the  time  mentioned. 
She  filled  the  impoverished  Persian  exchequer  with 
rubles  while  England  refused  to  lend  a  shilling,  and  her 
reward  was  a  constantly  growing  commerce  and  a 
promise  from  the  Persian  government  to  give  no  rail- 
road concessions  without  the  consent  of  St.  Petersburg. 
But  not  even  all  this  adroit  diplomacy  could  palliate 

23 


24  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  bad  impression  left  by  an  unsuccessful  war;  and 
so  it  happened  that  the  defeats  in  Manchuria  cost  Rus- 
sia her  Asiatic  prestige,  and  the  fact  was  skilfully  ex- 
ploited by  the  English  to  their  own  benefit.* 

This  by  no  means  accomplished  Russia's  expulsion, 
however.  In  the  north  of  the  extensive  region  under 
consideration  she  continued  to  dominate  in  spite  of 
internal  political  fluctuations,  while  the  British  held 
sway  in  the  Persian  Gulf  region.  After  checking  a 
Russian  invasion  of  Afghanistan  the  limits  of  the  Rus- 
sian frontier  were  determined  by  a  treaty  signed"  by 
the  two  on  March  n,  1895.  That  Russia  had  directed 
herself  eastward  before  considering  a  more  definite 
expansion  north  and  a  more  favorable  one  south,  the 
occupation  of  Turkestan  and  the  laying  of  the  Trans- 
caspian  Railroad  are  conclusive  evidence;  and  as  for 
Afghanistan,  in  spite  of  St.  Petersburg's  declarations 
of  disinterestedness  in  1869,  I^74>  an^  1883,  it  is 
nevertheless  true  that  she  had  sporadically  acted  to 
the  contrary.  England  always  vigorously  upheld  her 
own  advantage  in  Afghanistan  even  to  assuming  its 
defense,  by  the  treaty  of  1893,  in  case  it  should  be  at- 
tacked by  a  foreign  nation.  This  was  an  effort  evi- 
dently to  reaffirm  the  British  protectorate  and  to  ex- 
clude Russia  from  all  sphere  of  influenced  When  Rus- 
sia tried  the  same  expansion  in  Thibet  the  same  English 
measures  opposed  her. 

*L.   de   St.   Victor   de   St.   Blancard;   "L' Accord   anglo-russe 
du  31  Aout,  1907,"  in  the  Annates  des  sciences  politiques. 
t  "L' Accord  anglo-russe,"  page  49. 


RUSSIA  AND  ENGLAND  25 

Thus  were  the  great  Russian  interests  in  Asia — may 
one  say  appetites  ? — in  opposition  to  British  ambitions. 
Just  as  a  check  was  put  by  Great  Britain  on  territorial 
or  commercial  expansion  in  the  south,  so  toward  the 
north  when  Russia  tried  to  hold  Manchuria,  to  aspire 
to  Korea,  and  to  have  decisive  influence  at  the  court 
of  Pekin;  all  of  which  Russia  was  doing  in  order  to 
augment  her  trade  with  the  Celestial  Empire  and  later 
consider  it  as  an  enormous  Russian  dependency.  But 
England  thereupon  urged  Japan  to  defend  her  inter- 
ests (and  England's  own)  with  a  result  that  is  well 
known.  Bismarck  had  previously  said,  satisfied  at  see- 
ing Russia  engaged  in  other  affairs  than  European, 
"There  is  nothing  for  Russia  in  Europe  but  nihilism 
and  other  diseases.  Her  mission  is  in  Asia.  There 
she  stands  for  civilization."  The  old  wolf,  knowing 
well  Russia's  weak  spot,  held  the  image  of  nihilism 
before  her  eyes  to  serve  his  own  ends.  Obviously  a 
Russia  absorbed  with  Asiatic  expansion  signified  a 
Germany  unmenaced  at  the  back  and  free  to  concen- 
trate on  western  Europe.  > 

And  yet  Russia  had  a  legitimate  right  to  mix  in 
European  affairs,  or  more  strictly  speaking,  in  Balkan 
affairs.  A  common  origin,  commercial  relations,  con- 
tiguity, the  navigation  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  most  of  all 
Russia's  Mediterranean  aspirations,  all  called  her  in 
that  direction.  But  the  Congress  of  Berlin  in  1878 
foiled  her.  It  prevented  her  from  enjoying  the  fruits 
of  her  recent  victory  over  the  Turks,  and  definitely 
fixed  her  situation  in  southern  Europe.    After  this,  dis- 


26  THE  WORLD  WAR 

illusionized  perhaps,  and  finding  outlet  in  increased 
Asiatic  activities,  she  kept  aloof  from  the  turbulent 
peninsula,  only  to  find  when  she  came  back  that  the 
situation  had  radically  changed.  It  was  no  longer 
England  she  had  to  face.  It  was  Austria  who,  to 
Russia's  discomfiture,  had  powerfully  established  her- 
self there  while  Germany  was  directing  covetous 
glances  toward  Turkey,  both  European  and  Asiatic. 

Thus  in  short  time  and  in  the  natural  course  of 
events  it  ceased  to  be  England  and  France  who 
thwarted  Russia  in  her  Balkan  policy,  and  Austria  and 
Germany  took  their  place.  This  is  precisely  one  of 
those  variations  which  international  policy  frequently 
exhibits.  The  Crimean  War  was  now  a  thing  of  the 
remote  past;  and  of  the  remote  past  also  was  Bis- 
marck's contemptuous  remark,  "The  whole  Balkan 
question  is  not  worth  a  Pomeranian  soldier's  solid 
bones." 

The  natural  sequel  was  the  treaty  of  August  31, 
1907,  which  established  the  entente  between  England 
and  Russia.  The  Franco-English  treaty  had  prepared 
the  way  for  it,  England's  moderate  attitude  toward 
victorious  Japan  made  it  possible,  and  the  conversa- 
tions between  Count  Cassini  and  Sir  Arthur  Nichol- 
son during  the  Conference  of  Algeciras  shaped  it.  As 
finally  signed  it  comprised,  besides  a  general  declara- 
tion, three  distinct  conventions  relative  to  affairs  in 
Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  Thibet,  and  a  declaration  by 
Sir  Edward  Grey  concerning  the  Persian  Gulf.  Thus 
were  the  English-Russian  quarrels  of  so  many  years 


RUSSIA  AND  ENGLAND  27 

adjusted  and  future  ones  eliminated  as  far  as  the 
human  mind  could  forestall  them.  Once  more  exigency 
had  been  stronger  than  tradition.  Between  the  former 
rivals  in  Asia  and  the  Balkans  had  risen  Germany; 
curbing  the  boundless  Asiatic  ambition  of  Russia  were 
Mukden  and  Tsushima;  disturbing  the  one  dream  of 
English  statesmen  was  the  ever-increasing  naval  force 
of  the  Central  Empire.  Result,  the  Anglo- Russian  en- 
tente. 

England  could  now  be  tranquil;  the  road  to  India 
was  not  to  be  so  quickly  traveled.* 


*  Andre  Tardieu ;  "La  France  et  les  Alliances.' 


# 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   TRIPLE   ALLIANCE 

AS  already  stated,  the  Alliance  of  the  Three  Em- 
perors  had  been  a  Bismarckian  idea.  This  logical 
conception  was  quite  worthy  of  the  great  statesman, 
since  it  would  make  Germany  mistress  of  the  Euro- 
pean situation,  and  Europe  in  his  scheme  was  the  only 
important  field  of  action.  By  it  she  would  give  her 
moral  support  to  Russia's  Asiatic  aspirations — moral 
support  only  since  Germany  was  then  far  from  possess- 
ing a  fleet  that  could  hinder  England's  policy  in  that 
same  continent.  By  it,  Austria  having  been  conquered 
and  excluded  from  the  Germanic  community,  could 
return  only  by  means  of  a  treaty  which  would  make 
her  recognize  the  supremacy  of  Prussia  and  which 
would  command  Austrian  aid  in  Prussia's  Balkan 
policy.  By  it,  both  Russia  and  Austria  would  serve 
to  maintain  the  German  hegemony  over  all  continental 
Europe  and  keep  out  England ;  the  territorial  conquests 
granted  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  would  be  con- 
solidated; and  lastly  this  alliance  of  the  three  empires 
would  have  a  salutary  effect  on  internal  order  and 
do  away  with  those  revolutionary  flickers  with  which 

29 


30  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  restless  and  frothing  Latin  world  had  contaminated 
the  Saxon  and  the  Slav. 

But  logical  though  it  all  appeared,  Bismarck  had  to 
be  content  with  uniting  only  two  of  the  desired  three. 
The  Triple  Alliance  came  later  but  with  Italy,  not 
Russia,  as  the  third  power. 

The  union  of  Germany  and  Austria  concerted  in 
1879  was  tne  fruit  of  the  Great  Chancellor's  genius  and 
France's  traditional  policy  of  errors  (not  yet  reformed 
by  Delcasse).  Prior  to  it  Bismarck,  having  realized 
the  difficulty  of  bringing  the  three  great  empires  under 
one  single  policy  which  would  assign  Asia  to  Russia, 
the  Balkans  to  Austria,  and  the  Occident  to  Germany, 
had  been  oscillating  between  Austria  and  Russia.  As 
the  latter  was  growing  ever  stronger  while  Austria 
appeared  to  be  growing  weaker,  the  chancellor  in- 
clined more  to  the  Czar.  Emperor  William  I  also  had 
undisguised  preference  for  the  Russians.  But  when 
in  1875  tne  Czar  and  his  chancellor  Gortshakoff  pre- 
vented Germany  from  again  attacking  France  and 
completing  the  inadequate  work  of  1870,  the  conse- 
quence was  the  hostile  German  attitude  revealed  in  the 
Congress  and  Treaty  of  Berlin.  This  ended  all  hopes 
of  a  treaty  with  the  Bey  had  occupied  Tunis,  and  the 
appointed  were  the  Russian  reactionaries  who  expected 
that  the  union  would  put  a  curb  on  nihilism. 

Bismarck  soon  managed  Austria,  and  Count  An- 
drassy  decided  to  accept  the  German  advances.*     On 


*  S.  L.  Driault;  "Problemes  politiques  et  sociaux,"  Paris,  1911, 
page  259. 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  31 

October  7,  1879,  was  signed  the  secret  and  merely  de- 
fensive treaty  by  virtue  of  which  if  one  of  the  two 
empires  should  be  attacked  by  Russia  the  other  was 
to  help  with  the  totality  of  its  forces;  and  if  one  of 
the  two  should  be  attacked  by  some  other  power  sup- 
ported by  Russia  the  unattacked  must  help  with  its 
whole  army;  but  if  one  of  the  two  were  attacked  by 
some  other  power  not  aided  by  Russia  the  unattacked 
must  maintain  a  benevolent  neutrality. 

Two  years  later  Italy  became  a  party  to  this  agree- 
ment. Not  all  the  causes  which  brought  her  into  such 
an  unpopular  alliance  are  known.  France  in  pursuance 
of  a  treaty  with  the  Bey  had  occupied  Tunis,  and  the 
act  was  considered  in  Italy  not  only  as  an  aggression 
but  as  an  indication  of  a  future  policy  of  violence  and 
violation.  Yet  this  could  hardly  have  been  the  only 
or  even  the  principal  cause  of  her  joining  Austria. 
Though  she  considered  that  France  had  defrauded  her 
of  a  territory  over  which  she  claimed  historic  rights, 
elsewhere  she  was  forced  to  see  even  more  legitimate 
hopes  crushed  or  at  least  postponed.  Under  the  none 
too  gentle  rule  of  Austria  were  living  great  numbers 
of  Italians  in  extensive  tracts  that  were  both  geograph- 
ically and  historically  an  object  of  aspiration  to  the 
new  Italian  kingdom.  One  of  the  most  widely  ac- 
cepted hypotheses  regarding  the  Triple  Alliance  is  that 
Bismarck,  by  friendly  advances  to  the  Holy  See,  made 
the  Italians  fear  that  the  Roman  question  would  come 
up  for  reconsideration.  Be  this  as  it  may,  Italy  be- 
came part  of  the  Triple  Alliance  in  1881  and  it  was 


32  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Austria,  her  ancient  enemy,  who  brought  it  about. 
That  is  to  say,  the  negotiations  were  carried  on /by 
Count  Kalnoky,  the  Austrian  Minister,  and  Pasquale 
Stanislao  Mancini. 

Although  this  Alliance  forced  Italy  into  greater  ex- 
penditures than  her  economic  condition  warranted,  it 
nevertheless  guaranteed  the  as  yet  unstable  national 
unity. 

For  many  years  the  policy  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
was  the  policy  of  Germany.  Only  recently  did  Italy 
emancipate  herself  and  try  to  make  new  ententes  on 
the  margin — a  proceeding  which  caused  Von  Biilow 
to  exclaim  that  they  had  permitted  her  to  take  a  waltz 
turn  with  France.  Delcasse  meanwhile  was  telling 
France  that  she  need  never  fear  aggression  from  Italy. 

The  Triple  Alliance,  renewed  whenever  it  was  about 
to  expire,  was  always  a  defensive  alliance  and  as 
such  superior  to  the  Franco-Russian,  the  Anglo- 
French,  and  the  Anglo-Russian.  But  so  far  as  Italy 
is  concerned,  she  was  in  recent  years  harping  more 
on  the  letter  of  the  bond  and  forgetting  its  spirit. 
The  Central  Empires,  on  the  contrary,  kept  identifying 
themselves  more  and  more  with  a  common  international 
policy  which  was  almost  a  precursor  of  national  union 
in  case  of  a  victorious  war.  It  was  even  said  of  the 
late  Archduke  that  his  Pan-Germanic  tendencies  were 
so  pronounced  that  he  seemed  more  German  than 
Austrian.*    While  Italy,  by  means  of  accord  with  the 

*  Andre  Cheradame ;   "England,  France,   and  Russia,"  in  the 
Quarterly  Review,  October,  1909. 


THE  TRIPLE  ALLIANCE  33 

Mediterranean  powers,  continued  emancipating  her- 
self from  Berlin,  Austria  kept  drawing  nearer  till  the 
relationship  came  to  signify  a  phenomenon  of  Pan- 
Germanism  rather  than  an  alliance  in  the  strict  inter- 
national sense. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   MEDITERRANEAN   AGREEMENTS 

REVIEWING  the  conditions  which  induced  Italy  to 
fall  into  the  arms  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  thus 
subordinating  herself  to  Germany  and  becoming  the 
friend  of  Austria,  we  find  that  Bismarck's  strategem 
had  made  her  apprehensive  of  rinding  herself  forsaken, 
especially  with  regard  to  the  Papal  question.  But  how- 
ever unpopular  the  new  bond  was,  as  long  as  England 
looked  upon  it  with  not  unfriendly  eyes,  Italy  remained 
secure  and  satisfied.  The  newly  unified  nation  found 
herself  guaranteed  on  land  by  the  armies  of  the  two 
great  Central  Empires;  while  the  equilibrium  which 
England  maintained  in  the  Mediterranean  conceded 
free  Italian  action  in  the  Adriatic  and  Tyrrhenian  Seas. 
To  be  sure  it  also  gave  France  a  certain  hegemony 
over  the  western  Mediterranean  (far  from  contenting 
Gambetta,  however,  who  aspired  to  make  it  "the  theatre 
of  French  action") ;  but  the  reassuring  fact  was  that 
England  was  still  prime  arbiter  in  the  whole  extension 
of  those  waters  which  had  been  the  great  highway  of 
Phoenicians  and  Carthaginians,  and  the  mare  nostrum 
of  the  Romans. 

35 


36  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  friendship  between  England  and  Italy  was  tra- 
ditional. Gladstone,  with  that  noble  policy  which  could 
recognize  the  aspirations  of  idealists  and  at  the  same 
time  keep  his  country  in  contact  with  realities — Glad- 
stone, it  will  be  recalled,  had  given  the  Italian  patriots 
full  approval  by  affirming  that  the  Bourbon  rule  in 
Naples  was  "the  negation  of  God."  English  cruisers 
looked  on  indulgently  when  the  celebrated  Expedi- 
tion of  the  Thousand  sallied  out  from  Cuarto  under 
the  orders  of  Garibaldi,  to  land  in  Marsala.  From 
that  British  intervention  which  helped  to  win  Palermo, 
to  the  official  recognition  of  young  and  growing  Free 
Italy,  the  British  spirit  had  been  saturating  the  people, 
and  the  friendship  which  then  sprang  up  has  always 
been  strong  enough  to  withstand  all  strain.  France, 
too,  helped  in  these  difficult  moments;  but  the  effect 
was  very  different.  England  risked  nothing  in  favor- 
ing Italian  unity;  France,  on  the  other  hand,  gave  her 
blood,  her  money,  and  her  honor  in  a  cause  from 
which  she  could  expect  no  benefits.  But  she  did  it 
with  many  reservations.  Napoleon  Ill's  Treaty  of 
Villafranca,  for  instance,  came  as  a  cruel  surprise  after 
a  whole  series  of  helpful  victories;  likewise  Minister 
Rouher's  "Never;"  likewise  the  whole  Catholic  agita- 
tion in  favor  of  maintaining  the  temporal  power  of 
the  Pope.  In  face  of  so  many  sad  disillusions,  the 
benefits  received  from  France  paled  beside  England's 
less  positive,  but  less  meddlesome,  sympathy. 

When  England  decided  to  occupy  Egypt  she  urged 
Italy  to  accompany  her;  but  the  latter  declined  on  the 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  AGREEMENTS    37 

ground  of  not  being  prepared  for  colonial  activities 
and  not  understanding  the  art  of  intervention  in  for- 
eign countries  (she  who  herself  had  been  the  scene 
of  so  much  intervention!).  Upon  the  statesmen  who 
rejected  this  gratuitously  offered  opportunity,  many 
reproaches  have  been  heaped;  but  such  judgment  re- 
sults from  inappreciation  of  the  conjuncture  of  events 
at  that  time. 

Bismarck  always  kept  in  mind  England's  friendship 
for  Italy.  The  old  statesman  was  accustomed  to  re- 
solve all  his  problems  within  a  narrow  circle  (soon 
snapped  for  better  or  worse  by  the  nation  he  built  up)  ; 
and  apart  from  his  argument  that  the  unity  of  the  Ital- 
ian peninsula  was  in  line  with  his  own  project  for  a 
great  central  empire,  his  thorough  estimate  of  British 
power  would  alone  have  predisposed  him  to  favor 
Italian  unity. 

With  such  importance  and  honor  did  Italy  regard 
England's  friendship  that  in  1896  Premier  Rudini 
affirmed  with  satisfaction  that  the  English  compact 
completed  the  system  of  Italian  alliances.*  In  1897 
Italy  gave  up  Kassala  which  she  had  recently  wrested 
from  the  Dervishes,  in  order  that  the  British  might 
consolidate  the  conquest  of  the  Sudan.  In  the  light  of 
such  long-standing  and  cordial  feeling  the  clouds  which 
formed  over  the  question  of  Tripoli,  or  when  Chamber- 
lain's imperialism  dreamed  of  changing  the  language 
of  Malta,  were  quickly  dissipated. 

That  the  Entente  Cordiale  between  England  and 


*  E.  Lemonon,  "L'Europe  et  la  politique  brittanique,"  page  189. 


207934. 


38  THE  WORLD  WAR 

France  should  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  Mediterranean 
entente  between  France  and  Italy  was  in  the  course 
of  things.  But  even  on  this  point  Bismarck  wished  to 
keep  the  two  countries  apart  and  wrote  accordingly 
to  Giuseppe  Mazzini :  "The  Mediterranean  constitutes 
an  inheritance  difficult  to  divide  among  the  heirs." 
And  so  it  happened  that  France  and  Italy  with  so  many 
historic  memories  in  common,  so  many  reasons  for 
uniting,  continued  to  suffer  the  consequence  of  the  ex- 
clusory  policy  of  their  respective  governments.  Under 
this  influence,  the  masses  in  each  indulged  in  recipro- 
cal acts  of  hostility*  and  it  was  some  time  before  mis- 
givings and  suspicions  were  quenched  by  a  flow  of 
satisfactory  explanations.  As  already  mentioned,  the 
credit  of  putting  an  end  to  this  useless  and  ignoble  en- 
mity, and  of  initiating  an  epoch  of  peace  and  mutual 
understanding,  is  due  to  Delcasse.  The  good  relation- 
ship he  was  able  to  create  heralded  Italy's  benevolent 
attitude  at  the  outburst  of  the  present  war  and  her  sub- 
sequent entrance  into  it  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 

The  accord  between  Italy  and  France  determined  the 
action  of  one  and  the  other  in  the  cases  of  Tripoli  and 
Morocco;  and  so  sure  was  Delcasse  of  the  good-will 
both  of  the  Italian  people  and  their  government,  that 
at  the  very  time  when  the  Triple  Alliance  was  being 
renewed  in  1902,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  affirm  from  the 
tribunal  of  the  Chamber  that  "neither  directly  nor  in- 
directly is  the  policy  of  Italy,  as  a  consequence  of  her 
alliances,  directed  against  France.    In  no  case  will  her 

*  A.  Billot,  "La  France  et  l'ltalie." 


THE  MEDITERRANEAN  AGREEMENTS    39 

policy  constitute  a  threat  for  us,  either  in  diplomatic 
form,  or  in  protocols,  or  in  international  military  stipu- 
lations. In  no  case,  nor  in  any  form,  can  Italy  be  the 
instrument  of,  or  a  party  to,  an  aggression  against  our 
nation.* 

And,  in  effect,  Italy  kept  her  pledges  when  the  in- 
cident of  Morocco  gave  France  reason  to  fear  an 
attack ;  and  again  at  the  Conference  of  Algeciras,  where 
her  chief  delegate,  the  aged  Marchese  Visconti-Ven- 
osta,  gave  France  a  support  which  was  doubly  useful 
because  in  addition  to  representing  a  factor  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  he  was  a  diplomat  of  great  prestige. f 

France  on  her  side  fulfilled  her  obligations  during 
the  Italian-Turkish  war.  There  were  momentary  diffi- 
culties over  the  steamer  Manouba,  but  these  had  no  real 
importance,  and  indeed  the  question  would  never  have 
been  raised  had  the  present  president  of  the  Republic, 
who  was  then  foreign  minister,  been  animated  by  the 
same  conciliatory  feeling  as  his  predecessor  Delcasse. 

In  addition  to  the  Manouba  incident  there  was  the 
pro-Greek  sentiment  born  of  the  Balkan  War,  when 
Italy  for  a  moment  united  with  her  allies  in  aggressive 
action  as  to  Albania  and  Epirus ;  but  the  rancor  in- 
spired by  Austria,  more  powerful  and  threatening  than 
ever,  brought  into  relief  the  solid  base  on  which  the 
Italo-French  accord  had  been  built  up. 


*  Cited  by  Andre  Tardieu  in  "La  France  et  les  Alliances, 
t  Andre  Tardieu ;  "La  Conference  d' Algeciras." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FRANCO-JAPANESE  AND  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE 
AGREEMENTS 

ENGLAND  was  also  back  of  the  Franco- Japanese 
and  the  Russo-Japanese  agreements.  English 
statesmen  understood  that  the  British  nation  could  not 
defend  its  enormous  empire  if  engaged  in  a  European 
war.  The  increasing  naval  and  military  force  of 
Japan,  as  revealed  in  the  latter's  wars  against  China 
and  Russia,  gave  them  considerable  uneasiness;  they 
saw  that  even  were  England  victorious  in  a  war  in 
Europe  her  Asiatic  empire  might  be  endangered ;  hence 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of  1905.  This  treaty  was 
exclusively  Asiatic.  By  virtue  of  it  the  two  powers 
were  to  reciprocally  defend  the  territories  thus  far 
obtained  and  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  China.  It 
guaranteed  occupations  already  made  and  left  China 
exclusively  under  the  influence  of  the  English  and 
Japanese.  When,  in  the  present  war,  England  author- 
ized Japan's  offensive  against  Germany,  the  treaty  was 
made  to  exceed  its  original  well-known  intent;  but 
such  action  it  will  be  observed  was  limited  to  Asia,  for 
England  probably  did  not  care  to  awaken  future  mis- 

41 


42  THE  WORLD  WAR 

givings  in  the  United  States  nor  to  set  a  precedent  for 
calling  the  yellow  race  into  Europe. 

In  the  Russo-Japanese  enmity  England  would  have 
found  another  problem  difficult  of  solution  in  case  of 
war.  Her  treaty  with  Japan  would  have  missed  its 
perfect  application,  for  while  England  was  allied  to 
Russia  and  France  in  Europe,  Japan  could  not  be  their 
foe  in  case  of  a  general  war  in  Asia.  Out  of  these 
considerations  were  evolved  the  Russo-Japanese  entente 
of  July  30,  1907,  and  the  Franco- Japanese  of  June  10, 
1907.  It  appears  at  first  glance  impossible  that  Russia 
should  have  so  soon  forgotten  her  defeat  at  the  hands 
of  Japan;  but  since  that  disastrous  war  she  had  been 
giving  signs  of  wiser  foreign  policy,  and  besides,  the 
treaty  of  peace  did  not  take  advantage  of  her  van- 
quished position.  In  short  the  accord  which  was  bound 
to  develop  under  the  aegis  of  England  was  anticipated 
by  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth. 

On  June  13,  1907,  was  signed  the  first  agreement 
between  Japan  and  Russia.  In  July  of  the  same  year 
the  treaty,  of  a  political  order  and  "fortifying  the 
peaceful,  amicable,  and  neighborly  relations  which  have 
been  so  satisfactorily  reestablished  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  and  avoiding  the  possibility  of  future  misin- 
terpretations'' was  signed  by  Iswolsky,  Russian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Motone,  Japanese  Am- 
bassador in  Petrograd.  It  bound  the  two  nations 
to  respect  their  own  territorial  integrity  and  that  of 
China,  and  also  to  maintain  the  so-called  "open-door" 
policy  in  that  country. 


THE  FRANCO- JAPANESE  AGREEMENT    43 

The  accord  between  France  and  Japan  was  easier  of 
consummation  because  the  friendship  of  the  two  na- 
tions was  traditional.  True,  it  was  distressing  in  the 
trying  days  of  the  Russian  and  Japanese  War,  for 
France  to  see  her  ally  suffer  one  defeat  after  another, 
and  the  aid  which  she  gave  to  the  fleet  of  Rodjestwensk 
in  his  difficult  voyage  through  the  French  possessions 
appeared  likely  to  cause  complications;  but  the  an- 
cient good  feeling  survived  it.  The  convention  was 
signed  on  June  10,  1907,  by  Kurino,  Japanese  Ambas- 
sador in  Paris,  and  Pichon,  French  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs.  It  promised  mutual  aid  in  preserving 
the  security  and  peace  of  territories  occupied  by  either 
in  the  Asiatic  continent,  and  like  the  previously  men- 
tioned treaty,  it  guarded  the  integrity  of  China  and 
the  open-door  system. 

With  peace  thus  assured  in  the  Far  East,  the  three 
nations,  France,  England,  and  Russia  could  better 
focus  on  their  European  interests  and  more  solidly 
uphold  the  Triple  Entente  to  their  common  good. 

Germany  also  had  understood  the  importance  of 
having,  if  not  an  ally,  at  least  a  friend  in  the  Far  East. 
Innumerable  times  had  she  tried  to  establish  closer 
associations  with  Japan.  By  publishing  newspapers 
in  that  empire  and  sending  professors  and  military  men 
there  she  had  impressed  the  educated  classes ;  but  even 
though  she  succeeded  for  a  spell  in  weaning  them  away 
from  the  French  influence  which  had  inspired  their 
first  steps  in  the  acquisition  of  European  culture,  she 


44  THE  WORLD  WAR 

never  succeeded  in  winning  over  the  Japanese  govern- 
ment. 

English  diplomacy,  more  subtle  and  uniform,  never 
left  the  field  free  to  Germany  for  a  single  moment. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  AND  THE  "ENCERCLEMENT" 


WHILE  these  events  were  transpiring  and  matters 
were  shaping  for  a  European  conflict,  Germany 
was  applying  herself  to  getting  the  necessary  strength 
for  the  decisive  moment.  This  she  accomplished  not 
only  by  foreign  arrangements  and  compacts,  but  also 
by  creating  a  formidable  army  and  navy  of  her  own. 
Her  concern  for  foreign  support  was  limited  to  Aus- 
tria, Italy,  and  in  more  recent  times,  Turkey.  The 
advances  made  to  the  last  named  had  in  reality  a  double 
object;  they  were  both  military  and  economic,  for 
Turkey  not  only  represented  a  military  spirit  of  the 
highest  order  and  was  the  leader  of  the  Islamic  world, 
but  she  was  also  the  highway  of  Asia ;  she  led  to  Per- 
sia immediately  and  perhaps  to  India  later.  A  proof 
of  this  assertion — the  double  interest — may  be  seen  in 
the  difficulties  Germany  was  willing  to  face  in  order 
to  construct  the  Bagdad  Railroad  across  Ottoman  Asia 
and  thus  unite  the  North  Sea  with  the  Persian  Gulf. 
The  very  rails  themselves  seemed  to  indicate  the  path 
of  Greater  Germany*     But  unfortunately  for  both 


*B.  Combes  de  Patris;  "De  Berlin  a  Bagdad,"  in  the  Revue 
des  sciences  politiques,  June  15,  1914,  page  357 

45 


46  THE  WORLD  WAR 

countries,  the  sixteen  years  or  so  that  Germany  has 
devoted  to  coaching  Turkey  have  been  the  most  dis- 
astrous in  the  latter's  existence.  Turkey,  as  German 
statesmen  conceived  it,  was  to  balance  the  ever-grow- 
ing military  force  of  Russia  and  serve  as  a  brake  to 
England.  If  Russia  could  swell  her  regiments  with 
the  rude,  ignorant  peasants  of  her  outlying  regions, 
just  so  surely  could  Turkey  summon  the  Mohammedan 
hordes;  it  was  merely  a  question  of  organization.  It 
followed  logically  that  Turkey,  in  order  to  be  efficient 
as  an  ally,  would  have  to  be  guided  in  her  internal 
policy  and  to  have  her  army  put  into  shape.  These 
two  points  attended  to,  she  could  be  of  extraordinary 
usefulness.  Therefore  Baron  von  Marschall,  the  flower 
of  German  diplomacy,  was  sent  to  Constantinople, 
while  Baron  von  der  Goltz  (who  has  since  played  in 
Belgium  the  same  sorry  role  as  the  Duke  of  Alba) 
dedicated  himself  to  the  development  of  Turkish  mili- 
tarism. His  sympathy  during  the  war  against  Italy, 
and  the  counsels  which  he  gave  to  the  Turkish  officers 
through  the  medium  of  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of  Vi- 
enna will  be  recalled.  In  the  meantime  Germany,  ex- 
ploiting the  cupidity  of  the  French  financiers,  counseled 
the  Turkish  government  to  borrow  largely  from  them 
with  a  view  to  bettering  her  war  material,  which  was 
furnished  mostly  by  Krupps'.  The  end  was  that  Tur- 
key found  herself  definitely  tied  to  the  chariot  of  the 
German  Empire. 

Results,  however,  were  not  commensurate  with  the 
efforts  made.    At  home  the  Young  Turk  party  did  not 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  47 

know  how  to  overcome  the  racial  tendency  to  dejec- 
tion nor  did  they  find  the  reorganization  of  the  state 
on  an  improved  foundation  an  easy  task;  and  abroad, 
two  unlucky  wars  were  all  they  could  show  for  their 
military  and  diplomatic  preparation.  These  left  Tur- 
key reduced  to  a  minimum  of  European  territory,  and 
the  poorer  by  the  loss  of  two  vast  African  provinces. 

Yet  in  spite  of  defeats  she  never  lost  faith  in  her 
ally  and  protector.  Staking  her  national  life,  her  all, 
on  a  single  card,  she  has  continued  to  be  guided  by 
the  Central  Empires.  Perhaps  the  game  was  not  un- 
welcome to  Enver  Pasha  whose  personal  ambition,  like 
Teutonic  audacity,  acquired  great  force  in  any  environ- 
ment favorable  to  it. 

By  this  time  we  see  the  policy  of  the  Great  Chan- 
cellor completely  abandoned.  The  Orient  which  Bis- 
marck despised  had  become  an  object  to  covet;  the 
colonial  policy  was  now  the  chief  concern  of  states- 
men, while  the  fleet  received  the  Emperor's  special  so- 
licitude. And  in  the  anxieties  of  all,  England  and  Rus- 
sia had  supplanted  France.  In  other  words,  Bismarck's 
policy  had  completed  its  cycle,  and  a  newer  and  ampler, 
aiming  at  all  the  continents  instead  of  merely  western 
Europe,  had  taken  its  place. 

After  1870  Germany  applied  herself  to  develop- 
ing her  industries  and  increasing  her  commerce. 
Gifted  with  extraordinary  tenacity  and  genius  for  or- 
der she  got  every  possible  advantage  out  of  her  military 
successes ;  and  as  to  her  foreign  affairs  the  Triple  Al- 
liance appeared  to  be  the  Holy  Ark  in  which  she  took 


48  THE  WORLD  WAR 

shelter.  "Germany  shut  herself  up  within  the  Triple 
Alliance  as  if  in  a  fortress,  and  lived  securely.  Even 
the  Franco-Russian  agreement  did  not  alter  her  sense 
of  quiet.  On  the  contrary  it  was  amusing  that  her 
natural  rivals  should  take  the  trouble  to  guarantee  her 
own  conquests  to  her,  and  should  bind  themselves  by 
the  most  terrible  oaths  to  stay  at  home."* 

Equally  indifferent  was  Germany  to  the  subsequent 
Franco-Italian  agreement  on  Mediterranean  questions. 
Chancellor  Von  Biilow  who  had  referred  to  it  as  "a 
waltz  turn"  said  in  more  serious  and  official  mood : 
"We  should  congratulate  ourselves  that  France  and 
Italy,  each  with  great  and  important  interests  in  the 
Mediterranean,  have  come  to  an  understanding  con- 
cerning them."  The  next  accord,  the  Anglo-French, 
also  left  German  serenity  unruffled.  No  one  saw  that 
this  settlement,  by  putting  an  end  to  an  age-old  conflict 
between  the  two  nations,  might  serve  to  set  up  another 
against  a  third  party;  which  third  party  could  be  no 
other  than  Germany,  natural  enemy  of  France  and  rival 
of  England.  A  few  days  after  it  was  signed,  that  is 
to  say  on  April  12,  1904,  the  same  chancellor  with  the 
same  imperturbability  affirmed  that,  so  far  as  German 
interests  were  concerned,  there  was  nothing  to  object 
to  in  the  said  treaty,  f 

In  fact,  with  regard  to  France,  the  nation  which  was 
aspiring  to  the  hegemony  of  Europe  preferred  that  the 

*  Rene    Millet ;    "France,    Allemagne,    Maroc,"    in    the    Revue 
Politique  et  parlamentaire,  June,  1907. 

!  Andre  Tardieu;  "La  France  et  les  Alliances/'  page  191. 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  49 

statu  quo  should  not  alter :  she  was  therefore  disposed 
to  extend  every  sort  of  neighborly  courtesy.  At  each 
disaster  or  misfortune — the  death  of  General  Mac 
Mahon,  of  Sadi-Carnot,  of  Marshal  Canrobet,  of  Jules 
Simon;  on  the  occasion  of  the  Charity  Bazaar  Fire,  the 
shipwreck  of  La  Bourgogne,  and  innumerable  other 
lamentable  events, — the  Kaiser  always  tried  to  be  the 
first  to  send  condolence  and  to  have  his  ambassador 
persuade  the  afflicted  of  his  sympathetic  sentiments.* 
The  Treaty  of  Frankfort  had  given  Germany  the  de- 
sired frontier  and  had  served  to  complete  and  con- 
solidate her  unity;  to  maintain  its  clauses  and  to  do 
nothing  that  would  interrupt  her  ever-increasing  com- 
merce and  industry  were  the  chief  desideratum.  Any 
difficulty  with  France  would  mean  a  relapse.  Hence 
the  significance  of  Chancellor  Bethmann-Hollweg's  ex- 
clamation in  the  Reichstag :  "I  do  not  care  to  go  over 
the  past  any  more  than  is  necessary  to  know  the  fu- 
ture." 

Germany  might  well  be  satisfied,  for  until  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance  this  state  of  things  had  meant 
her  absolute  domination  on  the  Continent,  a  domina- 
tion which  took  a  new  lease  of  life  when  the  defeats  in 
Manchuria  showed  how  ineffectual  was  the  Russian 
army.  To  counteract  this  domination  France  had  to 
direct  all  her  acts;  likewise  England,  when  the  day 
came  on  which  Germany,  forgetting  the  counsels  of 
dead  and  gone  statesmen,  took  a  place,  and  took  it  with 


*  Andre   Tardieu ;    "La    politique    exterieure    de    l'Allemagne, 
page  63. 


50  THE  WORLD  WAR 

unequalled  vigor,  among  the  maritime  and  colonial 
nations. 

Up  to  this  time  Germany's  relations  with  France 
had  been  the  pivot  of  European  politics;  now  it  was 
her  relations  with  England.  To  go  a  step  further,  the 
former  were  influenced  by  the  latter.  England  saw 
German  commerce  increasing  and  penetrating  into 
those  far-off*  seas  where  British  commerce  had  never 
before  met  a  rival;  she  saw  the  German  fleet  increasing 
and  threatening  that  supremacy  which  had  always  safe- 
guarded her  progress  and  her  wealth;*  and  above  all 
she  saw  jeopardized  her  ancient  prestige  which,  as  Lord 
Roseberry  had  declared,  formed  the  base  of  England's 
grandeur. 

Then  there  came  a  moment  of  severe  trial,  when 
England  perceived  that  just  as  Spain,  Holland,  and 
France  had  threatened  her  in  the  past,  so  was  Germany 
threatening  her  in  the  present.  This  moment  was  the 
Transvaal  War,  which  put  British  resources  to  a  hard 
test.f 

She  understood  that  the  supreme  effort  of  her  his- 
tory must  be  made,  that  it  was  one  of  those  crises  in 
which  great  world  questions  must  be  decided,  and  that 
she  must  find  out  which  way  the  scales  inclined.  To 
wait  would  be  to  give  the  enemy  more  time  to  prepare. 
The  doctrine  of  "splendid  isolation"  had  had  its  day. 


*  Rene  Pinon ;  "La  rivalite  de  l'Allemagne  et  de  l'Angleterre, 
in  the  Revue  des  deux  mondes,  March  i,  1909. 
t  Victor  Berand;  "L'Oeuvre  d'Edouard  VII." 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  51 

Edward  VII's  reign  merits  a  eulogy  for  having 
known  how  to  interpret  the  signs  of  the  times.*  After 
a  tentative  accord  with  Germany  which  never  material- 
ized and  which  was  attributed  to  Chamberlain,  a 
marked  hostility  to  that  nation  took  shape  in  England. 
If  only  past  history  could  serve  as  a  guide,  this  feeling 
would  appear  inconceivable;  for  just  as  surely  as  it 
shows  us  that  England  was  the  hereditary  enemy  to  the 
Frenchman,  it  shows  her  as  the  ancient  ally  and  con- 
stant friend  to  the  Prussian. 

In  Germany  the  sentiment  was  returned,  even  antici- 
pated, as  revealed  on  such  occasions  as  the  German  ap- 
proval of  Russian  domination  in  Manchuria,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  all  it  meant  for 
German  dreams  of  expansion,  and  the  attacks  on 
Chamberlain  in  1901,  when  hard  and  even  vulgar  terms 
were  applied  to  him  in  the  Reichstag.  All  these  re- 
vealed, as  was  said,  a  state  of  hostility,  and  could  not 
but  initiate  that  current  of  suspicion  and  prevention 
which  precedes  all  great  crises. 

Applying  Von  Billow's  famous  axiom,  "When  one  is 
not  sure  of  making  himself  loved  he  should  make  him- 
self feared,"  Germany  proceeded  to  augment  her 
marine,  for  as  Baron  von  Marschall  expressed  it,  "We 
must  sharpen  the  German  sword  on  sea  as  well  as  on 
land."  So  vigorously  was  this  done  that  the  English 
themselves  were  stupefied.  It  endangered  their  mari- 
time policy  of  the  "two  power  standard."     Nor  were 

*  Rene  Pinon ;  "France  et  Allemagne,"  in  the  Revue  dcs  deux 
mondes,  part  i  for  April,  1912,  page  657. 


52  THE  WORLD  WAR 

their  misgivings  calmed  by  the  discourses  of  Emperor 
William  II. 

From  the  year  1901  when  the  silent  antagonism 
began  between  these  two  nations,  France,  prompted  by 
England,  asserted  herself  more  positively  in  interna- 
tional politics,  and  in  serious  matters  sought  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James.  And  that  same  year 
began  the  isolation  of  Germany,  the  encerclement 
whose  success  is  so  manifest  in  the  present  moment; 
then,  too,  began  la  revanche  and  the  decline  of  the  Ger- 
man hegemony.  In  all  this  silent  cumulation,  the  only 
noisy  interruption  was  the  aggressive  tone  which 
Germany  directed  to  France  in  1904. 

The  Morocco  incident  roused  her  out  of  her  tran- 
quillity and  gave  her  the  first  positive  and  unmistakable 
sign  of  the  hemming-in  policy.  That  Germany  should 
not  be  gratified  at  seeing  France  plan  a  vast  Mediter- 
ranean empire  is  natural,  for  it  was  at  the  expense  of 
Germany's  own  aspirations;  moreover,  in  it  would  be 
recruited  a  warlike  colonial  army  which  could  be 
brought  into  Europe  at  the  required  moment  to  serve 
as  a  balance  against  the  great  Teutonic  military  con- 
tingents. To  Algeria,  long  since  conquered,  France 
had  added  Tunis ;  and  next  she  penetrated  slowly  but 
decidedly  into  Morocco.  The  Kaiser  resolved  not  to 
tolerate  any  expansion  whatever  and  gave  his  neigh- 
bor many  a  start  by  way  of  advising  her  of  his 
feelings ;  this  produced  the  desired  uneasiness.  On  his 
trip  to  Tangiers  he  saluted  the  Sultan  with  a  speech 
in  which  he  dwelt  with  immoderate  emphasis  on  his 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  53 

host's  quality  of  independence.  "It  is  to  the  Sultan  in 
his  capacity  as  an  independent  sovereign  that  1  am 
paying  a  visit,"  he  said ;  and  again,  "I  hope  that  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan,  Morocco  will  remain 
free,  open  .  .  .  without  annexation,  and  on  a  footing 
of  absolute  equality  ...  for  I  consider  the  Sultan  a 
completely  free  monarch."  All  these  insistent  declara- 
tions and  phrases  are  comprised  in  a  short  discourse 
of  less  than  seventy  words.  This  time  France  did  not 
heed  the  hint;  but  when  Delcasse,  more  radical, 
did  not  wish  longer  to  remain  foreign  minister  and 
suffer  the  imperial  prosiness,  France  consented  to  the 
calling  of  a  conference  sure,  as  well  she  might  be 
through  her  ententes,  of  its  result. 

The  Conference  of  Algeciras  was  a  complete 
triumph  for  France.  Russia  stood  by  her  ally  reso- 
lutely; Spain,  except  for  a  few  waverings  on  the  part 
of  the  Duke  of  Almodovar  del  Rio,  was  chivalrous  and 
obliging  to  her  neighbors  across  the  Pyrenees ;  Sir  Ar- 
thur Nicholson,  the  English  plenipotentiary,  firmly  and 
courteously  upheld  her ;  Italy,  represented  by  the  Mar- 
quis Visconti-Venosta,  was  prodigal  in  her  praise  (re- 
calling the  treaty  which  had  opened  the  road  to  Tripoli 
for  Italy,  and  which  later  she,  in  her  turn,  had  to  faith- 
fully uphold) ;  and  the  United  States  was  not  behind  in 
sympathy.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  argued, 
changed  about,  retraced  her  steps;  followed  in  it  all 
by  her  faithful  Austria  who  had  neither  opinion  of  her 
own  nor  special  interest  in  the  matter.*     By  forcing 


*  Andre  Tardieu ;  "La  Conference  d' Algeciras.' 


54  THE  WORLD  WAR 

this  diplomatic  fencing  competition,  Germany  hoped, 
as  Von  Biilow  later  expressed  it,  to  deal  France  a 
riposte.    The  result  was  a  counter-riposte. 

The  Conference  of  Algeciras  made  Germany  under- 
stand her  true  situation,  even  though  the  press  of  the 
country  preferred  not  to  admit  the  defeat  suffered. 
Furthermore,  the  distribution  of  the  English  fleet,  di- 
rected as  it  evidently  was  against  the  empire  of  the 
Kaiser,  the  visits  of  Edward  VII  to  the  Mediterranean 
states,  the  frigidity  of  the  meeting  between  William 
and  Edward,  all  confirmed  Germany  in  the  belief  that 
she  was  surrounded  by  a  sentiment  of  mistrust. 

Soon  it  began  to  be  evident  that  Italy  was  separating 
markedly  from  the  Triple  Alliance.  For  twenty  years 
the  Italian  people  had  been  indulging  in  irredentist 
meetings  in  favor  of  Trieste  and  Trent,  and  in  Novem- 
ber, 1908,  and  May,  1909,  they  gave  even  greater  in- 
dications of  enthusiasm,  driven  to  it  by  Austria's  blun- 
ders in  domestic  policy. 

By  this  time  the  Irredentist  Movement  had  passed 
out  of  the  hands  of'  young  students  like  Giuglielmo 
Oberdank  who  had  offered  his  blond  young  head  on  the 
Austrian  scaffold,  and  had  become  the  concern  of 
statesmen.  Then,  too,  Russia  had  entered  into  Italian 
politics;  and  with  the  visit  of  the  Czar  in  1909  to 
Racconigi,  the  summer  residence  of  King  Victor  Em- 
manuel III,  a  current  of  sympathy  had  been  set  up 
between  the  two  countries.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten 
that  Victor  Emmanuel's  romantic  love-match  was  pre- 
pared in  the  Russian  court. 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  55 

Austria's  brusk  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina was  a  blow  to  both  Russia  and  France;  both 
nations,  and  England  with  them,  realized  that  they 
must  close  in  their  ranks  and  prepare  for  the  inevitable 
war.  Thus  in  1908  England  offered  to  put  two  divis- 
ions at  France's  disposal  in  case  of  an  immediate  war 
on  the  Continent.  By  this  it  will  be  seen  that  they 
were  exceeding  the  letter  of  their  agreement. 

To  such  a  point  did  interest  side-track  conscience 
that  words  no  longer  had  their  normal  meaning  but 
appeared  to  say  something  different  and  even  contrary. 
Emperor  William  in  an  interview  of  November,  1908, 
tried  to  tranquillize  the  English  people,  and  instead  the 
English  people  gave  quite  an  opposite  interpretation  to 
the  imperial  words.  The  same  Emperor  tried  inces- 
santly to  be  on  good  terms  with  France,  but  always, 
naturally,  within  the  limits  of  the  Treaty  of  Frank- 
fort, to  maintain  which  he  believed  that  Germany  must 
stake  her  honor,  lose  her  last  man,  and  spend  her  last 
penny.  So  he  said  to  everybody  high  and  low;  and 
when  France  would  not  respond  to  his  advances  he 
exclaimed  to  one  of  the  ambassadors  accredited  to 
Berlin :  "I  fear  for  next  summer.  I  am  tired  of  hold- 
ing out  my  hand  to  France  and  having  her  ignore  it." 
This  was  in  191 1. 

Evidently  the  Teutonic  amiability  was  not  all  pure 
generosity. 

To  return  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  At  the  inspiration 
of  German  diplomats  it  had  acquired  in  the  last  two 
years  more  solidity  than  at  the  time  of  the  Italo-Turk- 


56  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ish  war.  Italy,  although  the  German  press  had  cried 
aloud  against  her  enterprise  in  Tripoli,  was  neverthe- 
less indebted  to  Germany  for  the  temporary  possession 
of  the  islands  in  the  iEgean  Sea;  and  to  Austria  for 
having  defended  the  statu  quo  in  the  Adriatic  during 
the  Balkan  War,  or  at  least  for  having  prevented  a 
power  which  might  some  day  become  strong  from  oc- 
cupying one  of  its  shores.  France,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  thrown  onto  her  shoulders  the  defense  of  the 
Greek  cause.  But  soon  Italy,  irritated  by  the  Trieste 
incidents  which  the  governor,  Hohenlohe,  provoked, 
again  showed  herself  hostile  to  Austria. 

In  the  years  19 12  and  19 13  armaments  were  every- 
where augmented.  Germany  raised  the  number  of  her 
soldiers  to  900,000  in  time  of  peace,  so  that  at  a  given 
moment  she  could  dash  over  any  frontier ;  France  imi- 
tated her  by  increasing  the  term  of  military  service  to 
three  years,  though  to  do  so  cost  the  most  violent  dis- 
cussions in  Parliament.  Russia  went  on  enthusiastic- 
ally with  her  army  reorganization,  and  England  pushed 
ahead  with  her  marine;  the  standing  armies  of  both 
Italy  and  Austria  were  raised  and  their  naval  construc- 
tions hastened.  Meanwhile  the  chiefs  of  the  various 
General  Staffs  exchanged  visits,  perhaps  to  prepare 
the  attack  or  to  communicate  the  plans  for  it.  In 
short,  by  191 3  war  appeared  certain. 

The  forthcoming  incident  of  Sarajevo  was,  it  is 
evident,  a  pretext  and  not  a  real  cause. 

Germany  did  not  intend  that  the  encerclement 
should  be  complete.     She  knew  her  own  strength,  she 


THE  POLICY  OF  GERMANY  57 

felt  ready.  Once  more,  in  order  to  maintain  her  fron- 
tiers and  to  realize  her  ambitions  (certainly  none  too 
modest),  she  would  be  forced  to  fight,  even  though  to 
do  so  meant  an  offensive  war.  Her  pride  in  her  new 
naval  power  impelled  her  to  give  battle.  Her  greatness 
was  at  stake.  The  loss  of  that  position  in  Europe 
which  had  formerly  been  so  absolute,  obliged  her  to 
deal  the  supreme  and  decisive  blow.  Only  a  noble 
resolution  on  her  part  not  to  dominate  the  world  would 
have  avoided  the  conflict;  but  such  a  decision  was  not 
part  of  her  program. 


CHAPTER  X 

PLANS   FRUSTRATED 

VON  MOLTKE'S  plan  for  1870  in  case  Prussia 
should  be  attacked  in  the  rear  was  to  throw  an 
army  rapidly  on  France,  deliver  a  crushing  defeat,  and 
then  turn  and  defend  himself  against  the  other  bellig- 
erent. And  now  after  forty  years  this  was  still  the 
best  strategy,  especially  as  the  Austrian  ally  could  keep 
Russia  in  check,  and  Italy  could  engage  a  large  part 
of  the  French  army  by  an  assault  on  the  south  of 
France.  England,  though  an  enemy,  could  not  do 
much  damage  on  land  if  she  decided  to  stand  by  France 
and  Russia ;  but  there  was  always  the  chance  that  she 
would  leave  them  to  fight  alone,  for  had  not  the  Brit- 
ish foreign  minister,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  said  to  the 
French  ambassador,  Cambon,  that  England  was  not 
obliged  to  cooperate  in  case  of  war? 

All  was  foreseen  but  that  which,  according  to  the 
ancients,  lay  on  the  knees  of  Jupiter.  Obstacles  of  the 
sort  that  defy  even  the  profoundest  human  calculation 
upset  the  German  plans.  In  the  first  place  England 
was  war-inclined.  She  knew  that  another  German 
triumph  would  not  be  at  the  expense  of  France  but 

59 


60  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  herself.  As  expressed  in  a  pamphlet  by  the  well- 
known  English  socialist,  Robert  Blatchford,  "The 
problem  of  British  defense  is  the  defense joi JFrance." 
InTormer"dayT Albion  was  not  addicted  to  drawing 
her  sword  for  others;  but  Albion,  perfidious  though 
her  reputation,  was  never  so  to  herself.  Everybody 
in  England  knew  that  Germany  was  a  successful  com- 
petitor in  every  field,  and  that  a  war  which  left  her 
victorious  would  do  more  harm  to  England  than  to 
any  other  nation. 

The  next  unforeseen  obstacle  was  Belgium's  ener- 
getic defense  of  her  neutrality.  German  diplomatists 
and  strategists  had  believed  that  she  would  limit  her- 
self to  vehement  protests,  or  perhaps  would  sacrifice 
a  few  brigades  in  order  to  comply  with  the  obligation 
of  defending  herself  against  invasion.  But  instead 
the  Belgian  soldiers  held  up  the  march  of  a  whole 
powerful  army  and  thus  enabled  the  French  to  con- 
centrate on  the  most  important  points  of  their  unex- 
pectedly invaded  frontier. 

Then  to  further  frustrate  German  diplomatic,  and 
more  especially  military,  prevision,  came  Italy's  re- 
fusal to  participate  in  an  offensive  war.  As  already 
pointed  out  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  undergoing 
some  readjustment  during  the  previous  few  years. 
Italy  was  still  bound  officially  to  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria but  the  people  had  never  given  their  soul  to  the 
alliance.  Long  before  the  coalition  the  aged  premier 
Agostino  Depretis,  in  order  to  excuse  certain  neces- 
sary concessions  to  Austria,  had  confessed,  that  in  his 


PLANS  FRUSTRATED  61 

youth  he  had  taken  part  in  a  plot  to  kidnap  the  Aus- 
trian Emperor  ;*  and  Crispi,  the  statesman  most  favor- 
able to  Germany,  used  to  say  that  necessity  had  driven 
him  into  union  with  the  Central  Powers  when  affection 
would  have  drawn  him  to  France. 

When  the  present  storm  was  brewing  Italy  had  only 
recently  finished  a  war  with  Turkey  and  still  had 
troops  in  Africa.  The  worst  or  at  any  rate  most  im- 
mediate consequences  of  the  conflict  would  have  fallen 
upon  her;  for  Germany  and  Austria  having  but  little 
coast  line  could  easily  defend  themselves  whereas  she 
would  catch  the  brunt  of  all  the  naval  attacks.  She 
would  suffer  a  rigid  blockade  and  would  have  to  aban- 
don, and  perhaps  lose,  her  newly  acquired  colony  of 
Tripoli.  Therefore  as  the  treaty,  strictly  speaking, 
did  not  bind  her  to  participate  in  offensive  warfare  she 
turned  it  into  the  instrument  of  an  unpleasant  surprise 
for  her  expectant  allies,  and  this  without  breaking  any 
given  pledge.  Their  paths  further  diverged  when 
King  Victor  Emanuel  listened,  as  had  his  illustrious 
grandfather,  to  the  groans  of  the  Italian  Irredentists. 
He  decided  to  unsheathe  his  sword  but  not  on  the  side 
that  twenty  years  of  mutual  aid  and  guarantees  would 
have  indicated. 

From  the  course  of  this  war  we  learn  how  com- 
pletely a  whole  series  of  previously  outlined  hypotheses 
can  fall  short  of  application.  For  instance  the  pacifist 
tendency  which  it  was  believed  would  deeply  influence 
the  contending  parties  at  the  crucial  moment,  became 

*  Salvatore  Barzilai ;  "Vita  parlamentare." 


62  THE  WORLD  WAR 

a  dead  letter — hardly  more  than  the  talk  of  a  few 
newspapers;  the  same  with  the  revolutionist  and  syn- 
dicalist tendencies  and  the  great  general  strike  which 
was  to  be  declared  the  minute  war  burst.  All  were 
swept  away  by  an  avalanche  of  resurging  patriotism, 
more  sanguinary  to-day  than  ever  in  past  centuries. 
Jaures,  whose  fine  spirit  and  profound  perception  had 
forced  him  to  affirm  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  a 
necessary  counterpoise  to  French  Chauvinism,  was  shot 
down  in  Paris,  one  of  the  first  victims  of  the  war. 
German  socialists  marched  in  the  first  ranks  just  as 
the  aged  Bebel  had  said  they  would,  a  few  years  be- 
fore in  the  Reichstag.  French  socialists  did  the  same, 
and  Guesde,  high-priest  of  French  Marxism,  became 
a  minister  without  a  portfolio. 

The  beginning  of  this  twentieth  century  saw  more 
Peace  Congresses  and  Peace  Conferences  than  any 
other  period  of  history;  it  heard  the  word  peace  re- 
peated more  often  probably  than  all  the  centuries  of 
humanity  put  together;  and  yet  to-day  it  is  looking 
\  upon  the  most  bloody  war  ever  recorded.  Such  are 
\the  contradictions  of  destiny,  the  ironies  of  fate. 

And  to  what  has  all  the  preparation  led  thus  far? 
Germany  having  had  to  abandon  her  plan  of  rapid 
entry  into  Paris,  has  fallen  back  on  her  previously  out- 
lined plan  of  a  tenacious  resistance;  and  in  her  own 
strength  she  still  confides,  chanting  her  war-song  of 
Deatschland  iiber  Alles. 

Notwithstanding,  the  final  result  of  the  war  is  be- 
yond all  doubt.    England  having  instantly  made  her- 


PLANS  FRUSTRATED  63 

self  mistress  of  the  seas,  the  enormous  merchant  fleet 
which  Germany  so  lovingly  and  carefully  built  up  lies 
idle  in  her  own  ports  or  worse  still,  plies  in  the  service 
of  the  enemy.  She  can  use  only  her  submarines  whose 
victims  have  been  all  too  often  innocent  non-combat- 
ants and  whose  material  booty,  while  enormous,  can- 
not bring  the  hoped-for  victory.  This  is  a  condition 
which  no  end  of  brilliant  land  engagements  can  out- 
weigh. 

Alone  of  the  great  personages  who  played  a  leading 
role  in  the  tragedy  of  1870  survives  the  Spanish-born 
ex-Empress  of  the  French,  Eugenie;  and  she,  of  them 
all,  must  have  least  interest  and  least  consolation  in 
the  revanche.  Widow,  inconsolable  mother,  dethroned 
empress  who  waited  in  vain  for  the  husband  of  heroic 
name  to  reinstate  her,  she  will  witness  the  triumph  of 
that  Republic  which  forced  her  to  flee  in  humiliation. 
Perhaps  she  is  thinking  that  the  son  whom  the  Zulus 
sacrificed  might  have  obtained  the  revenge.  But  she 
must  recognize  that  the  odious  Republicans  have  known 
better  how  to  prepare  alliances  and  armies  than  the 
husband  whose  surrender  at  Sedan  was  the  occasion 
of  her  Homeric  words  to  his  mesenger:  "You  lie,  sir; 
you  mean  that  he  is  dead  I" 

The  Republic  has  succeeded  where  the  Empire 
failed.  France's  success  has  been  the  product  of  fif- 
teen years  of  wise  and  sure  diplomacy.  The  isolation 
policy  against  Germany  initiated  by  Delcasse  has  borne 
its  fruit.  Even  Gabriel  Hanotaux  will  have  to  compli- 
ment his  fortunate  rival  and  revise  his  latest  writings.* 


Gabriel  Hanotaux;  "La  politique  de  l'equilibre." 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE  VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED 

HOW  much  cause  and  how  much  pretext  there  may- 
be in  human  disagreements  is  difficult  to  de- 
termine, especially  when  the  contending  minds  are 
cautious  and  of  high  calibre.  This  truth,  applicable  in 
all  wars,  stands  out  most  prominently  in  the  present 
one;  for  in  spite  of  all  the  literature  the  catastrophe 
has  brought  forth  we  are  not  yet  able  to  agree  unani- 
mously as  to  which  were  specific  causes  and  which 
were  mere  pretexts. 

Nor  is  this  strange.  In  certain  far  less  complicated 
international  conflicts  all  the  facts  have  come  out  later 
and  yet  have  failed  to  produce  a  concordant  opinion. 
The  Franco-Prussian  War  for  instance — and  this  is  a 
reference  we  are  justified  not  only  in  making  but  in 
reiterating  because  of  its  relation  of  cause  and  effect 
to  the  present — the  Franco-Prussian  War  was  un- 
doubtedly desired  by  Bismarck  as  a  necessary  step  in 
German  progress  as  he  conceived  it;  yet  to  many  it 
still  appears  rather  as  a  consequence  of  French  Chau- 

65 


66  THE  WORLD  WAR 

vinism.  Bismarck  himself  frequently  said  so  and 
many  agree  with  him.  But  analysis  shows  that  how- 
ever patriotic  his  motives  may  have  been  his  share  of 
the  responsibility  was  very  grave ;  and  this  without  de- 
nying French  errors  and  weaknesses,  nor  the  indeli- 
cacies and  vanities  of  the  Emperor  and  Empress,  of 
Olivier  and  Grammont  and  Benedetti ;  to  say  nothing 
of  the  reactionary  party  who  were  a  dominant  factor 
in  spite  of  the  change  in  the  political  regime  of  the 
Empire.  If  opinion  is  not  yet  unanimous  regarding 
the  war  of  1870,  how  much  less  so  could  it  be  regard- 
ing the  war  of  1914. 

There  is  no  denying  that  the  present  crisis  had  a 

ytvarlike  preparation  based  on  well-defined  interests. 
Facing  each  other  stood  Germany  and  Russia,  the 
latter  threatened  in  her  European  prestige  through 
having  lost  her  Asiatic,  the  former  powerful  on  the 
sea,  pushing  her  maritime  commerce  whither  she 
wished,  maintaining  a  colonial  policy  and  defending, 
in  union  with  Austria,  a  Balkan  policy  of  conquest  and 
domination ;  and  beyond  them  both  stood  England  and 
France,  the  one  waylaid  on  the  ocean  highways,  the 
other  watching  for  her  revenge.     War  had  to  break 

•   out,  and  many  a  time  did  its  sinister  phantom  appear 

I  on  the  horizon. 

Everything  that  could  preclude  war  had  happened 
in  Europe.  The  various  interests  had  been  delineated 
by  the  grouping  of  states  into  two  great  bodies,  for 


VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED  67 

every  member  of  which  the  future  struggle  constituted 
a  hope;  in  its  final  result  every  one  was  seeking  the 
satisfaction  of  some  clearly  felt  necessity.  The  de- 
velopment of  one  of  the  groups,  or  of  one  of  the 
principal  nations  dominating  it,  represented  danger 
for  the  other.  The  turning-point  had  to  come  in  this 
international  chess  game.  When?  How?  This  no 
one  could  know.  But  each  player  hoped  it  would 
come  at  the  moment  when  his  moral  and  material 
preparation  was  best.  Each  one  thought  of  his  own 
interests,  although  with  different  degrees  of  inten- 
sity ;  and  nobody  for  a  moment  forgot  his  own  advan- 
tage through  a  platonic  love  of  peace. 

In  international  matters,  as  in  physics,  expansion 
must  produce  shock.  There  was  England  with  her 
mercantile  imperialism — had  not  Chamberlain  said 
that  empire  and  commerce  were  one? — the  product  of 
centuries  of  constant  effort  and  seemly  procedure. 
And  there  was  Germany  with  her  expansion  of  vio- 
lence, a  porcedure  which  time  had  crowned  with  suc- 
cess. (Far  back  in  Mirabeau's  day  he  had  said  that 
the  national  industry  of  Prussia  was  war.)  Germany 
wished,  in  revolutionary  manner,  to  strike  other  na- 
tions who  by  the  slowness  of  their  effort  had  been 
disguising  that  lust  which  economic  imperialism  im- 
plies, while  her  own  greed,  precisely  through  the  op- 
posite or  rapid  method,  was  made  to  appear  un- 
bounded. 


68  THE  WORLD  WAR 

France,  aided  by  her  admirable  financial  organiza- 
tion and  impelled  by  her  enormous  bureaucracy,  had 
formed  two  empires,  one  in  Asia  and  one  in  Africa. 
The  vanquished  of  1870  found  easy  that  which  the 
conqueror  was  not  able  to  achieve.  Even  Italy,  least 
powerful  and  least  populated  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
least  in  commerce  and  military  force,  had  managed  to 
conquer  for  herself  vast  African  territories  and  mag- 
nificent Mediterranean  positions;  and  the  same  with 
Russia,  whose  breast  had  only  recently  begun  to  throb 
with  economic  aspirations,  and  the  same  with  Austria. 
This  last-named,  for  every  colonial  conquest,  had  to 
break  the  cord  drawn  tight  around  her,  and  yet  she  had 
captured  the  road  to  the  port  of  Salonika. 

Outside  facts  throw  but  little  light  on  underlying 
causes.  It  matters  very  little,  for  instance,  whether 
the  Kaiser  one  day  embraced  his  royal  English  cousin 
or  his  imperial  Russian  cousin,  and  whether  one  of 
these  returned  the  embrace  with  more  effusion  than 
the  other;  nor  does  it  matter  whether  on  some  other 
day  this  same  Kaiser  extended  his  hand  to  France,  and 
she,  to  use  his  own  picturesque  phrase,  pretended  not 
to  see  it.  It  is  not  expressions  of  affection  which  are 
to  be  examined,  but  great  national  interests.  It  did 
not  help  the  international  situation  for  the  Kaiser  to 
hold  out  his  hand  to  France  and  at  the  same  time 
insist  on  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  by  which  she  had  lost 
two  provinces  and  suffered  the  greatest  humiliation  of 


VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED    69 

her  history;  nor  did  it  help  matters  to  talk  of  family 
ties  and  past  links  in  the  court  of  Russia,  while  the 
Slavs  in  the  Balkans  were  being  harrassed  to  the  great 
detriment  of  Muscovite  prestige.  Fine  words,  need- 
less to  say,  never  distracted  the  eyes  of  utilitarian  Al- 
bion from  the  enormous  German  fleet ;  and  vice  versa ; 
Germany  in  full  hegemony  and  with  her  people  trained 
to  the  point  of  megalomania  in  thinking  and  talking 
of  grandeur,  was  not  going  to  limit  her  political,  mari- 
time, economic,  and  financial  expansion  just  to  please 
her  adversaries.  She  had  to  threaten  the  rivals  which 
her  own  greatness  was  creating,  and  to  refuse  every 
status  quo  which  signified  enforced  but  unmerited  in- 
feriority, heedless  of  the  truth  that  historic  conse- 
quences must  be  respected  unless  a  nation  deliber- 
ately wishes  to  provoke  war. 

For  England  the  present  struggle  is  just  such  an- 
other phase  in  her  time-honored  policy  as  that  which 
brought  her  into  conflict  with  Spain,  Holland,  and 
France;  just  such  as  in  future  will  bring  her  against 
any  power  who  tries  to  take  from  her  the  maritime 
dominance  which  insures  her  national  existence. 

For  Germany  the  war  signifies  the  inevitable  com- 
plement of  William  IPs  political  scheme.  If  he  had 
not  kept  in  mind  an  armed  action  which  would  give 
the  backing  of  force  to  his  Oriental  and  maritime  ex- 
pansion, all  the  effort — chiefly  economic — of  twenty- 


70  THE  WORLD  WAR 

four  years,  from  his  1890  journey  to  Constantinople 
to  the  present  day,  would  have  been  useless. 

When  Bismarck  was  sent  into  retreat  everybody 
thought  it  was  a  coup  de  tete  of  the  new  Emperor,  the 
act  of  a  young  man  who  could  not  brook  the  presum- 
ing authority  of  his  chancellor.  To  a  few  it  signified 
a  necessity  of  domestic  policy;  and  still  fewer  watched 
from  then  on  for  a  radical  change  in  foreign  policy. 
Bismarck  was  content  with  the  past  and  in  its  security 
he  expected  to  live  long  years  of  tranquillity.  Prussia 
dominated  in  Germany  and  Germany  in  continental 
Europe,  and  this  was  his  serene  aspiration  and  his 
beatific  reality ;  he  was  willing  to  leave  far-off  colonial 
vanities  to  others.  William  II,  however,  was  dream- 
ing of  greater  glories.  The  past  did  not  belong  to 
him.  For  him  it  was  necessary  to  be  as  strong  on  sea 
as  on  land  and  even  to  lift  his  eyes  to  that  Orient 
which  was  the  object  of  general  European  covetous- 
ness.  His  must  be  the  task  to  beat  down  the  wall 
which  hemmed  in  the  Teuton  race.  He  must  extend 
his  policy  of  hegemony.  From  Occidental  Europe 
he  must  go  to  Oriental,  and  from  there  he  must  look 
higher  and  acquire  even  greater  authority  over  the 
world.  Was  it  not  perhaps  on  the  tomb  of  "his  illus- 
trious ancestor  Charlemagne"  that  he  was  inspired  to 
pronounce  that  memorable  discourse  so  imbued  with 
medieval  policy? 

The  grandeur  of  Germany  dictated  to  him  the  line 


VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED    71 

of  conduct  he  must  follow;  it  obliged  him  "to  grasp 
the  trident  of  Neptune  along  with  the  sword  of  Fred- 
erick the  Great,,;  it  opened  to  him  the  doors  of  the 
luxurious  and  much-coveted  Orient.  In  short,  Ger- 
man grandeur  interpreted  by  German  mentality  meant 
war.  And  now  that  this  has  come  we  see  with  what 
ingenuousness  German  statesmen  and  writers  declare : 
"They  denied  us  that  which  we  had  a  right  to  de- 
mand; our  power  was  superior  to  our  opportunity." 

Ever  since  1890  German  foreign  policy  has  been 
indicating  the  ideas  which  to-day  are  openly  upheld. 
The  fleet  which  was  constructed,  the  army  which  was 
enlarged,  and  the  military  organization  which  was 
held  in  readiness,  as  if,  to  use  ex-Chancellor  Von 
Billow's  expression,  *  war  might  break  out  the  follow- 
ing day — all  this  was  to  serve  not  for  guarding  a  favor- 
able statu  quo  and  warning  off  adversaries,  but  to  offer 
itself  some  day  on  the  international  market  and  bid 
for  a  greater  part  of  that  booty  which  the  powerful 
states,  under  the  pretext  of  civilization,  were  accumu- 
lating at  the  cost  of  the  little  and  less  fortunate  ones. 

France,  Russia,  and  Austria  were  all  revolving 
around  an  unsettled  policy.  France,  in  the  name  of 
the  past,  should  have  been  more  partizan  of  war  than 
the  others.  For  them  the  greatness  of  the  neigh- 
boring   empire    represented    a    future    danger    only; 


♦Count  Von  Billow;  "Imperial  Germany,' 


72  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  her  it  represented  an  unhappy  past  as  well.  Add 
to  this  the  proud  spirit  of  the  Frenchman  which  a 
glorious  history  had  quickened  to  a  higher  pitch  than 
normal.  For  forty-four  years  he  had  been  champing 
the  bit  and  longing  for  the  day  when  Sedan  might  be 
avenged,  Metz  reconquered;  when  the  statues  of  the 
lost  provinces  would  be  a  living  reality  to  the  masses 
who  crossed  the  Place  de  la  Concorde,  instead  of  a  dead 
hope.  And  so  it  was  that  France,  moved  by  the  two 
opposing  sentiments  of  past  injury  and  present  well- 
being,  desired  war  yet  maintained  peace.  Thus  when 
the  Kaiser  offered  friendship  to  the  nation  which  had 
been  forced  to  accept  the  preliminaries  of  Versailles 
with  tears  in  the  eyes  and  groans  in  the  soul,  insult 
was  added  to  injury;  the  compassion  of  the  victor 
humiliated  the  victim.  Granted  the  antagonism,  both 
peoples  knew  that  whatever  conflict  arose,  it  would 
drive  them  against  each  other.  Evidently  destiny  had 
put  them  on  opposite  sides  forever,  and  each  knew 
what  its  future  position  must  be.  Such  being  the 
collective  psychology,  the  mind  of  the  masses  and  the 
preparation  of  the  youth,  the  tension  of  the  two  gov- 
ernments in  question  can  be  easily  understood.  This 
tension,  never  relaxed  for  a  single  day,  was  the  cause 
of  the  alliances  in  continental  Europe.  It  united 
France  to  Russia  and  it  formed  the  Triple  Alliance. 
Russia,  nevertheless,  had  oscillated  in  her  inter- 
national policy.    Friend  and  loyal  ally  of  France  she 


VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED    73 

remained  after  signing  the  treaty;  but  for  some  time 
she  gave  scant  attention  to  France  in  particular  or 
Europe  in  general.  Pushed  by  her  geographic  con- 
figuration towards  the  vast  continent  of  Asia,  she 
mixed  in  the  affairs  of  China,  Thibet,  Turkestan, 
Afghanistan,  and  above  all  Korea,  Manchuria,  and 
Persia.  So  absorbed  was  she  in  these  that  she  some- 
what forgot  the  Balkan  States,  their  Slavic  popula- 
tion, and  her  influence  in  Turkey.  Lured  by  the  Pa- 
cific she  forgot  her  dream  of  being  a  Mediterranean 
power.  But  so  far  as  Asia  was  concerned,  her  disas- 
trous Asiatic  war  and  the  Anglo-Russian  and  the  Rus- 
so-Japanese treaties  all  clipped  her  aspirations ;  she  then 
went  back  with  greater  freedom  and  calm  to  that  Euro- 
pean policy  which  represented  so  great  a  part  of  her 
diplomatic  and  military  life. 

On  returning,  however,  she  found  her  adversary 
better  prepared,  with  greater  influence  and  more  de- 
fined ambitions.  Austria  was  still  under  the  sceptre 
of  Francis  Joseph  (to  whom  longevity  had  made  a  con- 
cession in  order  that  he  might  live  through  innumer- 
able family  and  state  afflictions),  but  the  aged  Em- 
peror was  subject  to  the  influence  of  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand,  his  heir.  This  young  man  opposed 
his  tendencies  with  all  the  energy  of  his  fiery  charac- 
ter and  expounded  the  system  for  a  Greater  Austria 
based  not  on  economic  development  and  intellectual 
progress,  but  on  a  big  fleet  and  a  war-trained  army. 


74  THE  WORLD  WAR 

And  in  truth  it  was  the  heir-apparent  and  not  the 
Emperor  who  represented  the  true  current  of  public 
opinion.  The  whole  army  of  which  he  was  generalis- 
simo approved  his  plans.  Intimate  of  the  Kaiser  he 
received,  by  reflection  as  it  were,  all  the  favor  of  the 
Pan-Germanists  and  was  considered  the  representative 
of  Austrian  militarism  and  imperialism — an  adversary 
to  be  feared  by  Russia.  His  audacity  of  character 
made  him  less  of  a  Hapsburg  than  a  Bourbon,  from 
which  house  he  inherited  abundantly,  both  as  to  tem- 
perament and  political-religious  tendencies.* 

Balkan  difficulties  no  longer  bore  the  timid  aspect 
of  years  ago.  No  longer  were  they  the  motive  for 
formal  international  congresses  or  for  an  exchange 
of  notes  between  European  governments.  Instead, 
events  were  violent.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  annexed 
in  face  of  international  stupor,  are  an  example;  like- 
wise the  expulsion  of  Montenegro  and  Servia,  and 
later  Greece,  from  certain  parts  of  the  Adriatic  shore  ; 
and  lastly,  the  repeated  threats  of  war  or  annexations 
made  to  the  smaller  Balkan  States. 

Russia's  return  to  intensive  Balkan  activity  was  not 
marked  by  success.  On  the  contrary  her  humiliations 
were  continuous  and  she  lost  considerable  prestige 
among  those  of  her  race  who  for  so  many  years  had 
looked  to  her  for  aid  and  protection. 


*R.  W.   Seton  Watson;   "The  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand, 
in  The  Contemporary  Review,  August,  1914. 


VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED    75 

War  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  out  at  the  end 
of  1908,  at  the  beginning  of  1909,  and  again  in  191 3, 
for  causes  almost  identical  with  the  present:  that  is 
to  say,  because  of  friction  between  Austrian  and  Slav 
interests  in  the  Balkans.  The  first  cloud  gathered 
when  the  official  newspaper  of  Vienna  published  on 
October  7,  1908,  the  following  documents:  a  procla- 
mation by  the  Emperor  to  the  inhabitants  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina;  a  letter  to  the  statesmen  represent- 
ing the  powers  signatory  to  the  Treaty  of  Berlin ;  and 
an  Imperial  rescript  directed  to  the  premiers  of  Aus- 
tria and  Hungaria.  In  these  documents  he  proceeded, 
in  spite  of  Servian  and  Montenegran  interests,  in  spite 
of  Russian  prestige  and  of  the  fact  that  he  was  violat- 
ing a  treaty  signed  by  many  governments,  to  annex 
the  two  provinces  mentioned. 

The  news  went  out  to  an  unsuspecting  world.  None 
of  the  powers  knew  of  the  intention  until  after  it  had 
been  consummated.  Then,  as  in  the  incident  which 
provoked  the  present  war,  English  initiative,  sup- 
ported by  France,  suggested  that  the  concerted  powers 
should  act  in  some  form  yet  to  be  determined  in  order 
to  obtain  from  Austria  and  Servia  a  solution  to  the 
question.  But  Germany  opposed.  War  between  Aus- 
tria and  Russia,  precursory  to  a  more  general  one, 
appeared  on  the  point  of  breaking  out;  but  as  Rus- 
sia was  not  fully  prepared  the  matter  was  arranged 
in  the  best  manner  possible,  thanks  to  Sir  Edward 


76  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Grey.*  Nevertheless,  in  order  to  justify  the  present 
conflict  and  limit  Austria's  responsibilities,  it  is  now 
being  published  that  Russia  knew  Austria's  intentions 
in  1908  and  approved  them;  but  subsequent  events 
plainly  disprove  these  tardy  statements.  As  Joaquin 
de  Bartoszewicz  justly  says  in  La  Vie  Politique  dans 
les  deux  mondes  (1909-1910),  "At  the  time  of  the 
Turkish  revolution  of  the  twenty- fourth  of  July  which 
changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  old  Balkan  question, 
again  on  the  proclamation  of  Bulgarian  independence, 
and  later  on  the  annexation  by  Austria-Hungary  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Russia  showed  herself  singu- 
larly reserved ;  she  was  visibly  impotent  to  dictate  her 
point  of  view  in  these  questions  which  nevertheless 
touched  her  so  closely." 

Because  of  the  death  of  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand, Austria  repeated  her  high-handed  acts.    She  dealt 
with  the  small  Balkan  nations  directly  without  the 
intervention  of  Europe,  as  if  their  existence  and  their 
line  of  conduct  had  not  always  been  imposed  by  the 
t-N  great  powers  without  any  one  disputing  their  right  to 
5  do  so.     But  this  time  Russia  did  not  turn  away  her 
£  eyes.     Instead,  she  admitted  the  appeal  of  the  racial 
3"*£i  tie ;  Germany  stood  firm  by  her  ally ;  France  followed 
r%  the  road  which  both  honor  and  interest  pointed  out; 
^"~     and  the  aged  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  known  for  his 


*  Achille   Viallate ;    La  vie   politique   dans   les   deux   mondes, 
for  the  year   1908-1909,  page  312. 


VARIOUS  INTERESTS  ENCOUNTERED     77 

aversion  to  war,*  though  freed  now  from  the  militar- 
istic domination  of  his  nephew  and  heir,  nevertheless 
prepared  his  own  grave  by  opening  many  others. 

♦Demetrius   C   Boulger;    "The   Emperor  Who   Made  War," 
North  American  Review,  September,  1914,  page  368. 


CHAPTER   XII 

SERVIANS  ASPIRATIONS  AND  AUSTRIA^  CRIME 

>TpHE  tragedy  of  Sarajevo  is  well  known.  In  com- 
-■-  pany  with  his  wife,  the  ex-Countess  Sophia 
Chotek,  who  had  been  elevated  to  the  dignity  of 
Princess  of  Hohenberg  on  her  marriage,  the  Arch- 
duke Ferdinand  was  visiting  that  city  when  a  young 
Servian,  Gabrilo  Princip,  killed  them  both.  Princep  p 
was  driven  to  the  act  by  a  blind  patriotism  which  made 
him  see  in  the  future  heir  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
throne  the  embodiment  of  all  the  difficulties  which 
beset  his  country  in  its  unlimited  ambition  for  ag- 
grandizement. 

The  form  in  which  the  affair  was  carried  out  was 
sufficiently  unique.  As  it  was  well  known  that  the 
Archduke  was  going  to  be, the  objecL-of  an  attack, 

tfaa£-2    pint    haH    fcffn    fppHfr.-anH    tn^n    wf>rf>    r^oHyu^n 

ej^cutejt,  public  opinion  throughout  Europe_jndicted 
the .  Auslrian,_j>oli£e.     The  first  attempt  was  on  the    ^ 
day  of  his  arrival  in  Sarajevo;  soQn_after  occurred      \* 
the  secondhand  the  royal  pairjyere^  obliged  to^jeaye. 

saicTthat  the  Archduke  himself  declined  courting      v> 
yg \0/ 


80  THE  WORLD  WAR 

further  danger  but  the  police  assured  him  there  was 
.nothing  whatever  to  fear. 

Like  many  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  Bourbons,  Fran- 
cis Ferdinand  was  a  man  without  poise  and  easily 
given  over  to  violence.  At  court  he  was  little  liked, 
having  imposed  there  a  wife  whom  strict  court  eti- 
quette repudiated.  Who  can  say  what  mysteries  may 
not  lie  back  of  their  tragic  deaths !  And  yet  this  was 
not  the  first  time  that  an  heir-apparent,  or  a  political 
chief,  or  the  head  of  a  royal  or  imperial  family,  had 
lost  his  life  by  the  homicidal  bullet  of  a  fanatic.  While 
jt_would  be  unfj3JX-J&_attributfc^the  responsibility  _fo 
the  Servian  nation  or  government,  it  wouldjbe  parr 
tial  to  consider  the  murder  within_ the  jnarrow  limits 
of  an~mdivT3u~araction.  It  is  evident  that  Gabrilo 
Princip  was  not  actuated  by  the  same  motives  as  the 
starving  Caserio  who  threw  himself  at  President  Car- 
not's  coach;  or  the  poor  distracted  Lucchesi  who  killed 
the  luckless  Empress  of  this  same  Austria.  To  have 
reproached  Italy  with  the  deeds  of  these  two  Italian 
subjects  would  have  been  as  unjust  as  to  have  blamed 
her  for  the  audacity  of  William  Oberdank  when  he 
tried  to  force  the  Julian  Alps;  nor  did  the  respective 
governments  concerned  ever  think  of  making  such  an 
accusation.  But  in  the  present  case  there  cauJbfi^no 
doubt_that  a  Sexsdan^m^anizatjnrij  pennjj^ed_orjoler- 
a^ed  Jby_that  government^  armed  the  young  man  and 
urged  him  to  nisTerrible  act  without  the  least  shud- 


SERVIA'S  ASPIRATIONS  81 

deltas jtg_  its_effect  on Jhe^xcitable,  ajmost  hysterical, 
maj,sf  s.     Indeed  there  was  a  general  and  secret  satis- 
faction shown  at  the  death  of  the  prince  who  was^ 
preparing  the  transformation  of_the_dual  monarchy  * '  ^ I ' 
,into  a  triple  by  adding  a  Slavic  kingdom  to  tf\ej^-'™^w 
manic  and  the  Hungarian.     Had  Francis  Ferdinand 
lived  to  accomplish  this,  it  would  have  been  the  death- 
blow  to  that  Servian  aspiration,  or  to  speak  more  ex- 
a^y  ambition,  which  aimed  to  put__Servia  at  the  head 
q{  a  Pan -Slavic  Balkan  movement;  moreover  it  would 
have  prevented  all  future  Russian  intervention  in  the 
jaame  of  the  Slav  race.    To  frustrate  him  was  one  of 
the  objects  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  a  society  deeply 
rooted  in  the  hearts  of  the  Servians,  and  to  which 
Princip  belonged.    All  the  ardent  patriots  and  heroes 
of  the  wars  against  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  were  mem- 
bers; and  with  much  the  same  feeling  that  a  cautious 
army  looks  to  its  intrepid  vanguard,  the  Servian  states- 
men who  were  aspiring  to  make  their  country  an  , 
Adriatic  power  looked  toward  this  society  of  fanatics..  au     , 
And  yet  the  time  when  the  Servian  King  Milan  ran  f^fj, 
to  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  to  pay  his  debts  was  Yj^i 
not  very  remote.    Only  with  the  assassination  of  King 
Alexander  and  Queen  Draga  in  1903  did  the  Servian 
Government  definitely  change  its  inclinations.     First 
Austrophile,  it  soon  began  to  debate  between  this  and 
the  Russian  tendency.     Under  the  influence  of  Pas- 
chitch,  a  Bulgarian  by  origin  but  prime  minister  of 


82  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Servia,  it  became  completely  Russophile,  which,   of 
course,  meant  completely  anti-Austrian. 

Giving  international  relations  their  just  values,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  Servia  got  no  benefits  what- 
ever from  the  Austrian  friendship.  It  was  purely 
commercial,  while  that  with  Russia  was  sentimental 
and  racial.*  To  depend  upon  the  former  signified 
subjection;  to  be  bound  to  the  latter  constituted  de- 
fense. In  the  article  cited,  Dumba,  the  Austrian  am- 
bassador to  Washington  when  the  war  began,  writes 
with  much  exactitude  on  the  Servian  agitation  against 
Austria  and  what  a  troublesome  little  neighbor  Servia 
was  because  of  it;  but  when  he  comes  to  the  Musco- 
vite predominance,  so  great,  he  says,  that  the  Russian 
minister  in  Belgrade  was  almost  a  viceroy,  he  loses 
his  equanimity  and  misses  thereby  the  just  estimate  of 
Senna' s  Russian  tendency.  He  fails  to  see  it  as  a 
policy  which,  ever  since  the  tragic  death  of  King 
Alexander,  has  been  more  in  harmony  with  the  in- 
terests of  the  nation.  Neither  Alexander  nor  his  pre- 
decessor Milan  represented  the  national  policy  of  Ser- 
via. Vicious  and  of  petty  souls,  they  were  far  below 
the  moral  height  of  their  nation  which  was  saturating 
itself  with  the  new  spirit  of  civilization.  The  Austria 
to  whom  these  monarchs  turned  was  not  a  good  guide 


*  Constantin  Theodor  Dumba ;  "Why  Austria  Is  at  War  with 
Russia,"  in  the  North  American  Review,  September,  1914, 
page  346. 


SERVIA'S  ASPIRATIONS  83 

for  small  nations,  and  had  never  brought  happiness 
to  those  who  depended  on  her  or  were  in  her  sphere 
of  influence.  This  the  Servians  knew  only  too  well; 
they  saw  themselves  restrained  in  all  their  expansionist 
desires,  and  left  to  content  themselves  with  a  reality 
that  offered  no  hope;  hence  the  change  of  policy  on 
Alexander's  death. 

Without  believing  that  the  Servian  government  was 
cognizant  of  the  Sarajevo  murders,  or  that  it  had 
armed  the  assassins,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the 
motive  for  the  regrettable  act  can  be  found  in  the 
great  patriotic  agitation;  and  that  this,  justifiable  or 
not,  imperiled  the  neighborly  relations  of  the  two 
countries. 

In  Austria  it  was  believed  absolutely  that  the  attack 
had  been  prepared  in  Belgrade  and  that  it  was  offi- 
cially inspired.  All  the  press  gave  this  version,  and 
the  unwarranted,  or  at  least  exaggerated,  Austrian  de- 
mand that  Viennese  officiallT  should  investigate _the 
crime,  shows  how  the  belief  had  penetrated  govern- 
ment circles.  It  cannot  be  supposed  that  here  there 
was  any  preconceived  idea  of  intervention,  for  the 
deed  was  unexpected ;  nor  can  we  admit  the  hypothesis 
that  grief  had  so  distracted  the  directing  spirits  of  the 
nation  that  it  drove  them  to  proceed  in  an  abnormal 
manner.  That  the  Servian  government  was  respon- 
sible for  the  crime  is  also  the  argument  upheld  in  the 
German  White  Book.     "The  investigations  begun  by 


<X 


84  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Austro-Hungarian  authorities  show  that  the  plot  to 
assassinate  the  Archduke,  heir  to  the  throne,  was 
hatched,  prepared,  and  matured  in  Belgrade ;  that  per- 
sons in  official  positions  cooperated,  and  that  the  weap- 
ons with  which  it  was  executed  came  from  the  state 
arsenals  of  Servia."  * 

To  thrash  out  the  matter  is  not  easy,  but  it  is  evi- 
dent that  Austria,  deeply  moved  by  the  Sarajevo 
crime  and  fully  aware  of  Servia' s  continued  hostility, 
wished  to  take  advantage  of  the  moment  and  destroy 
or  at  least  humiliate  the  little  frontier  state.  Nor  must 
it  be  forgotten  that  in  the  brief  period  of  six  years 
Servia  had  provoked  grave  international  troubles  and 
was  now  provoking  one  of  exceptional  importance 
within  Austria.  It  was  in  this  belief  and  in  this  state 
of  mind  that  the  ultimatum  was  sent  which  brought  on 
the  war;  but  likewise  it  must  be  remembered  that  the 
war  favored  Austria's  interests.  In  the  German 
White  Book  an  illuminating  confession  is  made  with 
certain  Saxon  ingenuousness,  namely:  that  the  Ber- 
lin government  knew  Austria's  intentions  of  making 
war  on  Servia  and  approved  and  encouraged  them. 
The  exact  text  is  as  follows : 

Given  the  circumstances  Austria  could  not  but  decide 
that  it  was  incompatible  with  her  dignity  and  with  the 


*  Memoir  and  documents  relating  to  the  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia;  official  publication,  page   I. 


SERVIA'S  ASPIRATIONS  85 

preservation  and  stability  of  the  monarchy  to  continue 
contemplating  passively  the  happenings  on  the  other  side 
of  her  frontier.  The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
informed  us  of  this,  her  opinion,  asking  ours. 

With  all  sincerity  we  were  able  to  declare  to  our  ally 
that  we  agreed  with  her  estimate  of  events,  and  to  assure 
her  that  we  would  approve  of  whatever  action  she  con- 
sidered necessary  to  put  an  end  to  the  movement  initiated 
in  Servia  against  the  stability  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy.  On  making  this  declaration  we  knew  per- 
fectly well  that  a  possible  armed  attack  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary on  Servia  was  likely  to  provoke  action  on  the  part 
of  Russia  and  involve  us  in  a  war.  But  recognizing  that 
the  vital  interests  of  Austria-Hungary  were  at  stake  we 
could  neither  recommend  a  condescension  incompatible 
with  her  dignity  nor  deny  her  our  aid  in  such  a  difficult 
moment.* 

In  this  we  see  the  explanation  of  the  attitude  as- 
sumed by  the  German  Government  regarding  posterior 
events.  It  is  a  pity  that  the  White  Book  does  not 
publish  the  text  of  the  notes  exchanged  between  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  Who  can  say  whether  in  them 
we  might  not  encounter  more  than  approbation  to  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  instigation  even?  The  vindications 
of  the  White  Book  appear  to  suggest  this  by  admit- 
ting that  Servia's  attitude  threatened  not  only  Aus- 
tria but  also  Germany,  which  is  tantamount  to  say- 


*  GugHelmo  Ferrero  appears  unaware  of  this  part  of  the 
Official  Memoir  of  Germany  in  his  book,  "La  Guerra  Europea." 
In  such  a  careful  writer  the  omission  is  strange. 


86  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ing:  Our  government  had  to  defend  itself  in  order 
not  to  perish  caught  in  the  meshes  of  a  diplomacy  at 
once  subtle  and  dangerous ;  we  had  to  cut  the  Gordian 
knot  and  force  Servia  to  abandon  forever  her  aspira- 
tions of  aggrandizement.* 

From  documents  published,  from  certain  statements 
encountered  in  the  English  White  Book,  and  from 
official  declarations  of  the  Italian  Government  and 
the  general  clamor  of  the  Italian  press,  it  appears  that 
the  third  ally  in  the  Triple  Alliance  was  as  much  sur- 
prised by  events  as  were  the  other  powers.  The  Ger- 
man White  Book  reveals  that  within  the  Triple  Al- 
liance there  had  been  another,  closer  still,  which  did 
not  extend  to  all  the  powers  who  had  signed  the  pact; 
and  the  revelation,  along  with  other  official  docu- 
ments at  hand,  justifies  the  neutrality  immediately 
assumed  by  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  had  Italy  been  previously  consulted  she 
would  have  advised  greater  prudence  and  would  have 
sought  a  solution  of  the  difficulty  as  she  had  done  on 
other  occasions,  notably  in  191 3.  But  Austria  pre- 
ferred other  advice;  for  having  followed  which  she 
will  certainly  not  go  down  in  diplomatic  annals  as  a 
model  of  perspicacity;  for,  admitting  all  the  extenuat- 


*  The  Austrian  Red  Book  throws  no  light  on  the  previous 
pourparlers  between  Germany  and  Austria  which  the  German 
Memoir  confesses.  The  very  omission  implies  a  confession — 
"excusatio  non  pertita  accusatio  manifesto," 


SERVIA'S  ASPIRATIONS  87 

ing  circumstances  and  justifications,  admitting  the 
troublesome  attitude  of  Servia  and  the  constant  provo- 
cations she  offered,  the  ultimatum  which  Austria  sent 
her  on  July  23  was  without  doubt  an  egregious  error 
and  a  deliberate  incitement  to  war. 


b&\ 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE  VIOLENT  METHOD  AND  ITS  RESULTS 

BISMARCK  once  wrote  that  "Even  governments 
most  inclined  to  sophism  and  violence  do  not 
wish  openly  to  break  their  word;  that  is  they  try  to 
keep  it  if  predominating  interests  do  not  enter  into 
play."  He  might  have  said  more.  He  might  have 
said  that  governments  prefer  always  to  execute  the 
most  violent  and  arbitrary  actions  under  the  cloak  of 
a  high  moral  duty  or  of  a  pressing  national  interest. 
But  Austria  did  not  even  seek  this  cloak.  Without 
the  subtlety  of  international  formalities  or  the  suavity 
of  diplomacy  she  bruskly  faced  Servia  with  a  prob- 
lem, and  in  doing  so  committed  one  of  the  most  au- 
dacious acts  of  modern  times — audacious  because  it 
ignored  the  fact  that  Europe  had  been  exercising  con- 
tinuous tutelage  over  the  Balkan  States ;  audacious  be- 
cause it  threw  down  the  glove  to  Russia;  and  more 
than  audacious  because  it  disregarded  Servia's  national 
rights  by  dictating  over  and  above  the  political  con- 
stitution of  that  country  the  fiat  of  Austria's  sovereign 

89 


90  THE  WORLD  WAR 

will.  However  well  prepared  puhhc  opinion  may  have 
Jieen^jjiie_AiiRtrian  note  of  July  23,  1914,  surpnsecl 
,the_ world.  Only  Germany  remained  tranquil,  cog- 
nizant as  was  later  revealed  bjyherojyn^^onfession^jof 
what  was  about  to  develop. 

The  note  from  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
of  Austria  to  the  Royal  Government  of  Servia  de- 
manded within  forty-eight  hours  an  acceptance  of  the 
following  exorbitant  terms : 

First.  To  suppress  every  publication  which  excited 
hatred  or  disrespect  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy and  whose  general  tendency  was  against  the 
national  integrity  of  the  same. 

Second.  To  immediately  dissolve  the  society  called 
Narodna  Odbrana  and  every  other  of  the  same  patri- 
otic tendency,  and  to  prevent  them  from  continuing 
under  some  other  name  or  form. 

Third.  To  immediately  eliminate  from  the  public 
schools  all  men  and  text-books  that  might  serve  to 
foment  the  propaganda  against  Austro-Hungary. 

Fourth.  To  dismiss  from  military  service  and 
from  the  administration  in  general  such  officers  and 
functionaries  as  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
should  accuse  of  anti-Austrian  propaganda. 

Fifth.  To  accept  the  collaboration  in  Servia  of 
representatives  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
in  the  suppression  of  the  subversive  movement  di- 


THE  VIOLENT  METHOD  91 

rected  against  the  territorial  integrity  of  said  Govern- 
ment. 

Sixth.  To  open  a  judicial  investigation  against  the 
accessories  to  the  plot  which  had  as  its  consequence 
the  assassination  of  the  hereditary  prince;  in  which 
investigation  delegates  of  the  Austro -Hungarian  gov- 
ernment would  take  part. 

Seventh.  To  instantly  condemn  to  prison  Captain 
Voijac  Tankositch  and  also  Milan  Ciganovitch,  Ser- 
vian employees  found  compromised  by  the  results  of 
the  magisterial  inquiry  already  held  in  territory  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  (Sarajevo)  against  the 
authors  of  the  crime  of  June  28. 

Eighth.  To  prevent  by  efficient  means  the  partici- 
pation by  Servian  authorities  in  the  illicit  traffic  of 
arms  and  explosives  across  the  frontier  and  to  dismiss 
and  severely  punish  those  functionaries  on  the  Scha- 
batz  and  Loznica  frontier  who  were  guilty  of  having 
aided  the  perpetrators  of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  by 
facilitating  their  passage  across  the  same. 

Ninth.  To  give  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment explanations  of  the  unjustifiable  attitude  of  high 
Servian  functionaries  who  in  spite  of  their  official 
position  did  not  hesitate  after  the  crime  of  Sarajevo 
to  publicly  express  themselves  both  in  Servia  and 
abroad  in  a  manner  hostile  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 


92  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Tenth.  To  report  wtihin  forty-eight  hours  the  exe- 
cution of  the  preceding  measures.* 

These  clearly  expressed  demands  were  preceded  by 
others  of  a  general  sort.  After  accusing  the  Servian 
government  of  culpable  tolerance  and  declaring  this 
to  have  been  the  cause  of  the  crime  of  Sarajevo,  it 
demanded  that  a  declaration  be  published  on  the  first 
page  of  the  Official  Gazette  condemning  not  only  Pan- 
Servian  aspirations  but  also  confessing  that  state  func- 
tionaries had  abetted  the  acts  directed  against  Austria- 
Hungary. 

The  foregoing  note  was  delivered  to  Servia  by  the 
minister  resident  in  Belgrade,  and  on  the  following 
day  it  was  ordered  that  it  should  be  communicated  to 
the  other  governments  with  explanations  of  the  rea- 
sons which  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  for  proceeding  in 
such  a  manner.  These  explanations  consisted  in  for- 
mulating an  accusation  against  Servia  for  having 
failed  in  the  obligation  imposed  upon  her  by  the  treaty 
of  March  31,  1909,  in  which  she  recognized  the  rights 
of  Austria-Hungary  over  Bosnia  and  Herezegovina, 
and  committed  herself  to  maintain  neighborly  rela- 
tions and  to  change  her  previous  policy  of  protest  and 
opposition.  There  was  further  talk  of  the  attacks  in 
Servian  newspapers,  of  the  plotting  by  Servian  poli- 


*  Memoir  and  documents  relating  to  the  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia.  German  official  publication,  page  22,  et  seq.;  also 
English   White  Book,  document  number  4. 


THE  VIOLENT  METHOD  93 

ticians,  and,  it  goes  without  saying,  much  talk  of  the 
benevolence  and  forbearance  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government.  This  note  to  the  European  powers  ter- 
minated by  stating  that  Austria-Hungary  was  con- 
vinced that  the  measures  she  had  adopted  would  be  in 
full  accord  with  the  sentiments  of  all  civilized  na- 
tions ;  and  she  offered  for  their  inspection  all  the  pro- 
bationary documentation  of  the  Servian  conspiracy 
and  of  its  connection  with  the  crime  of  June  28  which 
cost  the  hereditary  prince  his  life. 

The  impression  which  this  note  produced  in  the  Ser- 
vian and  other  cabinets,  especially  the  Russian  to  which 
it  was  sent  with  intentional  delay,  is  easy  to  imagine. 
Putting  aside  the  sentiment  of  grief  naturally  felt  for 
the  victims,  and  even  condemning  the  attitude  of  Ser- 
via,  it  must  nevertheless  be  admitted  that  the  Austrian 
note  outraged  all  the  rights  of  an  independent  state 
and  overstepped  the  limits  of  international  law;  fur- 
thermore, that  its  drastic  form  was  in  itself  a  provo- 
cation. For  the  purpose  of  avenging  a  crime  or  put- 
ting an  end  to  a  harmful  state  of  things,  armed  inter- 
vention would  have  appeared  more  logical.  Unfor- 
tunately for  humanity  international  relations  are  not 
regulated  by  the  famous  Scales ;  yet  even  violence  has 
its  limits.  It  is  undeniable  that  in  recent  years  we 
have  witnessed  the  formation  of  colonial  empires 
piratically  seized,  but  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  in 
such  cases  the  pretext  has  been  one  of  purely  inter- 


94  THE  WORLD  WAR 

national  order,  since  to  secure  the  emoluments  of  a 
determined  territory  it  was  necessary  to  occupy  it,  as 
was  done.  Deplorable  as  it  certainly  is  to  admit  such 
a  procedure  in  the  field  of  international  interests,  it  is 
quite  different  from  the  case  under  consideration, 
where  the  internal  laws  of  a  constitutional  European 
state  were  violated.  With  much  exactitude  could  Sir 
Edward  Grey  exclaim  in  the  note  sent  to  Sir  Maurice 
de  Bunsen,  English  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  on  that 
same  24th  of  July :  "Never  before  have  I  seen  one  state 
direct  to  another  independent  state  a  document  of  such 
formidable  character."  * 

Austria,  in  short,  claimed  governmental  rights  in 
Servia.  Although  limited  as  to  form  and  time  these 
signified  nothing  less  than  a  concurrence  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  Servian  justice.  This  virtually  con- 
demns her ;  it  destroys  state  sovereignty. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  formidable  note  the  effect  in 
Servia  was  enormous.  From  the  first  moment  the 
government  knew  what  it  meant  and  prepared  to 
transfer  the  capital  from  Belgrade,  which  was  too 
exposed,  to  Nisch.  Paschitch,  the  Prime  Minister, 
returned  precipitously  from  an  electoral  trip,  and  the 
Austrian  note  received  an  answer  which  was  tran- 
quil, serene,  adjusted  to  the  rights  of  nations,  very 
conciliatory,  and  sufficiently  submissive. 


*  English  White  Book,  correspondence  respecting  the  Euro- 
pean crisis,  page  9. 


THE  VIOLENT  METHOD  95 

It  began  by  declaring  that  Servia  had  fulfilled  her 
promises  of  1909,  that  the  protestations  of  former 
times  had  not  been  renewed,  and  that  she  had  made 
great  sacrifices  in  order  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope at  the  cost  of  her  own  legitimate  aspirations.  She 
agreed  in  its  totality  to  the  amende  honorable  which 
Austria  insisted  should  be  published  in  the  Official 
Gazette,  but  in  that  part  where  she  had  to  regret  the 
cooperation  of  Servian  officials  in  anti-Austrian  pro- 
paganda she  desired  to  add  the  modifying  words  "ac- 
cording to  the  communication  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Austro-Hungarian  Government."  She  de- 
clared herself  ready  to  comply  with  all  the  points  enu- 
merated, demanding  definite  proofs  in  individual 
cases;  but  she  could  not  accept  the  fifth  clause  re- 
ferring to  a  judicial  investigation  by  functionaries  of 
that  government;  instead  she  answered  submissively: 
"The  Royal  Government  declares  that  it  does  not  ex- 
actly understand  the  meaning  and  aim  of  this  demand, 
by  which  it  must  bind  itself  to  permit  delegates  of  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  to  intervene  in  its 
dominions;  but  it  is  disposed  to  accept  all  cooperation 
in  conformity  with  the  principles  of  international  law 
and  criminal  procedure,  and  of  good  neighborliness.',  * 

Servia  evidently  wished  to  avoid  war.    Even  if  the 


*  Memoir  and  documents  relating  to  the  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia;  official  German  publication,  page  26,  et  seq.;  also 
English  White  Book,  document  number  39. 


96  THE  WORLD  WAR 

body  of  the  document  did  not  so  indicate  the  ending 
was  irrefutable  proof.  To  prevent  the  Austrian  note 
from  having  the  importance  of  an  ultimatum,  and 
the  planting  of  a  consequent  casus  belli  in  case  Austria 
was  not  satisfied,  Servia  terminated  with  the  following 
proposition:  "The  Royal  Servian  Government  be- 
lieves that  it  is  to  the  general  interest  not  to  precipitate 
the  solution  of  this  affair;  for  which  reason  should 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  not  be  satisfied 
with  this  answer  the  Servian  Government  will  be  dis- 
posed to  accept  a  pacific  solution  either  by  referring 
the  decision  of  the  question  to  the  International  Tribu- 
nal of  The  Hague,  or  by  leaving  it  to  the  great  powers 
who  cooperated  in  the  note  of  explanation  given  by 
the  Servian  Government  in  March,  18-31,  1909."  * 

In  normal  times  the  most  exacting  government 
might  have  been  appeased  by  this  reply;  but  the  Vienna 
cabinet  had  not  sufficient  tranquillity  or  independence 
to  choose  the  road  it  ought  to  follow.  Some  powerful 
cause,  not  yet  completely  known,  launched  Austria  on 
a  previously  traced-out  path  of  violence,  and  the  note 
of  July  23  was  but  a  milestone.  The  Austro-Hun- 
garian Minister  at  Belgrade  withdrew  and  diplomatic 
relations  were  severed.  This,  if  not  actually  constitut- 
ing a  state  of  war  in  itself  (and  Japan  had  to  accept  it 
as  such  on  an  analogous  occasion  in  1904)  was  a  sure 


♦The  two  dates  are  of  the  two  different  calendars  used,  the 
one  in  Orthodox  countries  and  the  other  in  Western  Europe. 


THE  VIOLENT  METHOD  97 

announcement  of  the  proximity  of  war.  And  in  fact 
in  another  few  days  the  Danube  was  tinged  with 
blood. 

Austria's  note  and  her  subsequent  attitude  were  in- 
terpreted with  great  gravity  by  nations  and  statesmen. 
At  last  the  pretext  for  a  European  war  had  been 
found.  Many  times  had  the  conflict  been  provoked 
and  many  times  avoided ;  always  reciprocal  fear  or  the 
desire  of  the  opposing  parties  for  better  preparation 
had  changed  the  course  of  events. 

In  the  conduct  of  Austria-Hungary  two  extremes 
are  to  be  noted :  first,  that  she  consulted  with  her  ally 
Germany  on  the  note  of  July  23 ;  and  second,  that 
she  hardly  gave  any  news  of  it  whatever  to  her  other 
ally,  Italy.  This  fact  is  symptomatic  because  it  meant 
one  of  two  things:  either  the  Vienna  government  be- 
lieved from  the  very  first  moment  that  the  conflict 
would  be  general  and  consequently  serious  and  should 
therefore  have  warned  those  nations  whom  she  ex- 
pected to  aid  her;  or,  she  believed  that  it  was  merely 
a  diplomatic  question  between  two  nations,  or  at  most, 
a  circumscribed  casus  belli,  in  which  event  her  con- 
sulting Germany  was  completely  unnecessary.  Her 
doing  so  was  in  fact  suspicious  and  appears  even  more 
so  when  we  recall  that  the  German  White  Book  in- 
genuously confesses  that  Germany  too  felt  herself 
threatened  by  the  Slav  attitude,  that  she  feared  it 
might  weaken  Austria-Hungary,   and  that   she  saw 


98  THE  WORLD  WAR 

with  concern  that  it  might  open  a  breach  in  the  Triple 
Alliance  on  that  side.  Germany  makes  it  clearly  un- 
derstood that  Austria's  conduct  was  dictated  not  only 
to  protect  the  Dual  Monarchy  but  also  Germany's  own 
interests.  In  fact,  but  little  is  lacking  to  make  a  full 
confession  that  the  violent  act  of  Austria  was  dictated 
by  her. 
p  As  we  have  already  said  Servia  understood  that 
* — Austria  wanted  either  war  or  complete  hegemony  over 
her.  Therefore,  at  the  same  time  that  she  was  giving 
the  best  explanations  possible  and  try  to  adapt  Austria's 
claims  to  the  exigencies  of  her  own  sovereign  rights — 
all  of  which  meant  to  delay  events — she  began  pre- 
paring her  forces  for  defense  and  soliciting  outside 
help  as  well. 

Mobilization  was  ordered  at  once.  The  archives 
and  the  public  offices  were  transferred  to  Nish  and 
the  Skupshtina  was  convoked  there.  Paschitch  ad- 
dressed the  powers,  imploring  them  to  defend  the  inde- 
pendence of  Servia  and  declaring  "if  war  is  inevitable 
let  them  make  it."  *  His  Royal  Highness,  the  Prince 
Regent  of  Servia,  addressed  the  Emperor  of  Rus- 
sia, telling  him  of  the  Austrian  affair  and  the 
measures  Servia  was  taking,  and  begging  aid  in  the 
following  terms :   "At  the  expiration  of  the  time  con- 


*  Russian  Orange  Book;  communication  of  the  Russian 
Charge  6"  Affaires  in  Belgrade  to  the  Russian  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  document  number  I. 


THE  VIOLENT  METHOD  99 

ceded  we  may  be  attacked  by  the  Austro-Hunganan  y^* 
army,  already  on  our  frontier.    It  is  impossible  for  us   -^    . 
to  defend  ourselves  and  we  supplicate  Your  Majesty  \£lO 
to  send  aid  as  soon  as  possible.    Your  Majesty's  good 
will,  so  often  manifested  in  our  favor,  gives  us  the 
firm  hope  that  once  more  our  appeal  will  be  heard  by 
the  generous  Slav  heart.    In  these  difficult  moments  I 
interpret  the  sentiments  of  the  Servian  people  in  im- 
ploring that  Your  Majesty  may  interest  yourself  in 
the  fate  of  the  Kingdom  of  Servia."  * 

This  tragic  people  had  a  presentiment  of  war;  they 
looked  back  on  successive  subjugations,  and  now,  with 
apprehension,  they  saw  one  more,  perhaps  the  final. 
A  new  Kossovo,  which  battle  did  not  favor  valor  and 
which  delivered  Servia  for  five  centuries  to  Ottoman 
oppression,  might  deliver  her  for  another  five  cen- 
turies to  that  of  Austria.  The  promising  work  of 
national  rehabilitation  sung  by  the  bards  and  paid  for 
by  the  blood  of  her  warriors  was  on  the  point  of 
crumbling.  The  many  dramas  of  the  court  would 
have  no  national  objective.  The  last  reconquest  of  the 
kingdom  by  the  Karageorgeovitch  line  would  be  made 
void;  the  victories  of  General  Putnic,  barren;  the 
economic  and  financial  independence  obtained  by  enor- 
mous  sacrifices   in  the   face   of   acquisitive   Austria, 


*  Russian  Orange  Book;  telegram  of  July  24  from  H.R.H. 
the  Prince  Regent  of  Servia  to  H.M.  the  Emperor,  document 
number  6. 


ioo  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ephemeral;  the  Balkan  League,  product  of  the  efforts 
of  Paschitch,  nothing  but  a  dream.  All  would  fall  in 
one  moment  through  an  unforseen  and  inexplicable 
event.  How  many  times  had  the  little  kingdom  taken 
a  chance  without  meeting  such  sudden  peril!  Nor 
could  her  last  hope  be  her  own  effort  as  it  has  been 
in  remote  times  under  Duscian,  the  ancient  hero,  or 
Kara  George  the  modern  martyr.  The  cannon  would 
decide  forever  whether  the  Obrenovitch  line  calling 
on  Austria,  or  the  Karageorgevitch  calling  on  Russia, 
had  been  most  useful  to  Servia. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

ANTE-BELLUM   PUBLIC  OPINION 

THAT  the  Servian  incident  would  have  grave  con- 
sequences was  plain  to  European  opinion  from 
the  first.  The  press  of  the  different  countries  fash- 
ioned its  point  of  view  according  to  the  interests  of 
its  nation  and  undoubtedly  received  the  mot  d'ordre 
from  its  foreign  minister.  In  France  it  assumed  that 
tone  of  gravity  the  French  are  so  fond  of  but  which 
they  never  maintain  very  long.  Le  Temps  on  July  23 
and  24  was  giving  considerable  space  to  the  Caillaux 
trial  and  the  English  crisis  brought  about  by  Ulster's 
resistance  to  Home  Rule.  In  the  issue  of  July  25 
(published  the  preceding  evening)  it  took  up  the 
Austro-Hungarian  threat  and  straightway  declared 
that  out  of  the  ten  stipulations  there  was  one  which 
Servia  could  not  possibly  accept  without  destroying 
her  independence — the  one  admitting  Austria's  inter- 
vention in  judicial  processes.  On  July  27  and  28,  with 
fuller  information,  Le  Temps  attributed  all  the  conse- 
quences of  the  difficult  situation  and  all  the  blame, 

101 


102  THE  WORLD  WAR 

should  it  lead  to  war,  to  Germany,  since  she  could 
have  avoided  it  with  a  single  word  in  the  ear  of  the 
Austrian  cabinet.* 

Le  Matin,  in  spite  of  its  extensive  news  service,  did 
not  know  the  Austrian  intention  nor  even  the  nervous 
state  which  preceded  the  tempest  until  July  24.  Only 
on  July  25  did  she  awaken  and,  echoing  European 
opinion,  she  noted  the  sudden  drop  on  the  exchange, 
especially  that  of  the  French  national  debt  to  three 
per  cent,  the  lowest  in  thirty-five  years.  The  follow- 
ing day  the  same  newspaper  expressed  its  faith  edi- 
torially in  the  news  that  the  German  foreign  minister, 
Herr  Von  Jagow,  and  the  German  ambassador  in 
Paris,  Baron  Von  Schoen,  had  both  solemnly  declared 
that  Austria  did  not  consult  Berlin  as  to  the  Servian 
note.  Le  Figaro,  so  absorbed  at  that  moment  in  the 
Caillaux  trial,  foresaw  war  and  called  France  to  union. 
Even  Le  Gaulois,  the  reactionary  sheet,  exclaimed: 
"On  the  banks  of  the  Seine  and  in  all  France  there 
is  one  identical  sentiment — that  of  a  national  respon- 
sibility which  will  rise  to  whatever  height  events  may 
demand."  In  short,  this  was  the  tone  of  all  the  press 
small  in  circulation  but  large  in  political  importance — 
Le  Rappel,  Le  Radical,  La  Lanteme.  In  this  class 
only  UHumanite,  Jaures'  paper,  was  contrary  to  the 
common  journalistic  opinion.     Popular  newspapers  of 


*Le  Temps,  July  27,  1914;  "L'Allemagne  veut-elle  la  guerre?' 
The  same,  July  28:  "Du  role  de  rAllemagne." 


ANTE-BELLUM  PUBLIC  OPINION      103 

big  circulation  joined  in  the  general  chorus.  Le  Petit 
Journal  recalled  another  historic  date  on  which  Aus- 
tria provoked  war  with  the  same  violence.  "Today 
the  cabinet  of  Vienna  confronts  Servia  in  precisely 
the  same  way  and  with  the  same  self-justification  as 
she  did  the  Piedmont  in  1859.  That  is  to  say,  after 
breaking  diplomatic  relations  on  March  22,  1858,  she 
concluded  by  sending  to  Turin  on  April  21,  1859,  a 
peremptory  order  of  disarmament  within  three  days, 
and  set  forth  the  long  and  unexampled  forbearance 
of  which  she  had  given  proof  during  three  years  and 
in  presence  of  repeated  provocations.  This  is  pre- 
cisely the  attitude  and  language  adopted  to-day.  But 
the  same  action  of  1859  blasted  all  the  hopes  to  which 
it  had  given  birth.  Europe  rose  with  almost  universal 
condemnation.  Cavour  rejected  the  ultimatum  in  the 
name  of  national  dignity.  Napoleon  III  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  come  to  his  side.  Austria  found  a  great  power 
ready  to  fight  with  the  adversary  she  had  hoped  to 
crush;  and  Austria,  instead  of  triumphing,  lost  two 
provinces.,, 

This  apt  bit  of  history  unearthed  by  the  French 
newspaper  had  probably  slipped  the  memory  of  Aus- 
trian statesmen.  Certainly  they  had  forgotten  its  sad 
lesson. 

In  Russia  public  sentiment  was  even  more  roused. 
Internal  troubles  ceased  as  if  by  magic.  Newspapers 
and  public  all  understood  that  the  shot  aimed  at  Servia 


104  THE  WORLD  WAR 

had  struck  full  in  the  Russian  breast.  Instantly  there 
were  hostile  manifestations  against  Austria,  which 
had  to  be  repressed.  La  Novoie  Vremia,  the  official 
organ,  exclaimed :  "The  Russian  government  clearly 
understands  that  the  ultimatum  is  really  directed  to 
Russia,  and  Russia  will  answer  not  only  with  words 
but  with  deeds.  Servia  shall  not  stand  alone.  If 
Austria  does  not  withdraw  her  ultimatum  Russia  will 
not  be  a  mute  witness  of  the  violence  committed.  .  .  . 
We  want  peace,  but  if  war  is  forced  upon  us  official 
Russia  and  all  the  people  will  take  part  in  it."  The 
following  day  the  same  newspaper  affirmed  in  concert 
with  the  French  press  that  peace  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  German  government  and  that  she  could  easily  pre- 
serve it.  The  Gazette  de  la  Bourse,  of  Petrograd,  de- 
clared that  Russia  in  19 14  was  not  the  same  as  in 
1908.  The  reminder  was  very  apropos  because  at  that 
date  the  same  sort  of  conduct  on  Austria's  part  humil- 
iated Russia  and  left  her  conquered  without  having 
fought  a  battle.  Perhaps  Austria  herself,  and  Ger- 
many too,  knew  that  she  was  not  the  same  as  in  1908, 
but  preferred  the  Russia  of  1914  to  that  of  1918.  The 
Courrier  went  a  little  farther  toward  inflaming  its 
readers:  "The  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,"  it  de- 
clared, "proves  that  Austria  either  wants  war  with 
Russia  or  else  no  longer  considers  Russia  a  great 
power."  In  another  issue  the  same  newspaper  added 
that  "the  only  answer  worthy  of  Russia  is  the  mo- 


ANTE-BELLUM  PUBLIC  OPINION      105 

bilization  of  her  troops  on  the  Austrian  frontier." 
Statesmen,  and  in  fact  all  functionaries,  were  no 
less  agitated  than  the  journalists.  All  classes  felt  the 
same.  The  Austrian  blow  had  been  deliberately  aimed 
at  Russia  and  the  general  belief  was  that  Austria 
wished  war  or  else  their  humiliation.  On  July  24  the 
cabinet  met.  Sazonoff,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
announced  what  had  happened,  and  General  Suchom- 
linoff,  Minister  of  War,  explained  the  situation  of  the 
army.  Russia  from  the  first  moment  considered  the 
war  a  necessity. 

Of  the  nations  composing  the  Triple  Entente,  Eng- 
land, as  was  to  be  expected  from  her  character,  was 
least  excited.  Those  who  once  more  accused  perfidious 
Albion  of  having  wished  war  at  that  moment  be- 
cause all  her  alliances  were  prepared,  ignore  the  great 
tranquillity  displayed  in  the  early  moments  by  the 
public,  the  press,  and  the  government.  The  Times, 
although  surprised  at  the  language  used  in  the  Aus- 
trian note,  pronounced  the  form  to  be  courteous;  and 
admitting  the  moment  to  be  difficult  it  exclaimed: 
"All  who  love  peace  must  ardently  desire  that  Aus- 
tria-Hungary has  not  said  the  last  word  in  the  note 
to  which  Servia  must  give  answer  this  night."  The 
Morning  Post  tried  from  the  beginning  to  make  the 
public  see  the  importance  of  the  event  and  to  rouse 
it  out  of  a  general  apathy  which  was  incompatible 
with  the  world's  alarm.     "It  is  indispensable  that  the 


106  THE  WORLD  WAR 

English  people  should  be  made  to  see  how  grave  is 
the  situation  in  Europe.  At  any  moment  war  may 
break  out  and  no  one  can  say  whether  it  will  be  pos- 
sible to  localize  it.  There  is  a  tendency  here  to  con- 
sider that  the  fate  of  the  Balkan  States  has  no  interest 
for  this  country.  .  .  .  Can  England  contemplate  Eu- 
ropean questions  with  indifference  and  decline  to  take 
any  responsibility,  or  must  she  decide  to  play  the  part 
which  History  has  reserved  for  her?  This  is  the 
problem  we  put  without  indicating  the  answer.  .  .  ." 
But  the  Morning  Post's  fears  were  not  shared  by  other 
newspapers,  nor  by  the  Foreign  Office,  nor  by  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  in  spite  of  his  good  intentions  and 
great  prudence.  It  is  very  certain  that  this  sagacious 
minister  was  of  those  whom  the  Morning  Post  cen- 
sured for  believing  that  Balkan  affairs  did  not  interest 
England. 

Let  us  now  take  up  the  countries  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance where,  excepting  Italy,  opinion  was  just  as  grave 
but  in  a  different  direction.  From  the  first  moment 
Italy  began  to  have  doubts;  the  perplexities  of  the 
government  in  face  of  an  unforeseen  conflict  were 
reflected  by  the  public.  Certain  conservative  and 
clerical  newspapers  like  the  Corriere  d'ltalia  and  the 
Popolo  Romano  believed  that  Austria  was  not  far  in 
the  wrong,  and  that  the  Servian  attitude  had  been  a 
continuous  offense  to  the  name  of  friendship;  others, 
liberal  or  nationalist  like  the  Messagero,  the  Vittoria, 


ANTE-BELLUM  PUBLIC  OPINION      107 

and  the  Tribuna,  considered  the  Austrian  note  im- 
moderate. In  examining  either  judgment,  it  must  be 
kept  in  mind  that  Italy  was  predisposed  against  Ser- 
via,  whose  exaggerated  pretentions  to  expansion 
threatened  Italy's  Adriatic  interests.  Italy,  and  espe- 
cially before  Austria  aspired  to  be  a  naval  power,  al- 
ways looked  upon  the  Adriatic  as  a  lake,  all  her  own. 
Had  it  not  been  the  direct  field  of  action  of  the  glori- 
ous Venetian  Republic  whose  ancient  splendor  was 
the  dream  of  renascent  Italy?  Sentiment  aside,  the 
nearness  of  the  opposite  coast  constituted  a  real  peril, 
and  Italy  could  not  look  with  kindly  eyes  on  Servia's 
unconcealed  efforts  to  widen  her  confines,  particularly 
toward  the  sea.  This  she  aspired  to  as  a  consequence 
of  her  victories  over  Turkey  and  Bulgaria;  and  this 
Italy  along  with  Austria  had  evoked  all  her  diplomacy 
to  avoid. 

Public  opinion  in  Berlin  and  Vienna,  however,  was 
almost  unanimous  in  favor  of  the  Austrian  act.  In 
Vienna  it  was  apparent  that  the  note  had  served  to 
give  satisfaction  to  an  anxious  public  and  in  Berlin  it 
was  apparent  that  it  had  served  German  ends.  In  the 
joyous  chorus  of  the  press,  the  angry  voice  of  certain 
newspapers  crying  in  vigorous  Teutonic  fashion  for 
war  or  the  humiliation  of  Servia,  was  at  first  dis- 
cordant; but  in  proportion  as  events  developed  there 
appeared  a  uniform  communis  opinio  influenced  by, 


108  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  owing  to,  the  counsel  given  by  Wilhelmstrasse  and 
the  Ballplatz. 

The  Neues  Wiener  Tageblatt  set  forth  this  alterna- 
tive: "Either  Servia  must  consent  with  good  grace 
[sic]  to  renounce  her  dreams  and  the  manner  in  which 
she  tries  to  realize  them,  or  we  will  oblige  her  to.  We 
are  determined  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  that  which 
we  already  possess  and  not  to  separate  ourselves  from 
the  sea  through  the  ambition  of  a  small  neighbor.  If 
Austria  does  not  force  the  Pan-Servian  ideal  to  abdi- 
cate, Austria  herself  will  have  to  abdicate.,, 

The  Fremdenblatt  reflecting  entirely  governmental 
opinion  went  even  further  than  the  Neues  Wiener 
Tageblatt;  it  suppressed  half  the  dilemna,  leaving  only 
one  of  its  horns — war.  "War  is  an  ugly  word  not 
easy  to  pronounce  when  one  feels  its  full  responsi- 
bility; but  this  time  it  is  absolutely  necessary.  .  .  . 
We  do  not  know  whether  at  the  last  moment  when 
our  soldiers  are  ready  to  pass  the  frontier  our  neigh- 
bor will  be  more  reasonable.  War  does  not  yet  exist, 
but  we  are  preparing  for  it.  We  have  reached  that 
point  where  there  can  be  neither  mediation  nor  arbi- 
tration. It  is  not  a  question  of  summoning  our  mortal 
enemies  before  a  tribunal  of  justice,  but  of  convincing 
them  before  the  tribunal  of  history  that  they  have  no 
case;  that  the  future  does  not  belong  to  the  Pan-Serb 
ideal  but  to  our  monarchy  and  that  it  is  not  Pan- 
Serbism  which  is  the  stronger,  but  that  spirit  which 


ANTE-BELLUM  PUBLIC  OPINION      109 

for  centuries  has  kept  Austria-Hungary  united." 
The  words  of  the  Fremdenblatt  are  virtually  those 
pronounced  in  Budapest  by  Count  Tisza,  Hungarian 
Prime  Minister  (whose  cabinet  it  will  be  remembered 
had  no  responsibility  in  foreign  affairs).  Speaking 
before  parliament  the  Count  said:  "No  one  can  re- 
proach us  with  having  sought  war.  I  may  say  even 
more,  that  we  went  to  the  extreme  limits  of  patience 
[loud  cheers].  Convinced  that  our  action  is  due  to  the 
vital  interests  of  the  Hungarian  nation  we  are  ready' 
to  face  all  the  consequences."  [Loud  applause  from 
all  sides.]  Count  Andrassy,  leader  of  the  opposition, 
forgot  those  differences  and  even  old  rancors  always 
so  abundant  in  the  turbulent  Hungarian  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  and  insisted  that  the  Servian  attitude  was 
intolerable  and  called  upon  Hungarians  to  unite  and 
do  their  duty.*  The  Chamber,  as  in  similar  critical 
situations  when  resolutions  are  left  to  the  executive 
body,  suspended  its  sessions. 

Among  all  the  Austrian  newspapers  only  the  social- 
ist organ,  the  Arbeiter  Zeitung,  was  out  of  tune.  In 
its  issue  of  July  24  it  declared  that  Austria  was  trying 
to  take  advantage  of  a  weak  neighbor,  forcing  her  to 
rebel  against  unjust  demands  so  as  to  later  lay  at  her 
door  all  the  responsibility  of  a  war. 

As  a  consequence  of  newspaper  propaganda  and 


*  Session   of   July  24,    1914,   of   the   Hungarian    Chamber   of 
Deputies. 


no  THE  WORLD  WAR 

military  preparation  came  the  agitation  in  the  street. 
In  Vienna  the  masses  began  crying  "Down  with  Ser- 
m    via !"  and  ended  with  "Down  with  Russia"  correlative 
N'  terms  in  the  subtle  instinct  of  the  masses.     In  front 
£^    of  the  German  Embassy  they  sang  the  Wacht  am 
Rhein  and  other  national  songs,  and  sensed  in  the  very 
^-v    act  that  the  time  had  come  to  make  good  the  grandiose 
N^  pretentions  of  the  ringing  Teutonic  hymns. 
^^>      In  Berlin  during  the  first  moments  the  press  had  no 
V^fixed  orientation  but  soon  found  one.    For  instance  on 
J^*July  24,  the  Vossische  Zeitung,  a  liberal  newspaper 
^O   of  great  importance,  on  learning  of  the  Austrian  note, 
^     felt  obliged  to  comment  as  follows:    "It  cannot  be 
^*     denied  that  every  paragraph  of  this  note  is  an  attempt 
on  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Servian  state.    We  con- 
/     sider  it  very  unlikely  that  Servia  will  submit  to  such 
/      conditions."    But  when  on  the  following  day  it  learned 
I        that  Russia  had  asked  for  an  extension  of  time  in 
behalf  of  Servia  (a  petition  which  in  normal  circum- 
stances would  not  have  been  considered  unfair  espe- 
cially by  the  party  who  had  pronounced  Austria's 
claims  beyond  the  limits  of  international  law),  the 
Zeitung  expressed  itself  quite  differently:   "Yesterday 
brought  us  the  gravest  of  news.    Russia  asks  Austria 
to  delay.     Austria  cannot  accept  a  condition  which 
would  in  any  way  permit  Servia  to  take  shelter  be- 
■^        hind  a  diplomatic  wall."     Than  this  a  more  patent 
contradiction  could  not  exist. 


ANTE-BELLUM  PUBLIC  OPINION      in 

Immediately  after,  the  road  was  left  free  to  those 
newspapers  of  well  defined  opinion,  and  hesitating  ones 
like  the  Post  or  the  Rhein  and  Westphalia  Gazette  were 
silenced.  The  matter  passed  into  the  hands  of  the 
military  party  so  strong  in  Berlin,  staunchly  upheld 
by  the  whole  army,  and  led  by  no  less  a  person  than 
the  heir  to  the  throne.  When  the  Post,  following  the 
then  general  opinion  to  the  effect  that  Germany  had 
nojJjeen_con  suited  on  thejiote^aid :  'ili-advdce^con-  fc 
cerning  such,  a  serious^affak-  is  not  askgd— £rnr^an 
ally  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  her  aid,"  the  Berliner 
nrrkfti-^nzeiger,  the  officialperiodlcal, '  at  once  an- 
swered:  "The  Gerjaan  ^people  feel  better  _on,  seeing  / 
that  finally  the  ^alVan^tii^jjpn  is  to  bejjeaj^up" ;  \J 
and  further  declared  that  Germany  "congratulates  her 
ally  on  the  strong  decision  taken  and  will  give  her 
proof  of  fidelity  and  sympathy  in  the  course  of  the 
grave  hours  which  are  probably  to  be  passed  through." 
Identical  are  the  sentiments  of  the  popular  Berliner 
Tageblatt:  "The  Austro-Hungarian  note  admits  of 
no  diplomatic  negotiations.  In  spite  of  the  desire  of 
the  whole  civilized  world  to  keep  the  peace  it  must  be  ^^ 
admitted  that  Austria  could  not  act  in  any  other  man-  A 
ner.  She  may  count  on  the  aid  of  her  allies."  With 
even  greater  precision  the  principal  ultra-conservative 
organ  indicated  to  Austria  that  Germany  would  fight 
by  her  side :  "The  German  people  are  ready  to  fulfill 
the  duties  to  which  their  alliance  binds  them.     It  is 


ii2  THE  WORLD  WAR 

well  that  it  should  be  known  abroad  that  Germany 

will  not  vacillate  a  single  instant  in  deciding  to  march 

shoulder  to  shoulder  with  her  Austrian  ally."     The 

r*  Berliner  Nachtrichten  took  its  own  view  and  setting 

aside  all  question  of  alliance  came  out  on  July  25  with 

^A    the  following  philosophic  observation:    "If  we  must 

^  \   have  a  European  war  it  is  better  for  us  that  it  should 

n\  1  be  this  year  and  not  191 7.    By  that  date,  Russia  would 

1  have  terminated  her  military  reform  and  France  would 

Thave  filled  the  gaps  pointed  out  by  Senator  Humbert." 

This   is  a  reference  to  the  criticisms  made  by  the 

French  senator  on  the  deficient  military  organization 

of  his  country;  but  the   Prussian  newspaper   forgot 

that  when  he  made  them,  the  whole  German  press 

would  not  admit  the  gaps  but  alleged  that  it  was 

merely  a  pretext  to  augment  war  preparations. 

More  dangerous  for  the  people  were  the  semi-offi- 
cial communications  proceeding  now  from  some  high 
military  personage,   now   from   some  high  civil   em- 
ployee; and  more  exciting  for  them  was  the  financial 
news.     Influenced  by  one  and  the  other  the  crowds 
filled  the  streets  singing  that  hymn  which  embodies 
all  their  hopes — Deutschland  iiber  Alles. 
y    Diplomacy  did  its  work  under  the  influence  of  pub- 
/    lie  opinion  somewhat  as  follows :  Russia  decidedly  irri- 
tated; Austria  ready  for  the  worst;   Germany  pre- 
\       pared  to  defend  her  and  make  common  cause  with 
\    her;  France  aflame  and  serious;  Italy  taken  by  sur- 


ANTE-BELLUM  PUBLIC  OPINION      113 

prise  and  anxious  not  to  be  dragged  for  another's  ad- 
vantage into  a  position  contrary  to  her  own  national 
interest;  England  hoping  to  prevent  the  conflict  and 
knowing  that  if  it  should  break  out  she  must  depart 
consciously  and  voluntarily  from  her  state  of  "splen- 
did isolation."  Only  a  great  collective  effort,  only 
the  good  will  of  all,  could  have  prevented  the  war 
made  so  imminent  by  the  Austrian  note.  But  only 
in  those  who  had  least  reason  to  be  interested  in  a 
struggle  between  Germans  and  Slavs  did  the  good  will 
exist. 


CHAPTER   XV 

EFFORTS  OF  THE  VARIOUS   GOVERNMENTS 

WHEN  the  war  broke  out  the  internal  political 
situation  of  the  various  countries  was  most 
peculiar.  Only  Austria  and  Germany  had  no  diffi- 
cult problems  to  solve.  In  England  the  Irish  ques- 
tion was  assuming  alarming  proportions;  the  last 
effort  at  a  solution  by  means  of  a  conference  of  lead- 
ers of  the  two  parties  had  just  failed.*  The  Ulster 
fight  was  about  to  recommence  with  greater  violence 
than  ever  and  no  one  could  foresee  the  result.  In 
France  the  Caillaux  trial  kept  the  public  in  such  a 
ferment  that  not  a  few  believed  there  would  be  a  repe- 
tition of  the  difficult  period  of  the  Dreyfus  case.  In 
the  course  of  history  French  sentimentality  has  fre- 
quently proven  that  small  causes  can  take  possession 
of  the  public  mind  and  produce  disproportionate  ef- 
fects. 

In  Russia,  according  to  a  German  authority,!  they 
were  entering  on  a  new  period  of  strikes  which  threat- 
ened a  repetition  of  the  revolutionary  agitations  of 


*  The  London  Times;  July  25,  1914. 
^Berliner  Nachtrichten;  July  25,  1914. 

"5 


H6  THE  WORLD  WAR 

1905  which,  it  will  be  recalled,  led  to  bloodshed  in  the 
principal  cities.  In  Italy  they  had  not  yet  healed  the 
wounds  of  violent  labor  troubles  which  took  place 
chiefly  in  the  turbulent  Romagna ;  and  worse  still  rail- 
road employees  were  preparing  a  new  strike  which 
would  shortly  paralyze  the  commercial  life  of  the 
kingdom.  A  writer  of  great  psychologic  insight,  Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  accuses  Germany  of  having  taken  ad- 
vantage of  these  conditions  so  propitious  to  her  plans. 
"In  Russia,"  he  says,  "there  were  disorders  which  as 
usual  were  exaggerated  abroad.  Great  Britain  was  in 
difficult  circumstances  because  of  the  antagonism  be- 
tween an  Irish  province  largely  Protestant  and  the 
other  three  largely  Catholic.  In  France  the  major- 
ity in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  made  up  of  Socialists 
and  united  Radical-Socialists,  though  it  was  but  a 
weak  majority,  appeared  to  foreign  eyes  to  indicate  a 
diminution  of  military  tendencies  and  of  the  spirit  of 
sacrifice.  On  the  other  hand  Humbert's  declarations 
in  the  Senate  on  supposed  deficiencies  in  our  arma- 
ment and  in  our  general  war  preparation  were  inter- 
preted abroad  with  visible  exaggeration  as  a  sure  in- 
dication of  the  weakness  of  our  army.  This  conjunc- 
tion of  facts  appeared  to  furnish  Prussia  who  had 
long  been  lying  in  ambush  with  the  occasion  so  fer- 
vently desired."  * 


*"La    Guerre"    in    I'Economiste    Frangais,    August    3,    1914, 
page  202. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     117 

Besides  all  these  perturbations  there  was  another 
state  of  things  unfavorable  to  a  rapid  military  adven- 
ture. The  President  of  the  French  Republic,  Ray- 
mond Poincare,  accompanied  by  the  Prime  Minister, 
Rene  Viviani,  was  in  Russia  singing  hymns  to  the 
alliance  of  the  two  nations.  The  Kaiser  was  off  on 
one  of  his  favorite  maritime  excursions.  Ambassa- 
dors were  away  from  their  posts ;  at  the  Servian  capi- 
tal the  Russian  ambassador  had  recently  died  and  the 
French  was  ill. 

It  is  difficult  to  affirm  with  due  impartiality  that 
these  convenient  conditions  induced  Austria  to  deliver 
her  blow  against  Servia.  Up  to  the  present  we  do 
not  know  the  correspondence  which  Austria  had  with 
her  plenipotentiaries.  Time  will  undoubtedly  reveal 
things  which  it  would  be  venturesome  to  say  to-day. 
But  the  internal  political  condition,  especially  of  the 
nations  composing  the  Triple  Entente,  is  hardly  a  sure 
basis  for  assuming  that  Austria  was  taking  advantage 
of  their  situation.  For  years  past  they  had  all  been 
suffering  these  crises  in  their  respective  periods  of 
transformation.  England,  before  facing  the  difficul- 
ties of  Home  Rule,  had  experienced  those  no  less  seri- 
ous occasioned  by  fiscal  measures ;  in  Russia  there  had 
been  the  terrorist  agitations;  in  France  the  anti-mili- 
tarist disturbance,  etc. 

In  examining  the  diplomatic  acts  of  the  present  bel- 
ligerents it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  know  how 


n8  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Berlin  government  was  consulted  as  to  the  famous 
Austrian  note  and  how  much  influence  it  exercised. 
Everyone  is  now  aware  that  the  contents  of  the  note 
were  known  and  approved  in  Berlin.  This  explains 
Germany's  subsequent  attitude  when  she  was  so  little 
concerned  over  approaching  events  that  she  did  not 
care  to  advise  the  Ballplatz  cabinet,  although  sure  that 
any  prudent  counsel  given  there  would  have  found  a 
favorable  echo.  That  Berlin  knew  what  Austria  was 
about  to  do  and  the  seriousness  of  its  consequences 
there  can  be  no  doubt,  for  Germany  has  publicly  con- 
fessed as  much  in  the  paragraph  of  the  official  memoir 
to  which  we  have  already  alluded.  The  advice  to  pro- 
ceed violently  against  Servia  was  consciously  given. 
"On  making  this  declaration  we  knew  perfectly  that 
a  possible  armed  action  by  Austria-Hungary  against 
Servia  would  provoke  intervention  on  the  part  of  Rus- 
sia and  involve  us  in  a  war."  * 

Nor  can  it  be  doubted  from  the  language  of  the  offi- 
cial publication  just  referred  to  that  it  was  the  Ger- 
man government  and  not  the  Kaiser  who  was  con- 
sulted ;  and  we  can  only  suppose  that  the  statements  of 
Von  Jagow,  German  Foreign  Minister  in  Paris,  and 
Von  Schoen,  German  Ambassador,  in  which  they  af- 
firmed, July  25,  that  they  did  not  know  the  Austrian 


*  Memoir  and  documents  relating  to  the  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia,  official  publication,  page  5. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     119 

note*  were  due  to  Germany's  not  wanting  it  to  be 
understood  that  the  incident  had  been  especially  ar- 
ranged in  order  to  provoke  a  war.  Judging  from  the 
view  upheld  by  German  diplomacy  during  the  brief 
negotiations  that  lasted  until  August  1,  Germany 
wanted  the  world  to  believe  that  she  was  trying  to 
reduce  the  importance  of  the  question  and  to  localize 
the  conflict  between  Austria  and  Servia.  The  plea 
of  localizing  the  war  could  hardly  have  been  defended 
had  it  been  known  that  Austria,  fully  aware  of  the 
importance  of  the  case,  had  previously  consulted  her 
ally;  and  much  less  if  in  those  early  moments  the  true 
attitude  of  the  German  Empire  and  the  proportions 
which  it  expected  the  conflict  to  assume  had  been 
known.  How  serious  Germany  considered  it  was  later 
defined  in  the  following  official  words : 

"If  Servia  had  been  permitted  any  longer  to  en- 
danger the  integrity  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy with  the  aid  of  Russia  and  France,  the  conse- 
quence would  have  been  the  gradual  destruction  of 
Austria  and  the  bringing  of  the  whole  Slav  race  under 
the  sceptre  of  Russia;  and  Russia  in  turn  would  have 
made  untenable  the  position  of  the  Germanic  race  in 
the  center  of  Europe."  f 

It  is  to  be  supposed  that  identical  reasons  induced 


*  Le  Matin,  July  26,  1914. 

^Memoir  and  documents  relating  to  the  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia,  official  publication,  page  5. 


120  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  in  London, 
to  declare  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  "the  German 
Government  had  not  been  informed  of  the  text  of  the 
Austrian  note.',  *  In  this  case  the  false  statement 
takes  on  greater  importance  because  it  has  a  completely 
official  character. 

Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon  affirms  that  the  Kaiser  had  in  his 
hands  the  draft  of  the  note  and  after  reading  it  made 
suggestions  emphasizing  its  severity,  which  sugges- 
tions were  accepted  by  Austria. f  This  well-known 
publicist  was  representing  the  Daily  Telegraph  on  the 
Continent  during  the  crisis;  his  reliability  in  giving 
news  is  well  known  and  he  asserts  that  he  did  not 
merely  suppose  or  deduce  the  foregoing,  but  that  he 
knew  it  to  be  a  fact. 

German  intervention,  whether  to  the  extreme  of 
counselling  Austria  to  intensify  the  note,  as  Dr.  Dil- 
lon affirms,  or  whether  only  to  the  point  of  consider- 
ing the  matter  her  own,  as  the  German  government 
admits  in  the  official  publication,  can  be  explained  by 
the  disturbed  equilibrium  of  Oriental  Europe  resulting 
from  the  last  Balkan  War.  Germany,  as  described, 
had  made  great  efforts  to  attract  Turkey  within  her 
sphere  of  influence.  All  the  splendid  work  of  Von 
Marschall  during  long  years,  all  the  military  labors  of 


*  Russian  Orange  Book,  document  number  20. 
f  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon;  "Causes  of  the  European  War,"  in  The 
Contemporary  Review,  September,  1914,  page  319. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS    121 

German  tacticians  including  Von  der  Goltz,  had  had 
for  result  the  double  defeat  of  Turkey  in  Africa  by 
Italy  and  in  Europe  by  the  Balkan  League.  The  bal- 
ance against  increasing  Russian  force  which  Germany 
had  sought  in  an  entente  with  Turkey  was  neutralized 
by  the  latter' s  decrease  in  territory,  especially  as  she 
was  left  with  only  one  foot  in  Europe;  and  among 
other  causes  was  the  growth  of  the  Servian  military 
spirit  and  the  powerful  French  influence  in  Greece, 
which  overcame  even  the  desires  of  the  king  of  that 
nation.  The  European  balance  having  thus  inclined 
towards  the  Triple  Entente,  it  was  necessary  to  raise 
the  stock  of  the  Triple  Alliance — to  reestablish  the 
equilibrium,  if  not  the  supremacy. 

German  diplomacy  has  never  been  addicted  to  tran- 
quil preparations  and  insidious  occupation  of  new 
positions.  On  the  contrary  she  has  always  been  the 
nation  of  hard  blows,  violent  threats,  and  brusk  move- 
ments. Nations,  like  individuals,  follow  their  favorite 
tactics. 

After  the  establishment  of  the  new  Servian  mon- 
archy the  relations  of  the  Russian  minister  in  Belgrade 
were  of  the  most  intimate  (we  have  already  mentioned 
that  the  Austrian  ex-Minister  Dumba  compared  him  to 
a  viceroy).  When  the  Austrian  note  arrived,  the  post 
being  vacant  through  the  death  of  the  last  incumbent, 
Strandtman  was  at  the  head  of  the  Russian  Legation. 
On  the  23rd  he  communicated  to  the  minister  of  for- 


122  THE  WORLD  WAR 

eign  affairs  at  Petrograd  that  Patchou,  Servian  Min- 
ister of  State,  had  in  the  absence  of  Pachitch  ac- 
quainted him  with  the  contents  of  the  Austrian  note 
received  at  six  o'clock  that  same  afternoon.  Servia, 
he  said,  would  not  yield  to  Austria's  demands  and  ap- 
pealed through  him  for  Russia's  aid.* 

Servia  had  conjectured  aright  in  expecting  the  aid 
of  the  great  Slavic  nation.  The  appeal  of  the  Prince 
Regent  found  an  echo  in  the  heart  of  the  Czar  and 
that  of  Patchou  in  the  heart  of  Sazonoff.  There  was 
to  be  no  repetition  of  1908  when  Russia,  helpless,  had 
to  witness  Servia's  humiliation  and  the  ruin  of  her 
own  prestige. 

Sazonoff  immediately  communicated  with  the 
charge  d'affaires  in  Vienna  (the  ambassador  being  tem- 
porarily absent)  and  asked  him  to  solicit  more  time  in 
which  to  consider  the  ultimatum,  so  that  the  powers  to 
whom  it  had  been  sent  might,  if  they  deemed  wise, 
counsel  Servia  to  accept  at  least  some  of  Austria's  de- 
mands, f  At  the  same  time  the  governments  of  Eng- 
land,! France,  Italy  and  Servia  were  informed  that 
this  petition  had  been  made.  While  making  every 
effort  to  obtain  the  postponement  Russia  did  not  hide 
the  gravity  of  the  situation.  The  ministers  were  as- 
sembled and  an  official  communique  was  given  out  to 


*  Russian  Orange  Book,  documents   1   and  6. 
f  Russian  Orange  Book,  document  number  4. 
$  English  White  Book,  document  number  13. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     123 

show  the  concern  of  the  Czar's  government,  and  fur- 
ther, that  an  Austro-Servian  clash  would  not  find  it 
indifferent.* 

The  extension  of  the  forty-eight  hours  granted  to 
Servia  in  which  to  answer  appeared  necessary  even  to 
less  interested  nations;  that  is,  if  a  peaceful  solution 
was  to  be  found.  Naturally  neither  Russia  nor  the 
other  powers  pretended  to  wish  such  extension  out  of 
a  simple  desire  to  satisfy  Austria's  demands  a  few 
hours  later ;  but  neither  did  they  ask  it  for  the  purpose 
of  stealing  a  march  on  her  and  accelerating  their  own 
preparations.  It  would  be  as  unjust  to  suspect  this 
second  malicious  intent  as  it  would  be  ingenuous  to 
believe  in  the  first. 

What  all  sincerely  desired  was  a  more  adequate 
term  for  studying  the  serious  and  fulminating  Euro- 
pean situation.  Russia  did  not  wish  the  humiliation 
of  Servia.  Perhaps  she  wished  it  even  less  than  Ser- 
via herself,  for  while  the  latter  would  have  to  submit 
because  of  the  military  disparity  between  herself  and 
Austria,  Russia  could  not  advance  the  same  reason 
without  abdicating  her  post  as  a  great  power;  the  be- 
littling of  Servia  would  be  that  of  Russia.  Russia 
nevertheless  made  every  effort  to  find  a  way  out  of 
the  difficulty  just  as  any  nation  would  do  on  finding 
herself  unexpectedly  involved.      Even  the  most  ag- 


*  Le    Temps,    July    25,    1914;    also    Russian    Orange    Book, 
document  number  10. 
9 


124  THE  WORLD  WAR 

gressive  state,  like  the  most  aggressive  man,  prefers 
to  select  his  own  moment  for  combat. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  of  the  same  opinion  as  Sazo- 
noff  regarding  the  impossibility  of  an  instantaneous 
solution;  more  than  this;  on  July  23,  when  he  first 
learned  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  ambassador  in 
London  that  such  a  note  was  to  be  sent  and  that  it 
would  demand  an  answer  in  forty-eight  hours,  he  re- 
marked that  it  was  practically  an  ultimatum.*  That 
such  an  ultimatum  was  out  of  reason  and  without  po- 
litical antecedent  is  evident  for  if  Austria  had  believed 
it  necessary  to  send  a  copy  of  the  note  to  other  powers, 
and  if  these  had  always  intervened  in  Balkan  affairs 
and  had  exercised  over  those  states  a  collective  pro- 
tectorate, it  was  only  just  that  the  respective  govern- 
ments who  received  the  copy  should  have  time  to  study 
it  in  order  to  answer  and  take  action.  Nor  should  it 
be  forgotten  that  Austria,  to  her  own  interest  and 
with  but  scant  courtesy,  delayed  in  sending  the  text 
of  the  note  to  Petrograd,  so  that  this  government 
had  not  even  forty-eight  but  only  thirty-one  hours  for 
deliberation. f  Thus  while  England  from  the  first  was 
given  to  understand  through  the  German  and  the  Aus- 
trian ambassadors  how  grave  was  the  situation  (this 
with  the  hope,  as  will  presently  be  shown,  that  Ger- 
many might  make  sure  of  England's  non-participation) 


*  English  White  Book,  document  number  2. 
%  E.  J.  Dillon ;  article  cited,  page  462. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     125 

Russia,  whose  preponderating  influence  in  Servian 
affairs  was  well  known,  was  kept  in  darkness. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  on  insisting  on  more  time  made  a 
suggestion  that  might  have  led  to  a  solution,  namely: 
the  mediation  of  England,  France,  Germany,  and 
Italy.*  But  Germany  in  answering  this  put  the  mat- 
ter on  other  grounds.  "It  is  impossible  to  summon 
our  ally  in  her  conflict  with  Servia  before  a  European 
tribunal ;"  and  the  chancellor  in  a  telegram  to  the  Ger- 
man ambassador  in  London  expressed  himself  to  the 
effect  that  Germany  desired  above  all  to  localize  the 
conflict ;  that  Austria  must  be  given  a  free  hand  against 
Servia,  that  Russia  must  not  commit  any  act  of  hos- 
tility against  Austria  nor  even  partly  mobilize  her 
troops,  for  if  she  did  so  Germany  would  not  abandon 
her  ally.  Such  words  could  only  mean  a  European 
war.  This  evidently  was  desired,  for  no  solution  was 
forthcoming  and  the  matter  remained  enclosed  in  a 
circle  of  iron.  There  was  but  one  way  out — the 
lamentable  one  finally  resorted  to. 

Later  Germany  tried  to  twist  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
suggestion  into  an  entirely  different  meaning,  and 
offered  to  accept  mediation  in  case  of  an  Austro-Rus- 
sian  conflict  but  not  an  Austro-Servian.  This  dis- 
tinction was  never  intended  by  Grey  and  logically  could 
not  be  made,  for  Russia  had  no  disagreement  with 


*  English  White  Book,  documents    10  and   n;   also  German 
White  Book,  documents  12  and  13. 


126  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Austria  other  than  that  which  rose  out  of  Austria's 
with  Servia.  To  settle  one  without  the  other  was 
impossible,  and  however  great  and  clever  the  resources 
of  diplomacy,  to  give  affairs  this  turn  was  a  jest 
shorn  of  all  mirth.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  shown  from 
the  first  that  while  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  did  not 
interest  him  its  far-reaching  consequences  did;  there- 
fore he  would  be  obliged  to  weigh  carefully.  This 
was  about  the  same  as  saying  that  if  the  rest  were 
content  with  what  Austria  was  doing  with  Servia, 
England,  having  no  direct  Balkan  interests,  would  be 
silent;  but  if  any  of  the  great  powers  intervened,  Eng- 
land too  would  enter  into  the  fray. 

And  the  fact  is  that  this  same  minister,  even  after 
the  forty-eight  hours  had  expired,  asked  that  military 
operations  be  delayed  in  order  to  give  time  for  a 
settlement.  This  he  did  on  the  ground  of  the  Aus- 
trian ambassador's  statement  that  the  ultimatum  and 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Austrian  plenipotentiary  from 
Belgrade  did  not  signify  war. 

The  two  ways  of  understanding  the  conflict  were, 
then,  face  to  face.  On  the  one  side,  Germany  and 
Austria  wished  to  localize  the  combat  in  order  that 
Austria  might  more  easily  hurl  herself  against  Servia 
with  detriment  to  Russia  and  to  the  countries  of  the 
Entente  in  general,  after  which  the  Balkan  States  might 
once  more  be  made  into  a  prop  for  the  Triple  Alliance 
instead  of  the  danger  they  then  were.     On  the  other 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     127 

hand,  the  Entente,  and  along  with  them  one  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  Italy,  who  had  been  taken  by  sur- 
prise, wished  to  have  more  time  in  order  to  find  the 
as  yet  unknown  solution.  These  made  every  effort  to 
obtain  from  Germany  the  desired  extension  of  the 
forty-eight  hour  limit,  and  did  their  best  to  prevent  a 
declaration  of  war  and  to  urge  the  acceptance  of 
mediation.  But  the  prompt  declaration  of  war  which 
followed  Austria's  ultimatum  to  Servia  put  an  end 
to  all  possible  solution.  The  die  was  cast.  So  Russia 
understood  it,  and  so  Germany,  and  the  remaining  steps 
consisted  merely  in  maintaining  the  customary  good 
form  incident  to  such  occasions,  and  disavowing  the 
more  direct  responsibilities  of  the  approaching  catas- 
trophe. 

Germany  showed  that  she  was  ready  to  accept  medi- 
ation between  Austria  and  Russia  in  order  to  localize 
the  war;  and  when  war  was  declared  she  admitted 
that  certain  claims  in  the  Austrian  note,  on  which 
by  her  own  confession  she  had  been  consulted,  could 
not  easily  be  accepted  by  Servia.*  Russia  on  her  side 
had  no  doubts  as  to  her  conduct.  The  mobilization 
already  ordered  in  Austria  was  a  sure  sign  of  immedi- 
ate war.  The  telegrams  between  the  two  Emperors 
were  of  no  avail;  deeds  weighed  more  than  words. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  as  to  who  mobilized 


*  English  White  Book,  document  number  46. 


128  THE  WORLD  WAR 

first.  In  reality  this  has  no  importance  since  the  mo- 
bilization was  the  consequence  of  diplomatic  attitude 
in  the  respective  countries.  Russia  more  than  all  con- 
sidered that  she  must  accept  war  as  due  to  her  prestige, 
even  though  she  did  not  want  it  and  was  not  pre- 
pared, as  later  events  have  well  demonstrated.  Dur- 
ing the  course  of  negotiations  Sazonoff  understood, 
just  as  it  was  understood  in  Rome,  Paris  and  London, 
that  their  fate  lay  in  the  hands  of  Berlin.  If  in  that 
city  peace  was  wanted,  peace  would  be  maintained. 
If  not,  the  European  conflagration  would  burst  forth 
in  all  its  frightfulness.  Sazonoff  on  July  28,  the  day 
that  Austria  declared  war  on  Servia,  lamented  to  the 
Russian  ambassador  in  London  that  Berlin  had  not 
taken  a  definite  stand  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
crisis;*  and  later  in  the  same  day  he  pointed  out  to 
the  same  ambassador  the  need  of  England's  appealing 
to  Austria  not  to  crush  Servia  and  thus  make  pacific 
solution  impossible.f  Even  after  the  declaration  of 
war  he  kept  urging  all  the  ambassadors  to  appeal  to 
their  various  governments,  and  this  he  continued  to 
do  in  spite  of  the  communication  received  from  the 
Russian  ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  effect  that  the 
government  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  not  inclined  to 


*  English  White  Book,  document  number  54.    Russian  Orange 
Book,  document  number  43. 
•\  Russian  Orange  Book,  document  number  48. 


EFFORTS   OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     129 

exchange  ideas  direct  with  the  Imperial  Russian 
Government. 

It  is  certain  that  the  German  government  echoed 
Sazonoff's  good  intentions  but  more  than  intentions 
they  never  were,  since  no  practical  solution  had  any- 
chance  of  acceptance  from  her.  The  German  theory- 
was  to  give  Austria  a  free  hand  against  Servia,  to 
prevent  Russia's  acting  to  save  her  Balkan  prestige 
(the  loss  of  which  meant  the  loss  of  her  European 
prestige) ;  and,  this  accomplished,  to  show  her  great 
affection  afterwards.  Evidence  against  Berlin  may 
be  seen  in  the  fact  that  Servia's  sufficiently  conciliatory 
answer  to  Austria  was  not  published  on  July  28  by  a 
single  news  agency  or  newspaper  throughout  the  Ger- 
man Confederation;  obviously  because  it  would  have 
diminished  the  bellicose  humor  of  the  masses.  In 
this,  Germany  followed  her  old  system  of  1870 — to 
exacerbate  the  people  into  ready  and  enthusiastic 
soldiers. 

On  July  29  the  future  belligerents  knew  that  they 
would  meet  in  combat.  Russia  notified  France,  and 
Germany  notified  Russia.*  The  latter,  making  a  su- 
preme effort  at  the  last  moment  sent  the  following  to 
Berlin:  "If  Austria,  now  recognizing  that  the  Aus- 
tro-Servian  question  has  assumed  the  character  of  a 
European  question,  will  declare  herself  ready  to  elim- 


*  Russian  Orange  Book,  document  number  58. 


130  THE  WORLD  WAR 

inate  from  her  ultimatum  those  points  which  consti- 
tute an  infringement  on  the  sovereign  rights  of 
Servia,  Russia  will  cease  her  military  preparations." 
But  Germany  declared  this  proposition  unacceptable 
without  even  consulting  Austria.*  Gabriel  Hanotaux, 
French  ex-minister  of  foreign  affairs,  has  declared 
that  Austria  was  ready  to  accept  this  Russian  offer. 
"I  am  in  a  position  to  affirm,"  he  said,  "and  will  fur- 
nish proof  should  it  not  be  encountered  in  the  forth- 
coming French  Yellow  Book  whose  publication  is  impa- 
tiently awaited,  that  Austria-Hungary,  perhaps  seized 
with  vacillations  in  presence  of  events  whose  terrible 
consequences  she  began  to  foresee,  announced  herself 
ready  to  adhere  to  the  Russian  initiative  which  would 
present  an  honorable  way  out  for  all."  f  Later,  in  his 
Histoire  de  la  Guerre,  Hanotaux  again  insisted  that 
at  the  last  moment,  after  Germany  had  declared  war 
on  Russia,  the  Austrian  government  tried  through 
Berchtold  to  avoid  the  stupendous  climax.  However 
in  this  book  the  celebrated  author  is  less  positive  than 
in  the  Figaro  article  previously  cited.  The  foregoing 
should  be  considered  in  conjunction  with  Pierre  Ber- 
trand's  affirmation  that  the  current  opinion  as  to  Aus- 
tria's having  repented  at  the  last  moment  was  a  fiction 
pure  and  simple.    Austria,  he  says,  never  thought  of 


*  Russian  Orange  Book,  documents  60  and  63. 
tG.   Hanotaux;  "Les   responsabilites  allemandes/'  in  Le  Fi- 
garo, September  26,  1914. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     131 

taking  such  a  step  and  never  recanted  in  the  least.* 
Sazonoff  again  modified  his  compromise  in  order  to 
make  it  more  acceptable  but  in  Berlin  the  foreign  min- 
ister broke  off  conversations  with  the  Russian  ambas- 
sador. This  happened  July  30,  and  the  following  day 
Sazonoff  told  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  the  only  solution 
could  be  found  in  London,  f 

But  there  was  no  longer  a  way  out. 
Germany,  who  had  not  wished  to  duly  deliberate 
with  Austria,  wished  on  the  other  hand  to  forestall 
Russia's  action  and  make  impossible  the  conduct  the 
latter  was  bound  to  follow.  Germany  pretended  to 
see  an  aggression  in  what  was  merely  the  natural  con- 
sequence of  multiple  contributory  causes;  she  believed 
herself  attacked  because  Russia  was  preparing;  she 
investigated  the  Russian  mobilization  but  would  not 
admit  that  she  herself  was  preparing  with  greater 
intelligence  and  eagerness,  and  certainly  with  greater 
efficacy;  for,  considering  the  careful  organization  of 
her  army,  her  proclamation  of  a  state  of  war  was 
more  practically  effective  than  the  Russian  order  of 
mobilization. I  With  Teutonic  violence  she  hurled  at 
Russia  a  sort  of  ultimatum  demanding  the  suspension 
of  all  military  activity  within  twelve  hours  ;§  and  at 


*  Pierre   Bertrand ;    "L'Autriche    a   voulu   la   grande   guerre,' 
Paris,  1916. 
"f  Russian  Orange  Book,  document  number  63. 
t  German  White  Book,  addition  number  11. 
§  German  White  Book,  addition  number  24. 


132  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  same  time  sent  a  declaration  of  war  to  Petrograd 
to  be  delivered  in  case  this  demand  was  not  complied 
with  by  five  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  first  of 
August.  This  declaration  was  presented  and  the  state 
of  war  began. 

In  connection  with  this  declaration  of  war  a  curious 
and  extremely  significant  anecdote  is  published  by 
Tomaso  Tittoni  who,  as  former  Italian  ambassador  in 
Paris  and  also  former  foreign  minister,  had  every 
opportunity  of  knowing  both  great  international  ques- 
tions and  small  diplomatic  incidents.  According  to 
him,  Count  Pourtales,  German  ambassador  in  Petro- 
grad, after  pronouncing  the  fateful  words  to  Russia  in 
the  person  of  Sazonoff,  laid  on  the  latter' s  table  the 
written  declaration,  as  is  usual  in  such  circumstances. 
On  his  withdrawal  the  Russian  minister  of  war  picked 
up  the  terrible  instrument  which  was  to  be  the  death 
warrant  of  so  many  thousands  of  human  beings,  and 
found  to  his  surprise  that  it  contained  nothing  but 
friendly  words.  It  conveyed,  in  fact,  Berlin's  thanks 
to  Russia  for  having  acceded  to  her  demands.  While 
Sazonoff  was  still  staring  in  amazement  Pourtales  re- 
turned to  explain  that  he  had  made  an  error,  and  sub- 
stituted the  written  formal  declaration  of  war  for 
the  paper  Sazonoff  was  reading.* 

Evidently  the  Berlin  cabinet  had  provided  against 
every  eventuality.     Either  submission  or  defiance  on 


*T.  Tittoni;  "Nuova  Antologia,"  Rome,  September  16,  1916. 


EFFORTS  OF  THE  GOVERNMENTS     133 

Russia's  part  had  been  prepared  for ;  but  the  excessively 
cautious  German  cabinet  had  not  counted  on  the  am- 
bassador's carrying  the  double  correspondence  in  his 
pocket  when  he  made  his  final  visit  to  SazonofT. 

It  is  strange  that  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Chancellor  of 
the  German  Empire,  a  statesman  esteemed  for  the  rec- 
titude of  his  aims  and  for  his  broad  and  clear  mind 
opposed  to  all  Chauvinism,  a  sound  pacifist  in  the 
sense  that  he  realized  how  the  benefits  of  peace  were 
vivifying  the  spirit  of  the  nation — it  is  strange  that 
he  should  be  the  one  called  upon  to  accept  what  the 
German  document  calls  the  challenge  of  Russia.  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg declared  the  war  and  on  doing  so  all 
the  constructive  work  of  forty  years  crumbled. 

History  makes  some  unconscious  revelations. 
Among  them  it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  this  incident 
which  appeared  to  be  provoked  by  Austria,  the  first 
of  the  great  powers  to  send  a  declaration  of  war  to 
another  great  power  was  Germany. 

How  surely  do  internal  and  hidden  forces  work  up 
to  the  surface! 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  GENERAL  CONFLICT 

THE  general  conflict  was  initiated  as  we  have 
seen  by  Germany's  declaration  of  war  on  Rus- 
sia, preceded  by  an  ultimatum  sent  suddenly  and 
at  the  very  moment  when  hopes  of  peace  had 
been  renewed.  Germany,  attacking  Russia,  could 
no  longer  talk  of  localizing  the  quarrel,  and  this  the- 
ory upheld  by  her  in  the  case  of  Servia  and  disputed 
by  Russia  in  the  diplomatic  field,  was  trampled  under 
foot  by  her  own  acts.  She  knew  the  treaty  obliga- 
tions which  bound  France  to  Russia;  therefore  she 
knew  that  the  war  would  be  general.  Once  started, 
she  had  to  anticipate  events  for  it  would  have  been 
bad  policy  to  await  them.  Germany's  attitude  toward 
France,  then,  was  logical,  considering  the  first  bad 
step  taken,  and  as  the  theorists  of  the  early  nineteenth 
century  would  have  said,  it  was  in  the  natural  order 
of  events. 

France  proceeded  with  tact  during  the  negotiations, 
and  on  hearing  the  trend  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  govern- 

135 


136  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ment  counseled  the  greatest  prudence.  In  unison  with 
England  and  Italy  she  made  every  effort  to  maintain 
peace.  Wounded  by  the  humiliation  of  forty-odd 
years  France  wanted  war  whenever  it  was  spoken  of 
in  the  abstract  or  whenever  patriotic  hymns  and 
speeches  revived  her  past  grief;  but  whenever  danger 
presented  itself  she  preferred  peace  and  strove  for  it. 
Alsace  and  Lorraine,  separated  from  the  nation,  were 
a  constant  call  to  war;  Sedan  and  Metz  were  two  in- 
sults which  constantly  cried  for  satisfaction;  but  so 
greatly  had  the  French  people  prospered  without  Alsace 
and  Lorraine,  and  so  vigorously  had  they  conquered  a 
place  in  the  industrial  and  financial  world  that, 
though  they  had  not  forgotten,  an  intense  desire  for 
peace  animated  them  all.  To  the  military  and 
aristocratic  regime  of  monarchical,  especially  Napol- 
eonic, days,  had  succeeded  the  regime  of  the  great 
middle  class.  Its  small  tradesmen,  manufacturers,  ag- 
riculturists, and  modest  financiers  all  enjoyed  greater 
well-being  in  France  than  in  other  countries.  Of  a 
peaceful  nature,  little  inclined  for  adventure,  desirous 
of  glory  when  not  fraught  with  danger,  fond  of  their 
own  wealth,  they  asked  only  that  their  well-being  be 
indefinitely  prolonged.  The  upper  classes,  the  high 
financiers  and  men  of  big  business,  had  followed  the 
middle  class  in  these  pacifist  tendencies.  Four  decades 
of  economic  prosperity  had  wrought  a  change  in  French 
opinion,  had  wrested  the  directing  of  it  from  the  aris- 


THE  GENERAL  CONFLICT  137 

tocratic  class  who  found  glory  in  the  arts  of  war,  and 
given  it  to  business  men  who  found  in  peaceful  pur- 
suits the  only  means  of  augmenting  the  national  wel- 
fare. Along  these  lines,  and  in  the  interest  of  blissful 
tranquillity,  the  possessors  of  great  fortunes  had  be- 
come pacifists  outwardly  and  socialist-radicals  in- 
wardly. It  is  only  in  this  way  that  one  can  explain 
the  long-enduring  patience  of  so  many  French  cabi- 
nets in  face  of  German  irritations  and  provocations, 
as  well  as  the  course  recently  followed  in  face  of  the 
questions  brought  up  by  the  Austro-Servian  note. 

Germany  for  a  moment  endeavored  to  rob  the  alli- 
ance which  bound  France  to  Russia  of  its  fruit.  By 
trying  to  force  the  former  into  a  dispute  with  the 
latter,  she  hoped  that  French  advice  would  not  be 
followed  and  the  nation  thereby  absolved  from  keep- 
ing the  Russian  compact.  That  is  what  Iswolsky, 
Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  heard  on  hastening 
back  from  his  interrupted  vacation.  He  got  it  from 
the  lips  of  Bienvenu  Martin,  minister  of  justice,  and 
also  ad  interim  minister  of  foreign  affairs.  Martin 
had  seen  through  the  plan  and  communicated  his 
analysis  of  it  to  Petrograd.*  This  circumstance  dis- 
proves Baron  Von  Schoen's  pretension  that  France 
suffered  herself  to  be  led  into  common  cause  with 
Germany;  on  the  contrary,  in  all  the  preliminary  dip- 
lomatic proceedings,  and  these,  beyond  all  question, 


*  Russian  Orange  Book,  document  number  35. 


138  THE  WORLD  WAR 

focused  on  a  casus  belli,  she  removed  the  only  pre- 
text she  could  possibly  have  had  for  breaking  the 
alliance,  and  decided  to  unite  herself  to  Russia  should 
the  bellic  moment  arrive.  This  was  confirmed  to 
Iswolsky  by  Premier  Viviani  the  very  day  he  re- 
turned to  Paris :  and  in  order  that  Germany  might 
have  no  illusions  on  the  subject  it  was  also  confirmed 
to  Von  Schoen.  In  Petrograd  the  French  ambassador 
was  saying  the  same,  but  even  more  precisely,  for 
his  words  to  Sazonoff  were  that  Russia  could  count 
on  the  armed  aid  of  her  ally.* 

This  solidarity  had  to  be.  The  two  countries  were 
united  by  such  strict  treaty,  by  so  many  necessities  of 
defense  (involving  no  few  monetary  sacrifices  for  the 
one  on  the  part  of  the  other)  that  to  separate  in  this 
trying  moment  would  have  been  suicidal.  Moreover, 
mere  circumstance  had  just  prepared  them  for  closer 
union  than  ever.  Had  not  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public, Raymond  Poincare,  and  the  Premier,  Rene 
Viviani,  just  returned  from  Russia  with  all  the  flat- 
tering speeches  pronounced,  all  the  kindnesses  received, 
all  the  promises  of  mutual  help  and  reciprocal  de- 
fense, fresh  in  their  memory?  On  this  visit  both 
governments  saw  that  they  must  make  their  contracts 
clear,  especially  with  regard  to  the  grave  Oriental 
question — a  precaution  more  or  less  necessary  because 


*  Russian   Orange   Book,   document  number   55 ;   also   French 
Yellow  Book,  document  number  101. 


THE  GENERAL  CONFLICT  139 

in  preceding  years  doubts  had  arisen  in  France  as  to 
her  part.  She  had  not  always  sustained  her  ally, 
alleging  that  she  had  her  own  interests  in  Oriental 
Europe  and  that  these  were  contrary  to  Russia's.  For 
this  reason  Viviani  and  Sazonoff,  acting  in  their  re- 
spective capacities,  gave  out  on  the  24th  of  July  an 
official  communication  both  clear  and  to  the  point : 
"The  visit  just  paid  by  the  President  of  the  French 
Republic  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia  has 
offered  an  occasion  when  both  governments,  friends 
and  allies,  could  satisfy  themselves  as  to  the  identity  of 
their  views  on  various  problems  arising  from  a  mutual 
solicitude  for  the  general  peace  and  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe,  especially  Eastern  Europe."  * 

In  spite  of  these  specific  matters,  as  well  as  the 
treaty  of  the  Double  Alliance,  being  known  to  Ger- 
many, she  made  a  last  effort  before  the  French  Gov- 
ernment on  the  day  she  declared  war  on  Russia;  she 
charged  her  ambassador  to  ask  France's  intentions; 
and  he,  having  done  so,  was  able  to  report  that  very 
same  day,  August  1,  that  France  would  follow  her 
ally.  The  answer  was  laconic  and  left  no  room  for 
doubt.  Baron  Von  Schoen  gave  it  as  follows  in  a 
telegram  to  his  government:  "On  my  inquiring  di- 
rectly and  repeatedly  whether  France  would  remain 
neutral  in  case  of  war  between  Germany  and  Russia 
the  premier  declared  to  me  that  France  would  act  in 


*  Le  Temps,  Paris,  July  25,  1914. 
10 


140  THE  WORLD  WAR 

accordance  with  her  interests."*  On  the  arrival  of 
this  telegram  in  Berlin  war  on  France  was  decided 
upon,  and  the  postponing  of  the  declaration  until  Au- 
gust 3  was  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  neither  of 
the  two  parties,  either  because  of  international  agree- 
ments or  because  of  certain  moral  formalities,  cared 
to  be  the  first  to  make  it.  And  so  the  two  ambassa- 
dors, Jules  Cambon  in  Berlin  and  Baron  Von  Schoen 
in  Paris,  kept  up  their  visits  to  the  ministers  of  foreign 
affairs. f  But  Germany  had  already  decided  to  begin 
immediate  war  not  only  on  the  western  front,  as  said 
above,  but  also  on  the  eastern. 

On  August  i  the  French  cabinet  took  counsel, 
President  Poincare  presiding  and  General  Joffre  be- 
ing present.  Mobilization  had  already  begun,  and  the 
necessary  economic  measures  for  carrying  on  a  war 
were  arranged.  Germany  too  was  mobilizing,  and  on 
two  frontiers;  and  the  Kaiser  was  announcing  to  his 
people  that  he  was  unsheathing  his  sword  "to  fight 
an  enemy  who  has  been  hemming  us  in  while  we  were 
living  peacefully  in  every  sense  of  the  word." 

On  August  2  Germany  violated  the  first  treaty — 
that  which  guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  as 
signed  in  London  in  1867.  Against  the  protests  of  the 
government  of  the  Grand  Duchy  she  penetrated  into 


*  German  White  Book;  also  French  Yellow  Book,  docu- 
ment number  125. 

t  Paul  Leroy  Beaulieu ;  "La  Guerre,"  in  L'Economiste  Fran- 
eats. 


THE  GENERAL  CONFLICT  141 

it  with  armored  trains.  More  than  that,  she  pene- 
trated that  same  day  into  French  territory  at  various 
points  although  there  had  not  been  any  declaration 
of  hostilities.  Yet  the  following  day  it  was  Von  Schoen 
who  entered  a  protest  that  the  French  had  violated 
German  soil,  an  allegation  which  the  French  premier 
denied  most  emphatically.  However,  these  frontier 
incidents  to  which  great  importance  was  given  at  the 
moment  have  little  bearing  on  the  real  case.  The 
outstanding  fact  is  that  Germany  prepared  the  more 
rapidly  and  that  the  violation  of  Luxemburg  suited 
her  plans,  as  stated  by  the  ministers  of  the  Duchy 
who  certainly  had  no  partiality  for  the  French.  But 
let  it  be  repeated,  these  discussions  are  prolix  now 
that  we  can  look  back  upon  the  whole  series  of  events. 
As  soon  as  war  was  declared  against  Russia  it  was 
evident  that  France  intended  to  aid  her  ally  and  thus 
make  it  necessary  for  Germany  to  fight  on  two  fron- 
tiers. Further  accuracy  in  war-time,  and  in  comment- 
ing on  a  modern  country  which  admitted  the  medieval 
axiom  that  "necessity  knows  no  law,"  would  be 
superfluous.  Germany's  advantage  lay  in  rapid  action ; 
she  was  following  the  same  hypothetic  plans  as  in 
1870  when  she  assumed  an  attack  on  two  frontiers, 
to  wit:  rush  upon  France  and  obtain  a  prompt  and 
decisive  victory  and  then  turn  her  forces  on  the  other 
enemy.  Germany's  every  manoeuvre  on  the  French 
border  responded  to  her  urgent  necessities,  and  the 


142  THE  WORLD  WAR 

delay  in  declaring  war  on  her  ancient  adversary  can 
be  explained  only  by  her  wish  not  to  appear  too  ag- 
gressive in  the  eyes  of  England,  whose  neutrality  she 
still  hoped  for,  and  of  Italy,  whose  aid  she  counted 
on  as  almost  certain. 

On  August  3,  Von  Schoen,  having  first  packed  up 
all  the  effects  of  the  embassy,  repaired  somewhat  osten- 
tatiously to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  at  5.45  in  the  afternoon, 
and  declared  war;  and  the  French  nation  knew  that 
the  hour  of  the  great  duel  had  sounded,  and  that  vic- 
tory was  a  peremptory  necessity. 

That  France  was  forced  to  war  at  a  moment  when 
she  was  striving  desperately  to  maintain  peace  is  un- 
deniable. Until  the  very  moment  when  the  discon- 
certed Von  Schoen,  without  cause  and  without  ani- 
mosity, delivered  the  challenge,  she  had  acted  as  if 
doubting  that  the  storm  would  really  burst.  With 
much  exactitude  Bienvenu  Martin  could  say  that 
"neither  act,  appearance,  nor  word  other  than  pacific 
and  conciliatory  could  be  imputed  to  France."*  And 
with  no  less  truth,  or  at  least  with  certain  right  inas- 
much as  the  cabinet  then  in  power  was  concerned,  could 
Rene  Viviani,  the  premier,  say  in  the  same  session: 
"Germany  has  nothing  to  reproach  us  with.  In  the 
interests  of  peace  we  have  made  a  sacrifice  without 
precedent,  for  throughout  half  a  century  we  have  si- 


*  Session  of  the  Senate  of  the  French  Republic,  August  4,  1914. 


THE  GENERAL  CONFLICT  143 

lently  borne  the  wound  in  our  breast  which  she  laid 
open." 

And  all  this  time  the  Austrian  ambassador  still 
drove  through  the  streets  of  Petrograd  and  the  French 
ambassador  through  Vienna,  and  vice  versa.  From 
the  moment  of  the  Kaiser's  brusk  ultimatum  to 
Russia,  Austria,  who  appeared  at  that  time  disposed 
to  adjust  matters,  receded  into  second  place.  But  on 
the  6th  of  August  Austria-Hungary  finally  declared 
war  on  Russia  and  on  the  nth  the  French  ambassador 
asked  the  Vienna  government  for  his  passports.  This, 
it  will  be  seen,  did  not  occur  till  after  Germany  was 
in  a  state  of  war  with  four  nations,  until  after  she 
had  violated  both  Luxemburg  and  Belgium,  and  after 
the  British  had  come  into  the  conflict ;  in  other  words, 
after  the  whole  tragic  problem  had  taken  a  definite 
form. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  VIOLATION   OF  THE   NEUTRALITY  OF   LUXEMBURG 

THE  first  act  which  cannot  be  put  down  to  the 
credit  of  the  German  Empire  is  the  violation  of 
the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  This  violation  has 
not  resounded  through  the  world  like  that  of  Bel- 
gium but  merely  because  of  its  lesser  political,  not 
moral,  significance.  Morally  each  bears  the  same 
aspect ;  each  is  a  question  of  a  treaty  broken.  The  case 
of  Luxemburg  was  all  the  more  unjustifiable  because, 
as  we  shall  see,  it  was  Prussia  who  had  displayed  most 
activity  in  framing  the  treaty  and  who  had  most 
interest  in  its  adoption.  Even  more,  this  violation  of 
neutral  territory  on  August  2  constituted  an  aggres- 
sion against  France  before  Germany  had  declared  war 
on  her;  it  therefore  invalidated  the  formal  complaints 
of  the  German  ambassador  in  Paris  to  the  effect  that 
Frenchmen  had  made  attacks  in  German  territory.  In 
violating  Luxemburg,  Germany  revealed  her  whole 
war  policy  of  surprise,  rapid  action,  and  contempt  for 
the  only  thing  which  modern  international  law  has 

145 


146  THE  WORLD  WAR 

acquired  for  civilization  after  so  many  centuries.  And 
it  is  all  the  more  to  be  condemned  because  it  is  impos- 
sible to  advance  a  shadow  of  justification  for  the  act. 

At  the  very  time  it  occurred  the  German  minister  in 
Luxemburg  was  declaring  that  the  neutrality  of  the 
Duchy  was  guaranteed  above  all  question  and  would 
never  be  violated  by  Germany.  This  statement  at  the 
moment  when  war  was  already  certain  forces  us  to 
one  of  two  painful  conclusions  regarding  Germany; 
either  the  diplomatic  and  the  military  staffs  were  act- 
ing in  defiance  of  each  other  or  else  the  government 
was  acting  in  complete  bad  faith. 

The  permanent  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  as  an  in- 
dependent state  was  specially  created  by  the  Treaty  of 
London,  May  n,  1867.  Its  most  important  antece- 
dent is  found  in  the  treaty  which  created  Belgian  neu- 
trality in  1839.  As  one  of  the  possessions  of  the 
house  of  Burgundy,  Luxemburg  in  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury fell  into  the  hands  of  Spain.  In  171 3  it  was 
transferred  to  Austria,  and  later  to  France.  In  181 5 
it  was  created  a  grand  duchy,  but  under  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands.  Being  one  of 
those  regions  which  geographical  situation  or  the 
course  of  events  has  put  in  the  road  of  great  conflicts, 
it  has  known  great  sorrows. 

The  Treaty  of  London  was  a  solution  in  order  to 
avoid  or  rather  postpone  a  conflict  between  Germany 
and  France.     Napoleon  III  had  just  tried  to  buy  this 


LUXEMBURG'S  NEUTRALITY  VIOLATED  147 

territory  which  had  been  garrisoned  since  181 5  by 
Prussian  troops,  and  keep  its  cession  and  its  price 
secret.  The  proceeding  would  have  been  within  the 
law  since  Luxemburg  from  the  political  point  of  view 
had  ceased  to  belong  to  the  Germanic  community ;  but 
it  did  not  suit  Prussian  interests.  The  secret  was  soon 
known  for  the  Grand  Duke  himself,  who  was  also 
King  of  Holland,  while  negotiating  with  Napoleon 
communicated  the  fact  to  the  Prussian  minister  at  The 
Hague  and  showed  him  the  contents  of  the  letter  he 
had  received  from  the  Emperor  of  the  French.*  At 
the  same  time  he  declared  himself  ready  to  make  the 
transaction  provided  Prussia  approved. 

Bismarck  decided  it  was  not  the  moment  to  give 
France  a  diplomatic  victory  or  a  military  position; 
but  neither  was  he  desirous  of  war.  Using  his  mar- 
velous tactics — that  mixture  of  audacity  and  reticence 
which  he  knew  how  to  employ  in  difficult  cases — he 
allowed  himself  to  be  interrogated  twice  in  the  Reichs- 
tag. Autocrat  by  instinct  he  could  handle  democratic 
institutions  for  his  own  ends;  and  so,  answering  the 
two  interrogations,  one  from  Carlovitz  and  the  other 
from  Benningsen,  he  manoeuvred  cleverly,  giving 
France  no  motive  for  a  casus  belli  but  making  it  clearly 
understood  that  without  the  consent  of  Prussia  the 
cession  of  Luxemburg  was  impossible.  Then  he  gave 
the  French  Ambassador,  Benedetti,  to  understand  that 


*  E.  Servais ;  "La  neutrality  du  Luxembourg,"  page  78. 


148  THE  WORLD  WAR 

he  could  not  favor  the  project,  not  because  he  was 
averse  to  it,  but  because  blundering  French  diplomacy 
had  obliged  him  to  make  premature  declarations,  and 
these  had  created  an  unfavorable  public  opinion.  On 
April  2,  1867,  Benedetti  wrote  as  follows  to  his  coun- 
try's foreign  minister :  "I  have  again  seen  Bismarck. 
He  complains  of  the  difficulties  confronting  him,  and 
appears  to  blame  us  for  the  turn  given  to  the  matter 
by  the  King  of  the  Low  Countries  (the  Grand  Duke) 
in  directing  himself  officially  to  the  King  of  Prussia 
before  talking  with  the  cabinet  of  Berlin.  These  pre- 
mature communications  do  not  leave  the  Prussian 
government  full  liberty."  The  truth  is  that  Bismarck 
took  this  tone  solely  because  it  was  the  most  con- 
venient one;  because  he  feared,  as  always,  that  his 
king  would  be  weak,  he  complained  of  their  having 
talked  first  with  him  before  treating  with  the  cabinet, 
which  latter  was  himself  and  no  one  but  himself. 

Later  events  show  how  far  he  was  from  any  inten- 
tion of  yielding  to  the  plans  of  Napoleon  III;  for 
when  the  Grand  Duke  finally  decided  to  break  off  the 
sale,  Bismarck  was  well  satisfied  and  straightway  asked 
the  powers  to  meet  in  international  conference  in 
London  in  order  to  avoid  war. 

In  the  London  of  1867,  however,  there  was  no  more 
interest  in  Luxemburg  and  its  neutrality  than  in  the 
London  of  19 14.  England  was  not  looking  for  an- 
other difficulty  nor  did  she  wish  to  assume  a  future 


LUXEMBURG'S  NEUTRALITY  VIOLATED  149 

responsibility  in  a  matter  of  no  interest  to  her.  Lord 
Stanley  therefore  gave  a  weak  answer  to  the  proposals 
of  Prussia.  In  a  telegram  to  Lord  Cowley,  the  am- 
bassador in  Berlin,  he  said:  "Of  what  use  is  it  to 
call  a  conference  until  Prussia  has  decided  to  state 
her  intentions  on  the  fortress  (which  she  possesses)  in 
Luxemburg,  or  at  least  until  France  has  declared  that 
she  will  submit  to  the  decisions  of  the  same?"  Never- 
theless, the  conference  was  convoked  and  in  it  Luxem- 
burg's neutrality  was  agreed  upon.  Its  terms  are 
clearly  expressed  in  Article  II : 

"The  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg,  within  the  limits 
determined  by  the  act  appended  to  the  Treaties  of 
April  13,  1839,  under  the  guarantee  of  the  Courts  of 
France,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  will  hence- 
forth form  a  perpetually  neutral  state.  It  will  be 
obliged  to  respect  this  same  neutrality  toward  all 
other  states.  The  high  contracting  powers  oblige 
themselves  to  respect  the  principle  of  neutrality  stipu- 
lated in  the  present  article.  This  article  is  and  will 
remain  under  the  sanction  of  the  collective  guarantee 
of  the  powers  signatory  to  the  present  treaty,  with 
the  exception  of  Belgium,  she  herself  being  a  neutral 
state." 

The  original  draft  did  not  contain  the  last  lines 
relating  to  the  sanction  of  a  collective  guarantee  but 
instead  terminated  with  the  words :  "the  principle  of 
neutrality  as  stipulated  by  the  present  article."     The 


150  THE  WORLD  WAR 

remainder  was  proposed  and  defended  as  a  condition 
sine  qua  non  (incredible  but  true)  by  the  Prussian 
plenipotentiary,  Count  Albrecht  Bernstorff.  In  order 
that  the  reader  may  know  the  different  attitudes  as- 
sumed by  the  representatives  of  Prussia  on  the  one 
side,  and  of  France  and  England  on  the  other,  we 
reproduce  the  acts  of  the  session  in  which  the  article 
and  the  amendment  were  approved. 

To  the  second  article  Count  Bernstorff  proposed  the 
following  emendation :  "This  principle  (neutrality)  is 
and  will  remain  under  the  guarantee  of  the  powers 
who  sign  the  present  treaty  with  the  exception  of 
Belgium,  since  she  herself  is  neutral."  The  Russian 
representative  Count  Brunnow  said  that  he  was  au- 
thorized by  his  court  to  subscribe  completely  to  the 
principle  of  giving  the  collective  guarantee  to  the 
neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  He  hoped  that  this  prin- 
ciple would  be  admitted  as  the  best  pledge  that  could 
be  offered  for  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Count  Apponyi  declared  that  his  government  (the 
Hungarian)  also  accepted  the  guaranteed  neutrality 
of  Luxemburg.  Prince  de  la  Tour  d'Auvergne  stated 
that  he  had  no  instructions  relative  to  the  question  of 
a  collective  guarantee;  but  he  felt  himself  obliged  to 
agree  that  this  guarantee  had  been  presented  up  to 
that  moment  as  the  natural  complement  to  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg;  and  even 
though  the  obligation  which  the  powers  assumed  to 


LUXEMBURG'S  NEUTRALITY  VIOLATED  151 

respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  might  in  a  given 
moment  have  a  value  almost  equal  to  a  formal  guar- 
antee, still  he  could  not  deny  that  the  Ambassador  of 
Prussia  might  not  be  right  in  his  observations. 

Van  de  Weyer,  who  was  also  without  special  in- 
structions (from  Holland)  on  this  point  gave  the 
opinion  that  in  an  ample  spirit  of  conciliation  it  might 
be  considered  that  the  guarantee  of  neutrality  ema- 
nated aggregately  from  the  treaties  of  1839.  Lord 
Stanley  declared  that  he  preferred  Article  II  as  it 
existed  in  the  draft  of  the  treaty  and  without  the 
amendment  of  Bernstorff;  but  as  most  of  the  pleni- 
potentiaries upheld  the  idea  indicated  by  the  repre- 
sentative of  Prussia,  he,  Lord  Stanley,  would  acquaint 
the  members  of  the  Queen's  cabinet  of  the  proposi- 
tion which  had  been  made  and  hoped  to  be  able  in  the 
conference  of  the  coming  week  to  inform  them  of  the 
decision  taken.* 

The  result  was  that  England  later  yielded  to  the 
wishes  of  the  powers  and  in  order  to  keep  peace  in 
Europe  agreed  to  the  guarantee,  definitively  approving 
the  article  with  the  amendment. 

History  presents  great  contrasts  and  at  times  great 
ironies.  Prussia  so  eagerly  desired  the  neutrality  of 
Luxemburg  that,  not  satisfied  with  the  declaration 
made  in  the  treaty  (which  as  the  French  delegate 
pointed  out  presupposed  the  defense  of  the  clauses  of 


♦Reproduced  in  Servais;  work  cited,  pages  163-65. 


152  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  same)  she  asked  the  signatory  powers  for  a  guar- 
antee which  would  put  that  neutrality  under  the  com- 
mon defense.  This  then  constituted  more  than  what 
she  desired,  since  the  defense  of  the  neutrality  became 
so  obligatory  that  one  of  the  powers  could  oblige  the 
others  to  enter  into  armed  action  in  defense  of  the 
ordained  pact. 

Prussia  having  proposed  the  clause  and  the  rest 
having  accepted  it,  England  understood  its  importance 
and  accepted  it,  as  we  understand,  when  she  saw  that 
the  other  powers  did  not  foresee  the  real  future  diffi- 
culties ;  and  undoubtedly  she  had  to  assure  herself  that 
they  did  not  grasp  its  full  importance  by  means  of 
those  private  conversations  which  form  the  most  elab- 
orate part  of  the  program  in  all  such  conferences. 

Bismarck  in  reality  had  again  practiced  his  finesse 
on  France,  as  he  himself  has  admitted.  Maurice  Busch 
in  his  book  on  Bismarck  attributes  to  him  the  follow- 
ing words  which  bear  every  evidence  of  the  mentality 
and  the  style  of  the  Chancellor:  "Public  opinion  in 
all  Germany  would  have  been  most  favorable  to  us 
(Prussia)  at  that  time  had  we  wished  war  over  the 
question  of  Luxemburg;  the  law,  however,  was  not 
on  our  side.  I  have  never  confessed  this  publicly  but 
today  I  can  say  it.  After  the  dissolution  of  the  Ger- 
man Confederation,  the  King  and  Grand  Duke  be- 
came a  sovereign,  and  could  do  as  he  wished.  To  sell 
his  country  for  money  would  have  been  a  piece  of 


LUXEMBURG'S  NEUTRALITY  VIOLATED  153 

villainy,  but  it  would  have  been  his  right."  In  this 
Bismarck  was  forgetting  what  he  had  publicly  said 
when  answering  certain  observations  made  at  the  time 
by  August  Bebel  on  a  discourse  of  the  Crown,  re- 
garding a  fortress  occupied  in  Luxemburg.*  Bismarck 
in  his  answer  upheld  an  exactly  opposite  point  of 
view. 

If  the  preceding  is  not  sufficient  to  prove  the  neu- 
trality of  Luxemburg  and  the  form  in  which  it  was 
dictated  to  have  been  principally  the  work  of  Prussia, 
and  further,  that  this  fact  aggravates  her  present  vio- 
lation of  the  same,  let  us  consider  Prussia's  own  criti- 
cism during  the  war  of  1870  when  it  was  a  question 
of  Luxemburg's  duty  to  defend  her  neutrality  by  arms. 
Bismarck  on  the  third  of  December  of  that  year  sent 
from  Versailles  a  telegram  to  the  government  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  holding  it  responsible  for  violations  of 
its  neutrality.  Both  the  reproach  and  the  threat  were 
unjust  because  by  the  treaty  of  May  11,  1867,  the 
Duchy  had  been  forbidden  to  keep  an  army.  The 
only  force  allowed  her  was  that  necessary  to  maintain 
order,  and  consequently  all  defense  of  neutrality 
against  belligerents  was  completely  impossible.  This 
circumstance  certainly  demonstrates  to  what  a  very 
great  degree  this  neutrality  was  appreciated  and  un- 
derstood by  that  same  nation  who  in  19 14  unhesitat- 


*  Session   of   the    Parliament   of   the    German    Confederation, 
September  24,  1867. 


154  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ingly  occupied  Luxemburg's  railroads  for  military 
uses,  crossed  its  frontiers,  and  established  herself  as  if 
in  her  own  house;  or  rather  with  more  rights  and 
less  concern  than  if  she  had  been  at  home. 

In  reality  it  is  a  flagrant  case  of  contempt  of  the 
principles  of  order  and  of  obligations  assumed.  It 
prepared  the  world  for  the  next  transgression — the 
invasion  of  Belgium. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

ENGLAND   AND    THE   VIOLATION    OF    BELGIAN 
NEUTRALITY 

THE  war  would  not  have  attained  its  present 
proportions  if  England  had  not  declared  war 
against  Germany;  or  to  make  a  more  prudent  state- 
ment it  would  not  have  attained  them  so  soon.  The 
culminating  moment  of  the  initial  stage  was  the 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  and  this  was  the  act 
which  involved  England.  When  she  claimed  this  in- 
tervention to  be  in  defense  of  the  Treaties  of  1839 
German  writers  doubted  her  sincerity.  They  accused 
her  of  wanting  above  all  to  assault  Germany  in  this 
difficult  moment  and  thus  make  good  on  the  battle- 
field the  previous  diplomatic  work  of  isolation.  They 
further  asserted  that  the  diplomatic  and  subsequent 
military  conduct  was  due  to  the  growth  of  German 
commerce  which  was  outstripping  Great  Britain's  in 
all  the  markets  of  the  world.*  The  English  answered 
by  alleging  the  necessary  defense  of  the  principles  of 


*  Bernhard  Dernburg,  former  German  Colonial  Minister ; 
"Germany  and  England,"  in  the  Saturday  Evening  Post,  Novem- 
ber 21,  1914. 

11  155 


156  THE  WORLD  WAR 

international  law  without  which  defense  it  would  be 
impossible  to  solve  any  difficulty  or  maintain  any 
agreement;  they  declared  that  English  public  opinion 
would  never  have  consented  to  Germany's  passing  into 
France  over  the  ruins  of  Belgium,  but  would  have 
forced  the  government  to  armed  intervention ;  and  that 
knowing  this  the  government  decided  accordingly. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  whether  England  would  have 
awaited  the  opportune  moment  and  entered  the  war 
in  any  case,  or  whether,  true  to  her  past  reputation, 
she  would  have  extracted  the  greatest  benefit  from  it 
with  the  least  effort.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Eng- 
land hoped  this  conflict  would  solve  her  modern  prob- 
lem. In  competition  with  a  powerful  rival  who  was 
overtaking  her  in  naval  power  and  depriving  her  of  a 
hegemony  indispensable  to  her  very  existence,  she 
dared  not  let  the  mighty  occasion  pass  without  its 
settling  who  was  to  be  the  winner.  But  in  what  man- 
ner and  at  what  moment  she  would  have  made  it  do 
so  is  mere  conjecture.  It  is  probable  that  the  prac- 
tical sense  of  English  statesmen  did  not  prompt  them 
to  prepare  a  specific  plan  but  rather  to  watch  events 
closely  and  take  whichever  course  might  appear  most 
favorable.  What  really  happened  however  is  that  Eng- 
land, contrary  to  German  accusations,  entered  the  war 
at  a  moment  not  to  her  liking  and  after  having  tried 
cautiously  to  avoid  all  compromise  and  all  obligation. 

It  is  not  to  the  point  to  repeat  Sir  Edward  Grey's 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    157 

efforts  to  avert  an  Austro-Servian  war  and  his  lack 
of  interest  in  the  Balkan  conflict;  nor  the  proposed 
mediation,  nor  the  later  attitude  when  Germany  hurled 
first  her  ultimatum  and  then  her  declaration  of  war 
on  Russia,  for  all  these  proceedings  demonstrate  of 
themselves  the  pacific  mind  of  the  Liberal  English 
Government  at  that  moment.  Grey's  answer  to  Paul 
Cambon,  French  Ambassador  in  London,  when  the 
latter  asked  for  a  declaration  in  favor  of  France 
should  war  break  out,  is  enough  to  clear  up  all  residue 
of  doubt.  To  Cambon's  argument  that  such  a  declara- 
tion from  England  could  in  itself  prevent  the  conflict, 
Grey's  answer  was  completely  negative  and  to  the 
effect  that  England  did  not  feel  obliged  to  uphold  the 
interests  of  any  other  nation.*  This  conversation  took 
place  on  July  29,  and  the  question  of  respecting  Bel- 
gian neutrality  directed  to  both  Germany  and  France 
is  one  more  proof  that  England  did  not  wish  to  enter 
the  conflict  at  that  moment ;  otherwise  she  would  have 
let  events  take  their  course  without  trying  to  warn 
those  whose  acts  might  establish  the  justification  for 
her  armed  intervention.! 

Then  too  the  declaration  of  Cambon  was  repeated 
in  parliament  when  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  set- 
ting forth  the  cabinet's  attitude,  said  that  England 
had  made  no  promise  to  any  power  whatever,  and  that 


*  English  White  Book. 

t  German  White  Book  and  English  White  Book. 


158  THE  WORLD  WAR 

she  would  follow  the  dictates  of  public  opinion.* 
When  finally  the  conflict  was  announced,  Lord  Mor- 
ley,  John  Burns,  and  Mr.  Trevelyan  resigned  from  the 
cabinet.  (Of  these  the  first  two  were  of  no  small 
influence;  the  aged  and  highly  esteemed  Lord  Morley 
being  a  Liberal  of  the  old  school  and  John  Burns  the 
most  genuine  exponent  of  the  Liberal  Labor  Party; 
that  is  to  say,  they  represented  the  two  extremes  of 
the  Liberal  cabinet.)  The  spontaneous  exodus  of 
these  three  men  makes  it  appear  still  less  likely  that 
there  was  any  predestined  policy  of  intervention. 
Later  events  demonstrated  that  England,  like  France 
and  Russia,  was  without  sufficient  military  prepara- 
tion either  in  men  or  war  materials.  She  had  to  keep 
on  preparing  as  she  fought. 

That  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  con- 
stituted a  great  crime  is  a  point  on  which  there  remains 
no  doubt  in  spite  of  the  efforts  made  to  defend  it. 
When  it  met  with  universal  condemnation  as  an  act 
which  trampled  in  the  dust  one  of  the  few  conquests  of 
international  law,  namely,  the  solemnity  of  a  sworn 
pledge,  it  was  claimed  that  the  treaty  of  1839  no 
longer  existed.  Such  an  affirmation  is  unworthy  of 
argument  in  spite  of  its  illustrious  and  audacious  sup- 
porters.!   No  one  could  have  made  it  seriously.    Not 


*  Session  of  the  House  of  Commons,  August  3,  1914. 
t  Bernhard  Dernburg ;   work  cited ;   also   Bernard   Shaw  and 
numerous  German  authors  of  renown. 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    159 

only  did  the  treaty  of  1839  appear  to  Berlin  as  one 
to  be  respected  by  Germany  herself  but  also  by  other 
nations,  and  had  any  of  them  violated  it  she  was  ready 
to  make  it  respected.  Herr  Von  Jagow,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  never  had  any  doubts  on  the  sub- 
ject. On  the  contrary  when  he  urged  the  reasons  of 
extreme  necessity  which  had  forced  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff  to  throw  its  army  through  Belgium  against 
France,  the  very  excuse  implied  the  transgression. 
On  the  day  of  the  declaration  of  war,  August  4,  Sir 
W.  E.  Goschen,  English  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  went 
twice  to  Von  Jagow  only  to  hear  that  Germany  could 
not  respect  Belgian  neutrality;  that  she  must  advance 
by  the  most  rapid  and  easy  route  into  France  and 
crush  her  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  since  it  was  a 
question  of  life  or  death  for  Germany  to  anticipate 
the  sending  of  Russian  forces  against  her.  Von  Jagow 
added  that  rapidity  of  action  was  one  of  Germany's 
greatest  advantages;  and  that  very  same  night  when 
England  was  threatening  to  declare  war  he  summed 
the  matter  up  by  saying  that  to  send  troops  through 
Belgium  was  a  question  of  the  salvation  of  the 
Empire.* 

Nor   did  the   Chancellor  Von   Bethmann-Hollweg 
advance  any  such  hypothesis  as  the  caducity  of  the 


♦Despatch  from  His  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  re- 
garding the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  with  the  German 
Government,  London,  August,  1914. 


160  THE  WORLD  WAR 

treaty  of  1839;  not  even  in  his  moment  of  greatest 
excitement  when  he  pronounced  the  famous  words 
"and  merely  for  a  scrap  of  paper  England  is  going 
to  war!"* — not  even  then  did  he  offer  such  a  de- 
fense. On  the  contrary  he  said  that  neutrality  was 
simply  a  word  which  had  often  been  disregarded  in 
war  time.  The  undeniable  fact  is  that  the  treaty 
existed  in  full  vigor  and  any  argument  to  the  contrary 
falls  through  its  own  premise. 

Belgian  neutrality  was  a  product  of  historic  neces- 
sity. In  the  successive  historic  periods  Belgium  had 
been  coveted  by  whatever  nation  happened  to  domi- 
nate. Famous  battles  had  been  fought  on  her  soil; 
Holland,  Spain,  Austria,  France,  had  disputed  its  pos- 
session, and  England's  eye  was  on  it  even  at  a  time 
when  she  was  paying  but  little  attention  to  continental 
politics  in  general.  Everything  indicated  that  there 
could  be  no  European  peace  without  neutralizing  that 
object  of  discord,  and  political  annals  and  interna- 
tional correspondence  are  full  of  the  difficulties  sur- 
mounted in  order  to  accomplish  the  neutrality. 

It  was  in  1830  that  Belgium  separated  from  Hol- 
land. On  October  4  of  that  year,  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment in  Brussels  assembled,  declared  that  Belgium 
had  constituted  herself  an  independent  state;  whereon 
the  powers,  at  the  instance  of  King  William  of  The 


♦Dr.  Dillon;  "The  Scrap  of  Paper." 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    161 

Netherlands,  convened  their  plenipotentiaries  in  Lon- 
don and  drew  up  the  protocol  of  the  separation  of  the 
two  countries.*  In  this  document  where  Belgium  first 
appears  as  a  separate  personality  it  is  set  forth  in 
Article  V  that  she  is  to  constitute  a  perpetually  neu- 
tral state  and  that  the  five  powers  signing  the  protocol 
are  to  guarantee  said  perpetual  neutrality. 

This  agreement  was  not  instantly  accepted  by  Bel- 
gium, but  later  on  July  9,  1831,  her  national  congress 
voted  the  preliminaries  of  the  peace,  with  its  Article 
IX  corresponding  exactly  to  Article  V  of  the  protocol 
of  London.  That  same  year,  on  December  14,  was 
signed  the  treaty  called  Of  the  Fortresses,  by  which 
England,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia  on  the  one 
side,  and  Belgium  on  the  other,  all  agreed  in  the  demo- 
lition of  certain  fortresses  in  Belgium  and  the  main- 
taining of  others,  in  virtue  of  the  changes  wrought  in 
the  country's  condition — "her  political  independence 
as  well  as  the  perpetual  neutrality  which  is  guaranteed 
to  her."  f  France,  as  seen,  did  not  agree  to  the  stipu- 
lations of  this  treaty,  nor  were  certain  of  its  clauses 
acceptable  to  Belgium.  All  the  preliminaries  were 
given  final  form  in  the  Treaties  of  1839,  by  which  was 


*  Protocol  of  December  20,  1830,  as  agreed  upon  by  the 
plenipotentiaries. 

f  Treaty  of  December  14,  1831,  between  England,  Prussia, 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Belgium,  preamble  and  Articles  I,  IV,  and 
VI ;  reproduced  in  "L'Etat  neutre  a  titre  permanent,"  by  Em- 
manuel Descamp. 


162  THE  WORLD  WAR 

settled  the  pending  conflict  between  Belgium  and  Hol- 
land, and  by  which  the  principle  of  permanent  neu- 
trality for  Belgium  was  fixed  more  firmly  than  ever. 
These  treaties  are  three,  and  interdependent.  In  the 
first,  Belgium  was  not  one  of  the  contracting  parties; 
on  the  one  side  Holland,  and  on  the  other  England, 
France,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria,  all  recognized 
the  dissolution  of  the  former  union  of  Belgium  and 
Holland  and  recognized  that  the  pacts  contained  in 
the  treaty  made  simultaneously  between  Belgium  and 
Holland  should  have  the  same  force  and  value  as  if 
they  formed  part  of  this  same  treaty.  In  the  second, 
Belgium  and  Holland  are  the  parties  interested;  it  is 
a  treaty  of  peace  and  friendship,  and  in  its  Article 
VII  is  set  forth  the  principle  of  neutrality.  In  the 
third,  Belgium  on  the  one  side  and  the  five  countries 
mentioned  concur;  its  main  premise  is  the  recognition 
of  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and 
the  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  great  powers  to  de- 
fend this  neutrality.  These  three  treaties  virtually 
are  one  and  their  subdivision  was  due  to  a  mere  for- 
mula whose  object  was  to  facilitate  diplomatic  labor 
and  avoid  a  repetition  of  the  difficulties  of  1830  and 
1 83 1.  A  proof  of  their  being  one  and  the  same  is  that 
in  two  of  them  the  clauses  of  the  other  two  are  re- 
peated, signifying  that  they  have  the  same  force  as  if 
they  were  clauses  of  that  same  treaty. 

To  discuss  its  validity  might  be  admitted  in  popular 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    163 

propaganda  or  justified  by  high-strung  patriotic  senti- 
ments, but  could  never  be  tolerated  in  an  impartial 
examination  of  the  facts.  It  has  been  affirmed  by 
those  defending  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium  that 
the  treaty  of  1839  did  not  solidly  recognize  Belgian 
neutrality,  especially  when  grave  international  inter- 
ests were  involved  in  the  case ;  to  reinforce  their  thesis 
they  say  that  in  1870,  when  Gladstone  was  prime 
minister,  England  considered  it  necessary  to  concert 
a  new  treaty.  The  facts  are  that  when  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War  broke  out  England,  as  at  the  beginning 
of  the  present  era,  initiated  conversations  in  order  to 
discover  the  intentions  of  the  belligerents.  The  pe- 
culiar circumstance  of  the  moment  must  not  be  for- 
gotten— how  Belgium  was  panic-stricken  over  Bis- 
marck's publication  of  a  secret  proposal  made  to  him 
by  Napoleon  III  regarding  the  annexation  of  Belgium 
by  France.  The  conversations  crystallized  in  the 
treaties  of  April  9  and  April  11  of  that  same  year. 
The  first  was  between  England  and  Prussia,  and  the 
second  between  France  and  England.  The  two  were 
identical  and  consisted  of  only  four  articles.  In 
Article  I  France  and  Prussia  each  stated  her  firm 
determination  to  observe  Belgian  neutrality  just 
so  long  as  the  other  respected  it,  and  England  bound 
herself  to  cooperate  by  means  of  forces  on  sea  and 
land  with  whichever  of  the  two  powers  respected  it, 
in  order  that  it  might  be  maintained  then  and  after- 


1 64  THE  WORLD  WAR 

wards.  In  Article  II  the  two  belligerents  bind  them- 
selves, as  already  stated  in  a  different  treaty,  to  main- 
tain said  neutrality  with  armed  force  and  to  take 
counsel  with  England  on  the  necessary  measures.  The 
third  Article  sets  forth  a  principle  which  undermines 
the  defenders  of  Germany;  and  as  it  was  not  kept  in 
mind  by  the  German  propagandists  we  give  it  entire 
for  those  who  have  not  gone  fully  into  the  question: 
"This  treaty  will  oblige  the  high  contracting  parties 
throughout  the  duration  of  the  present  war  between 
France  and  the  North  German  Confederation  or  the 
Confederation  of  the  North  of  Germany  and  for 
twelve  months  after  the  ratification  of  any  treaty  of 
peace  between  these  two  parties;  and  when  this  term 
will  have  expired  the  independence  and  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  so  far  as  the  respective  high  contracting  par- 
tics  are  concerned,  will  continue  to  be  based  as  for- 
merly on  Article  I  of  the  Treaty  of  the  Five  Nations 
of  April  19,  1839." 

It  is  very  clear  that  this  double  treaty  did  not  and 
could  not  revoke  that  of  1839,  and  so  plain  and  evi- 
dent are  its  terms  that  they  could  not  be  improved 
upon  by  any  other  diplomatic  document  whatever. 
Nor  can  it  be  alleged  that  although  the  treaty  of  1870 
did  not  modify  that  of  1839  **  nevertheless  inter- 
preted it  in  the  sense  that  should  a  casus  belli  arise,  a 
new  stipulation  would  be  necessary  to  give  force  to 
the  previous  one.     Should  such  judgment  be  accepted 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    165 

it  would  place  the  art  of  diplomacy  in  the  group  of 
speculative  sciences,  and  the  relations  between  nations 
in  the  field  of  abstract  doctrine. 

The  creation  of  a  neutral  state  and  of  a  treaty 
to  guarantee  its  neutrality  are  deeds  merely  positive; 
the  acceptance  of  the  treaty  is  a  promise  of  fulfilment 
and  admits  of  no  omission.  When  Prussia  signed  the 
famous  treaty  with  four  other  powers  in  1839  she  was 
not  performing  a  useless  act  but  was  offering  on  her 
oath  as  a  civilized  nation  to  respect  its  clauses  on 
neutrality,  and  to  use  her  right  of  obliging  others  to 
respect  them;  and  all  this  not  in  time  of  peace,  but 
in  the  only  moment  when  the  concept  of  a  neutral 
nation  takes  on  efficacy,  for  neutrality  and  war  are 
correlative  terms.  To  suppose  that  a  new  treaty  must 
be  made  previous  to  every  international  conflict  is  to 
deny  the  force  of  the  first,  and  this  would  mean  to 
throw  onto  the  scrap-heap  an  international  prescrip- 
tion still  in  full  vigor. 

It  is  easy  to  understand  how  without  a  careful  ex- 
amination of  the  problem  one  might  fall  into  such 
erroneous  argument.  One  may  argue  prima  facie  that 
if  a  new  obligation  was  necessary  in  1870  when  the 
two  nations  who  are  today  contending  were  at  war, 
so  in  1914  it  was  necessary  to  repeat  something  of 
the  same  sort  in  order  that  the  belligerents  should 
respect  what  they  then  respected;  but  this  logic  falls 
by  its  own  premise.    A  treaty  of  neutrality  does  not 


166  THE  WORLD  WAR 

exclude  a  treaty  guaranteeing  that  neutrality;  on  the 
contrary  the  latter  renders  homage  to  the  former. 
The  manner  of  maintaining  Belgian  neutrality  was  not 
and  could  not  be  foreseen.  Belgium,  on  her  side,  and 
the  powers  signing  the  document,  all  bound  them- 
selves to  maintain  this  neutrality;  but  none  of  them 
could  at  that  time  foresee  the  multiple  occasions  which 
the  future  might  present  and  could  not  predetermine 
their  solution.  The  application  of  the  covenant  had 
to  be  left  until  the  necessary  or  opportune  moment. 
Consequently  in  1870  England  looked  for  a  way  of 
guaranteeing  the  clauses  of  the  treaty  of  1839,  an<^ 
France  and  Prussia  satisfied  her  by  means  of  the 
treaties  of  April  9  and  11,  1870,  binding  themselves 
to  defend  with  arms  that  which  they  had  all  previ- 
ously compacted.  The  two  posterior  treaties,  then, 
are  nothing  else  than  conventions  for  maintaining  the 
preceding  stipulations. 

That  this  was  so  the  text  indicates,  and  so  it  was 
always  interpreted.  Baron  d'Anethan  in  the  Belgian 
Parliament  of  that  day  thus  explained  it :  "The  trea- 
ties, separate  but  identical,  just  concluded  by  England 
with  the  powers  in  war  neither  create  nor  modify  the 
obligations  incident  to  the  treaty  of  1839;  they  regu- 
late the  practical  manner  of  executing  these  treaties 
in  a  determined  case.  They  in  no  way  weaken  the 
obligations  of  the  other  guaranteeing  powers,  as  their 
text  attests.     They  leave  entire  the  future  obligatory 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    167 

character  of  the  anterior  treaty,  with  all  its  conse- 
quences." * 

Emmanuel  Descamp,  at  a  time  when  this  question 
was  simply  speculative,  wrote  with  great  precision,  as 
if  he  had  foreseen  the  present  objections:  "The  Acts 
of  1870  constitute  temporary  conventions  for  the  regu- 
lation of  the  guarantee  and  are  of  the  same  nature 
as  the  conventions  of  1831  already  quoted.  It  is  as 
absurd  to  interpret  them  as  acts  which  have  for  their 
object  to  revivify  a  guarantee  merely  taken  for 
granted,  or  guarantee  outlawed,  as  to  distort  against 
the  validity  of  any  law  the  subsequent  regulations 
which  serve  for  its  execution."  f  Another  writer, 
Charles  de  Woeste,  goes  even  farther,  though  in  our 
opinion  with  less  penetration,  and  says  that  the  con- 
ventions of  1870  are  useless  since  they  merely  con- 
stitute the  application  of  the  treaties  of  1839  m  a 
given  case.  J  It  is  interesting  to  know  that  these  and 
identical  opinions  precede  by  many  years  the  present 
war,  and  that  they  were  emitted  in  the  purely  scien- 
tific field  and  not  animated  by  partisanship. 

The  fact  is  that  Belgian  neutrality  was  never  even 
questioned  until  after  it  was  violated.  In  Germany, 
France,  and  England,  the  countries  most  interested,  no 
one  gave  it  judicial  consideration;  and  no  one  went 


*  Session  of  the  Belgian  Parliament,  August  16,  1870. 
t  Emmanuel  Descamp ;  work  cited,  pages  166-167. 
$  Charles  de  Woeste;  "La  neutrality  beige,"  page  56  . 


1 68  THE  WORLD  WAR 

seeking  for  antecedents  until  after  the  declaration,  or 
rather  confession,  of  the  German  chancellor  in  the 
Reichstag.  Besides,  the  same  chancellor  had  said  in 
other  days  that  Belgium  had  nothing  to  fear  from 
Germany's  growing  strength  and  that  the  guarantee  of 
neutrality  given  to  Belgium  gained  at  the  same  time. 
The  very  excuses  presented,  all  of  them  emanating 
not  from  justice  but  from  necessity,  are  enough  to 
show  that  the  neutrality  treaty  was  a  vital  thing.  Ger- 
many's necessities  can  be  appreciated  but  they  cannot 
exempt  her  from  responsibility  in  the  political  field; 
for  in  the  last  analysis,  to  yield  to  necessity  is  to 
trample  underfoot  all  good  social  relation,  all  the 
amenities  of  civilization ;  which  conditions  consist  pre- 
cisely in  the  limits  imposed  upon  our  own  convenience 
by  another's  rights.  Civilization  puts  the  collective 
interest,  immediate  or  remote,  above  the  individual  ne- 
cessity. This  criticism  was  aptly  expressed  by  Lloyd 
George  when  he  said:  "If  Germany  violates  treaties 
because  it  is  to  her  advantage  to  do  so,  then  we  must 
prove  to  her  that  she  will  find  even  greater  advantage 
in  respecting  them." 

Going  back  a  little,  we  find  that  in  191 1,  when  the 
newspapers  declared  that  Germany  would  violate  Bel- 
gian neutrality  in  case  of  war  with  France,  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  sent  to  Belgium  a  concrete  denial.  In  191 3 
when  Von  Jagow,  foreign  minister,  was  interpellated 
by  a  social  democrat  before  the  budget  commission 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    169 

of  the  Reichstag  he  answered :  "Belgian  neutrality 
is  fixed  by  international  conventions  and  Germany  is 
resolved  to  respect  those  conventions. "* 

In  France,  throughout  her  numerous  political 
changes,  throughout  innumerable  revolutions  in  the 
last  century,  Belgian  neutrality  was  never  questioned. 
The  Orleans  monarchy  respected  it  as  if  it  had  been 
their  own  work ;  and  in  fact  the  Belgian  revolution  of 
1830  was  really  a  consequence  of  the  revolution  which 
placed  Louis  Philippe  on  the  throne  of  France. 
After  him,  the  Republic  of  1848,  trying  to  renew  the 
1793  policy  of  spreading  the  ideal  of  liberty  among 
other  nations,  assured  Prince  de  Ligne,  the  Belgian 
ambassador,  that  France  had  not  changed  except  in 
her  internal  regime,  and  that  the  treaty  would  be 
respected.  Lamartine,  foreign  minister  of  the  Repub- 
lic, made  this  declaration  and  his  successor  repeated 
it.  The  Second  Empire  did  not  modify  this  policy  in 
spite  of  the  evident  Germanophile  sentiments  of  the 
Belgian  king.  The  question  of  the  secret  Franco- 
Prussian  treaty  which  so  alarmed  Belgium,  and  with 
reason,  was  really  a  deceitful  act  of  the  policy  of 
Bismarck,  who,  on  this  occasion  as  on  many  others, 
used  the  French  ambassador  Benedetti  for  his  ends. 
That  it  was  nothing  more  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact 
that  Bismarck  took  no  further  step  after  having  the 
famous  draft  in  his  hands,  but  guarded  it  most  craftily 


*  Belgian  Gray  Book,  document  number  12. 


170  THE  WORLD  WAR 

so  as  to  later  make  it  public  when  hostilities  had  actu- 
ally broken  out  between  France  and  Prussia.  He  ob- 
tained the  result  he  had  schemed  for;  the  League  of 
Neutral  Powers  initiated  by  England  to  give  Germany 
a  free  hand  against  France,  was  a  consequence  of  the 
publication.*  Written  in  Benedetti's  own  handwriting 
and  on  the  official  paper  of  the  embassy,  the  draft  was 
a  grave  indication  that  the  very  name  Napoleon  was 
synonymous  with  conquest. 

Regarding  Belgian  neutrality  the  chief  feature  of 
the  Second  Empire  was  its  attitude  in  1870.  It  is 
certain  that  Napoleon  III  on  acquainting  Leopold 
of  Belgium  with  the  declaration  of  war  against 
Prussia  sent  him  a  solemn  promise  to  respect  the  neu- 
trality and  soon  after  confirmed  it  through  diplomatic 
channels.f 

Belgium,  in  spite  of  the  treaties  which  the  bel- 
ligerents had  made  with  England  and  in  spite  of  the 
declarations  received,  prepared,  then  as  now,  to  defend 
her  territory  from  all  violation,  total  or  partial.  She 
knew  then,  as  later  in  19 14,  that  she  could  exist  and 
develop  only  while  this  neutrality  was  effective,  or  at 
least  while  she  showed  herself  able  to  defend  it  with 
that  valor  which  the  testimony  of  Csesar  and  subse- 
quent history  has  attributed  to  her.     It  appears  cer- 


*  Henry  Welschinger ;  "La  neutralite  beige,"  in  the  Revue  des 
deux  mondes,  September  1,  1914.  page  9. 
t  Henry  Welschinger ;  article  cited,  page  10. 


VOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    171 

tain  that  General  Wimpffen,  vanquished  at  Sedan, 
had  planned  to  enter  Belgium  to  escape  being  routed, 
but  the  border  was  well  guarded  and  the  Belgian 
army  made  the  enterprise  difficult.* 

The  Third  Republic  proceeded  even  better  than  pre- 
ceding governments  and  this  at  the  very  time  when 
Belgium  appeared  to  incline  toward  Germany,  and 
King  Leopold  to  have  suspicious  dealings  with  the 
neighboring  empire;  when  the  supposed  revelations 
were  gaining  credulity  with  the  general  public,  and 
when  the  Belgian  fortifications  which  were  being 
erected  appeared  rather  to  menace  France  than 
in  defense  against  a  German  invasion.!  There  was 
actually  a  period  from  1887  to  1895  in  which  France 
suspected  that  Belgium  would  not  only  admit  an  in- 
vading army  marching  rapidly  on  Paris  from  Germany 
but  would  even  join  it.  And  on  the  eve  of  this 
present  war  French  statesmen  knew  the  German  in- 
tentions, knew  the  Kaiser  had  informed  King  Albert 
that  he  was  no  longer  for  peace,  knew  that  Von 
Moltke,  Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff,  had  said 
that  in  case  of  war  they  must  pass  through  Belgium  ;t 
yet  in  this  crisis,  just  as  during  the  forty-four  years 
of  suspicious  and  ascertained  facts,  the  French  cabinet 


*  Declaration  of  General  Chazal  before  the  Military  Com- 
mission of  1871. 

f  Nouvelle  Revue,  July  I  and  October  I,  1888;  also  certain 
numbers  during  the  following  year. 

%  Bibliotheque  universelle  et  Revue  de  Suisse,  December,  1914. 
12 


172  THE  WORLD  WAR 

adopted  no  other  attitude  than  that  which  the  treaties 
and  the  word  of  the  nation  solemnly  pledged  de- 
manded. 

As  for  England,  never  since  the  Treaty  of  the  Five 
Powers  did  she  doubt  for  one  moment  the  obliga- 
tion assumed;  she  went  even  further  and  from  1839 
made  herself  the  champion  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

When  Lamertine  gave  up  the  ministry  of  foreign 
affairs  for  France  in  1848,  Lord  Palmerston,  fearing 
the  mob  agitation  fomented  by  French  statesmen  them- 
selves, affirmed  that  "the  powers  have  not  only  the 
right  but  the  duty  to  guarantee  Belgian  independence, 
which  duty  consists  in  aiding  by  every  means  the  parts 
subjected  to  aggression  and  to  preserve,  or  insist  upon 
the  return  of,  the  territorial  possessions  as  determined 
by  the  treaties."  Then  to  emphasize  the  statement  he 
took  a  formal  pledge  to  give  the  most  decided  aid  if 
necessary.  Gladstone,  some  years  later,  went  even 
further.  He  took  the  matter  out  of  the  juridical  field 
and  put  it  into  the  moral,  as  was  his  system,  and  de- 
clared that  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  "would 
be  the  perpetration  of  the  most  odious  crime  that  had 
ever  smirched  the  pages  of  history."*  In  the  very  year 
1870,  Lord  Russell,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords, 
recognized,  almost  with  verbal  excess,  the  juridical 
debt  of  Great  Britain.     "Our  obligations  to  this  king- 


*  Emmanuel  Descamp ;  work  cited. 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    173 

dom  (Belgium)  are  of  the  most  sacred,"  he  said. 
"We  have  accepted  these  along  with  other  powers 
and  separately  from  them.  We  cannot  choose  among 
manifold  solutions.  We  can  follow  but  one  road, 
and  that  is  the  road  of  honor.  We  are  obliged  to  de- 
fend Belgium.  The  members  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment declare  publicly  and  explicitly  that  they  intend 
to  respect  our  treaties,  to  loyally  fulfill  our  obliga- 
tions, and  not  to  dishonor  the  name  of  England." 
Lord  Salisbury,  more  inclined  to  the  typical  language 
of  a  statesman,  said  with  justice :  "The  independence 
of  Belgium  is  extremely  important  to  the  European 
powers  and  they  are  bound  by  compacts  highly  favor- 
able to  the  independence  of  that  country."  *  In  the 
foregoing  there  is  a  slight  lack  of  completeness;  if 
Salisbury  had  added  "and  vitally  necessary  to  Eng- 
land" he  would  have  said  the  whole  historic  truth. 

It  is  strange  that  Chancellor  Von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  did  not  comprehend  the  essence  and  therefore 
the  raison  d'etre  of  the  "piece  of  paper"  as  he  called 
the  Treaties  of  1839.  That  later  polemists  pretended 
not  to  understand  it  can  pass;  but  that  he,  directing 
the  affairs  of  the  most  powerful  empire  dominating 
for  long  years  Continental  policy — that  he  did  not  un- 
derstand is  inexplicable.  His  country  had  absolute 
prevision  of  the  slightest  happenings ;  its  military  men 
knew  all  the  weaknesses  of  the  enemies,  their  forces, 


Session  of  the  English  House  of  Lords,  July  17,  1891. 


174  THE  WORLD  WAR 

movements,  means  of  communication,  fortresses, 
cities,  inhabitants,  and  even  the  private  fortune  of 
these;  it  is  inexplicable  that  in  the  diplomatic  depart- 
ment of  the  country  possessing  all  this  exact  informa- 
tion, the  very  real  importance  which  England  ascribed 
to  the  treaties  of  1839  was  not  known,  especially  when 
even  the  most  superficial  historian  was  aware  of  it. 
It  is  evident  that  there  are  two  Germanies,  one  of  the 
military  party  admirably  perfect  in  its  way,  and  the 
other  of  the  diplomats,  completely  negative. 

The  famous  scrap  of  paper  *  did  have  its  raison 
d'etre.  When  drawn  up  in  1839  ^  was  tne  outgrowth 
of  all  preceding  history  and  in  time  came  to  be  looked 
upon  as  a  precious  conquest  which  must  never  be  aban- 
doned, never  questioned,  but  always  respected  even  in 
the  most  difficult  crisis. 

History  shows  that  English  policy,  excepting  the 
colonial,  revolves  around  the  nearby  coasts ;  these  were 
a  subject  of  constant  dispute  and  the  theater  of  long 
wars  and  continental  conquests.  Let  us  see  what 
an  eminent  English  writer  said  in  an  epoch  not  in- 
fluenced by  the  events  of  today. f 

Under  the  reigns  of  Edward  I  and  Edward  III  our 
foreign  policy  had  already  begun  to  assume  a  definite  form 
and  to  direct  itself  towards  that  national  objective  still 


*  Communication  of  the  English  Ambassador  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  on  the  declaration  of  war. 

t  Esme  Wingfield-Stratford ;  "History  of  English  Patriotism," 
page  61. 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    175 

adhered  to  by  modern  statesmen.  The  British  policy  of 
those  reigns  is  dead  because  it  has  been  consummated; 
but  their  European  policy  still  survives  after  six  centuries. 
Its  resume  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  key  of  our 
position  in  Europe  is  the  Low  Countries.  The  extreme 
to  which  this  guiding  principle  of  our  diplomacy  has  ar- 
rived in  the  course  of  centuries  is  extraordinary,  and 
from  this  the  majority  of  our  important  wars  have  re- 
sulted more  or  less  directly. 

In  these  conflicts  may  be  included  the  Hundred  Years 
War,  dating  from  the  reigns  mentioned,  the  short  wars 
of  Henry  VIII  and  Mary  Tudor,  the  Holland  campaigns 
of  Elizabeth,  of  Cromwell,  and  of  Charles  II ;  all  the  long 
struggle  with  Louis  XIV,  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Suc- 
cession, and  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars 
which  began  at  the  Scheldt  and  ended  at  Waterloo.  And 
there  are  even  those  who  predict  that  another  war,  great- 
est of  all,  awaits  us  if  we  are  to  make  sure  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  those  countries  and  our  own. 

We  have  here  the  origin  of  the  long  rivalry  between 
England  and  France,  a  rivalry  which  some  persons  are 
convinced  is  permanent  and  incurable.  But  it  was  not 
against  France  as  France  that  we  were  set,  but  against 
the  power  which  threatened  to  dominate  the  Low  Coun- 
tries. Now  that  this  danger  is  over  it  has  been  shown 
that  it  is  possible  for  the  two  countries  to  come  together 
and  to  cordially  pursue  a  common  policy.  Until  a  very 
recent  epoch  the  Low  Countries  had  but  little  to  fear 
from  an  eastern  neighbor,  unless  this  term  be  applied  to 
the  Emperor  Charles  V.    These  are  the  reasons  why  our 


176  THE  WORLD  WAR 

policy  has  consisted,  generally  speaking,  in  cooperating 
with  Germany  against  France,  a  situation  which  is  now 
completely  reversed.  As  far  back  as  the  reign  of  King 
John  we  began  to  see  this  cooperation,  and  an  Anglo- 
German  army  was  defeated  in  Bouvines.  Later  we  find 
Edward  III  at  the  beginning  of  the  Hundred  Years  War 
exercising  the  functions  of  Vicar  General  of  the  Empire 
and  conducting  in  vain  a  numerous  and  heterogeneous 
army  to  force  the  French  defenses  on  the  Flemish 
frontier. 

In  past  epochs,  however,  the  means  of  defense  had 
not  assumed  the  astounding  form  of  today.  The 
depths  of  the  sea  had  not  been  conquered  and  the 
air  was  sacred  to  departed  spirits  and  the  gods.  But 
today  it  is  doubly  comprehensible  that  England  will 
not  easily  permit  the  second  maritime  nation  of  the 
world  to  instal  herself  on  the  opposite  shore  of  the 
narroAV  Channel — the  nation  that  wished  "to  clutch 
the  trident  of  Neptune  as  firmly  as  it  held  the  sword 
of  Frederick  the  Great,"  the  nation  that  aspired  with 
undisguised  eagerness  to  an  extensive  colonial  domin- 
ion, the  nation  that  competed  for  the  world's  com- 
merce and  struggled  with  Englishmen,  both  in  Europe 
and  abroad,  in  a  fierce  economic  fight.  It  is  strange 
that  not  only  the  chancellor  of  the  empire,  but  also 
scientific  men  like  Professor  Hermann  Oncken  of  the 
University  of  Heidelberg,  should  persist  in  considering 
that  England's  cause  for  entering  the  war — defense 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    177 

of  Belgian  neutrality — was  a  pretext  of  small  impor- 
tance. Professor  Oncken  says  doctorally:  "No  one 
goes  to  war  for  such  a  poor  motive."  It  is  true  that 
he  considers  this  question,  following  the  opinion  of 
many  English  writers  such  as  the  chief  members  of 
the  Faculty  of  Modern  History  at  Oxford,*  as  purely  a 
moral  question;  but  therein  lies  the  greatest  error. 
It  is  human  nature  for  the  English  to  make  a  virtue 
of  their  going  to  war,  but  that  the  Germans  should 
not  have  understood  that  their  doing  so  was  a  dire 
necessity,  is  completely  inexplicable. 

In  sending  her  troops  to  the  fields  of  Flanders, 
England  was  not  defending  the  Belgians;  she  was 
defending  her  own  rights  acquired  in  fair  contest  and 
in  perfect  reciprocity  by  means  of  a  compact  signed 
by  five  powers,  who  guaranteed  its  observance  by  their 
word  given  before  the  world  and  with  due  responsi- 
bility. 

To  consider  this  as  sentimentality  on  England's 
part  constitutes  the  whole  error  around  which  most 
of  the  writers  have  revolved,  and  is  explained  by  the 
passion  of  the  moment  which  distracted  even  H;he 
serenest  minds.  They  really  believed  that  English 
public  opinion  rose  in  defense  of  a  treaty  and  of  an- 
other nation,  and  obliged  its  government  to  declare  war 
on  Germany.     Neither  the  English  people  nor  their 


*  "Why  We   Are  at  War ;"   written  by  the  members   of   the 
Faculty  of  Modern  History  of  the  University  of  Oxford. 


178  THE  WORLD  WAR 

government  would  be  capable  of  any  such  error.  Only- 
one  ruler  in  history  would  have  committed  it — Na- 
poleon III — and  certainly  the  system  brought  him  no 
good  results.  England  was  not  disposed  to  intervene 
when  Austria,  in  spite  of  all  her  declarations,  was  pre- 
paring to  hurt  Servia  by  breaking  the  recent  treaty  of 
Bucharest  virtually  approved  by  the  powers ;  nor  when 
Germany  broke  the  treaty  of  London  of  1867  which 
guaranteed,  under  the  signature  of  the  English  gov- 
ernment, the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  England,  full 
of  great  statesmen,  would  have  understood  all  the 
ridiculous  aspect  of  this  championship  which  the 
writers  tried  to  attribute  to  her.  In  a  moment  when 
the  acute  mind  of  Asquith  was  directing  the  cabinet, 
and  that  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  has  been  likened  to 
Pitt  the  Younger,*  was  directing  the  foreign  policy, 
the  British  government  was  bound  to  be  devoted  to 
the  defense  of  state  interests  and  to  sustain  a  treaty 
which  benefited  these ;  naturally  they  alleged  that  the 
real  cause  coincided  with  one  even  higher — respect  for 
a  sworn  pact,  and  defense  of  a  people  laborious,  active, 
honest,  worthy  in  every  aspect  of  championship. 

It  is  just  as  much  of  an  error  in  historical  criti- 
cism to  glorify  the  act  of  the  Belgians.  The  Belgians 
responded  to  a  necessity.  The  calamity  which  has 
fallen  upon  them  is  one  more  of  the  many  due  to 
their  geographical  situation,  one  more  which  history 


James  M.  Beck;  "The  Evidence  in  the  Case." 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    179 

has  been  preparing  for  them  throughout  the  centuries. 
If  the  Belgians  had  let  the  German  troops  pass,  ac- 
quitting their  conscience  by  presenting  conventional 
protests,  they  might  not  have  seen  their  houses  de- 
stroyed, their  cities  razed  to  the  ground,  nor  suffered 
the  thousand  other  misfortunes  so  vividly  related ;  it 
is  probable  that  their  industries  and  commerce  and 
monuments  would  have  remained  intact ;  but  one  thing 
would  most  certainly  have  perished — their  independ- 
ence. Given  a  national  life  by  the  will  of  the  great 
powers,  and  with  the  object  of  establishing  a  neutral 
state,  Belgium,  had  she  demonstrated  the  impossi- 
bility of  maintaining  this  international  situation,  would 
have  shown  that  her  raison  d'etre  as  an  independent 
state  no  longer  existed.  Yuste,  studying  the  life  of 
Queen  Maria  of  Hungary,  sister  of  Charles  V,  says 
in  this  connection:  "Reason  and  experience  showed 
Queen  Maria  the  true  role  which  the  Low  Countries, 
an  industrial  and  commercial  nation,  should  play. 
Only  a  vigilant  neutrality  could  consolidate  her  pros- 
perity and  preserve  her,  perhaps,  from  dismember- 
ment."* A  writer  of  the  present  moment  speaking 
with  enthusiasm  of  King  Albert  I  says  something 
which  is  doubly  true  when  he  qualifies  him  as  the 
"second  founder  of  Belgium."  f 

♦Yuste;  "Vie  de  Marie  de  Hongrie,"  page  131. 
f  M.  L.  Dumont  Wilden ;  "Albert  I,  second   fondateur  de  la 
Belgique,"  in  the  Revue  des  deux  mondes,  December  1,  1914. 


180  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Neither  in  the  case  of  Belgium  nor  in  that  of  Eng- 
land do  we  wish  to  deny  the  importance  of  the  sac- 
rifice made  by  entering  the  present  war.  Nor  do  we 
mean  to  mete  out  any  less  sympathy  to  those  who 
are  so  sorely  tried  during  the  invasion.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  wish  to  express  our  conviction  that  a  country 
is  more  admirable  when  it  defends  its  national  exist- 
ence than  when  it  fights  for  an  abstract  principle;  in 
the  first  case  ideality  has  the  collective  well-being  for 
its  basis,  in  the  second  ideality  is  the  product  of  a 
morbid  condition.  From  the  day  that  Austria  sent 
her  ultimatum  to  Servia,  the  Belgian  government  un- 
derstood the  danger  it  was  running.  On  that  same 
day,  July  24,  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  sent  a 
circular  to  the  kings'  ministers  accredited  to  those 
governments  signatory  to  the  Treaty  of  1839,  which 
circular  directed  them,  should  events  precipitate  them- 
selves rapidly,  to  read  to  the  respective  ministers  of 
foreign  affairs  an  accompanying  letter  undated,  re- 
claiming respect  of  Belgian  neutrality.*  Five  days 
later  in  view  of  what  had  happened  the  Belgian  gov- 
ernment decided  to  put  its  army  on  war  footing,  and 
on  July  31  mobilization  was  ordered.  At  this  state 
England  had  already  taken  action  and  continued  ad- 
dressing herself  to  France,  Germany,  and  Belgium, 
demanding  the  fulfilment  of  their  obligation.  Sir 
Francis  Villiers,  British  Minister  in  Belgium,  begged 


*  Belgian  Grey  Book,  document  number  2. 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    181 

urgently  to  see  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  to  de- 
clare to  him  that  "in  view  of  the  existing  treaties  Sir 
Edward  Grey  presumes  that  Belgium  will  do  every- 
thing   possible    to    maintain    her    neutrality."      And 
Davignon,  the  minister  in  question,  answered  him  that 
"Belgian  military  forces,  considerably  improved  in  the 
recent  reorganization,  were  in  condition  to  permit  of 
an  energetic  defense  in  case  the  territory  should  be 
invaded."  *     The  same  day  the  German  minister  de- 
clared to  the  general  foreign  secretary  that  he  knew 
the  precedents  of  191 1  and  191 3  concerning  declara- 
tions on  the  part  of  the  German  government  to  re- 
spect Belgian  neutrality  and  that  he  was  "certain  that 
the    sentiments   manifested    at   those    dates   had   not 
changed."  f    And  on  August  2,  the  same  German  min- 
ister in  Belgium  repeated  that  although  he  had  no  in- 
structions to  make  an  official  communication  he  could 
declare  that  his  personal  opinion,  already  known,  was 
that  Belgium  could  feel  tranquil  so  far  as  her  neigh- 
bor on  the  east  was  concerned.  J 

But  on  the  same  second  of  August  came  the  ulti- 
matum to  Belgium,  a  work  of  gross  perfidy  and  one 
which,  though  a  precedent  can  be  found  in  history,  is 
nevertheless  a  dishonor  to  humanity.  It  appears  evi- 
dent that  German  diplomacy,  tied  to  the  tail  of  the 


*  Belgian  Grey  Book,  document  number  11. 
f  Belgian  Grey  Book,  document  number  12. 
%  Belgian  Grey  Book,  document  number  19. 


182  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Pomeranian  steeds,  was  obliged  to  write  this  infamous 
sheet.  In  it  was  set  forth  the  necessity  of  violating 
Belgian  territory,  and  the  intention  of  occupying  it  as 
a  base  of  operations;  an  offer  was  made  to  "pay 
cash"  for  everything,  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the 
territory  after  the  war;  but  in  case  these  conditions 
were  not  accepted  Germany  hurled  the  threat  of  treat- 
ing Belgium  as  an  enemy.*  A  great  error  both  in 
matter  and  in  form  is  this  note.  It  breathes  the  same 
sentiment  which  prompted  Frederick  the  Great  to 
occupy  Silesia;  in  it  is  the  same  utter  disregard  of 
another's  rights,  the  same  incomprehension  of  the 
limits  of  what  may  and  may  not  be  done.  The  great 
king  used  to  say  "I  will  occupy  Silesia  and  soon 
pedants  will  not  be  lacking  to  uphold  my  rights."  The 
German  General  Staff  thought  the  same  but  it  for- 
got that  the  times  have  changed.  The  moral  isolation 
in  which  its  nation  finds  itself,  in  spite  of  having  pro- 
duced so  many  men  beloved  of  humanity,  is  the  con- 
sequence of  this  great  fault.  The  law  of  modern  war- 
fare cannot  permit  this  outrage  even  in  order  to  de- 
fend great  tactical  interests,  even  to  rapidly  destroy 
an  enemy  so  as  to  then  turn  on  another,  even  to  settle 
the  outcome  of  a  war. 

If  this  were  not  the  case  anything  would  be  author- 
ized; collective  assassinations  and  the  enslavement  of 


Belgian  Grey  Book,  document  number  20. 


VIOLATION  OF  BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY    183 

a  neighbor,  the  taking  of  his  riches,  the  abuse  of  his 
person.  No !  Our  modern  age  has  created  a  force  in 
the  international  field  which  is  above  that  of  arms; 
an  effective  force  which  can  give  a  victory  and  impose 
a  defeat ;  a  force  which  is  called  international  law.  It 
finds  vigorous  supporters  in  all  those  who  see  in  the 
principle  of  public  order  dictated  for  the  public  good 
and  honestly  lived  up  to,  a  guarantee  of  their  own 
existence.  Lloyd-George  was  voicing  a  universal  con- 
viction when  he  declared  that  if  Germany  believed  it 
to  be  to  her  interest  to  break  treaties  she  must  be 
taught  that  it  would  be  even  more  to  her  interest  to 
keep  them. 


CHAPTER   XIX 

THE  ULTIMATUM   AND  ENGLAND'S  DECLARATION 
OF  WAR 

ENGLAND  acted  with  extraordinary  rapidity.  On 
her  asking  France  and  Germany,  as  in  1870,  for 
a  confirmation  respecting  Belgian  neutrality,  France 
immediately  gave  a  favorable  answer  and  sent  the 
same  assurance  to  Brussels.  This  attitude  of  France, 
whether  due  to  a  high  conception  of  her  own  duty 
or  whether  due  to  her  military  plans  which  did 
not  include  an  invasion  of  Belgium,  is  altogether 
laudable.  Germany  delayed  an  explicit  answer  to 
England,  but  meanwhile  was  using  other  language  in 
Brussels.  Toward  the  English  government  she  did 
not  wish  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  pledging  her 
word  and  then  committing  the  outrage  of  breaking  it; 
with  Belgium  she  wished  to  hide  the  truth  in  order 
that  the  country  might  not  be  prepared,  since  the  in- 
vasion beyond  doubt  was  prepared  beforehand  and  the 
German  diplomats  in  Brussels  knew  it. 

In  short,  Germany  made  her  decision;  and  in  face 
of  England's  threat  to  declare  war  on  her,  Von  Jagow 

i85 


186  THE  WORLD  WAR 

did  not  know  any  other  explanation  to  give  than  that 
of  military  necessity;  and  later  Von  Bethmann-Holl- 
weg  dissolved  his  own  ideas  in  a  sea  of  words  and 
regretted  that  England  should  go  to  war  for  a  scrap 
of  paper.* 

Germany  was  at  war  wTith  Belgium  on  August  4. 
On  that  day  she  assaulted  the  nation  which,  since  its 
birth  three-quarters  of  a  century  before,  had  strictly 
fulfilled  its  sworn  pact.  That  same  day  England  hav- 
ing sent  an  ultimatum  declared  war  on  Germany.  It 
was  a  grave  day  in  that  country,  where  they  had  not 
learned  to  reckon  with  the  race  that  never  pardons. 
It  was  a  grave  day  in  that  country  where  political  stu- 
dents and  writers,  lulled  by  a  long  peace  and  inflated 
by  great  prosperity,  had  not  foreseen  the  danger  of 
exploiting  the  credulity  of  the  masses  and  the  fanatic- 
ism of  the  governing  classes. 

Could  England  have  failed  to  enter  a  conflict  which 
was  jeopardizing  the  nation  that  so  flagrantly  disputed 
with  her  the  domination  of  the  sea  ?    Hardly. 

German  writers  have  talked  much  about  England's 
intervening  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  com- 
merce of  her  rival.  To  give  only  this  hypothesis  for 
her  act  means  ignorance  of  the  magnificent  figures 
which  British  commerce  has  shown  in  recent  years. 
That  the  active  and  audacious  German  competition  was 


*  Miscellaneous,   number   8,    1914.    Official    document   of    the 
English  government 


ENGLAND'S  DECLARATION  OF  WAR     187 

displeasing  to  Great  Britain  no  one  can  deny ;  nor  that 
economic  jealousy  was  one  of  the  causes,  perhaps  the 
principal,  of  the  political  complications.  Was  it  not 
the  Kaiser  himself  who  had  urged  German  mercan- 
tile activity  as  the  reason  for  his  larger  fleet  ?  Was  not 
the  international  policy  of  the  state,  as  necessary  pro- 
tector of  commercial  interests  and  as  motive  for  those 
interests,  his  idea  even  before  it  was  adopted  by  the 
"modern  Phenicians"  as  the  English  have  been  called? 
Even  before  it  became  for  a  brief  period  the  unfruit- 
ful program  of  an  eminently  industrial  Republic  like 
the  United  States  ? 

The  justification  presented  to  the  German  people 
whenever  new  sums  were  asked  for  warships  was  that 
the  expenditure  would  defend  and  augment  their  com- 
merce; and  sotto  voce,  and  indeed  sometimes  aloud, 
for  there  was  nothing  to  fear  from  British  imper- 
turbability, it  was  said  that  it  would  serve  to  chase  the 
English  from  the  sea.  To  these  English  the  Kaiser 
threw  out  a  threat  when  he  said  "Our  future  is  on  the 
sea";  or  his  more  picturesque  phrase,  "Without  the 
consent  of  the  German  Sovereign  nothing  must  hap- 
pen in  any  part  of  the  world."  No  one  can  suppose 
that  England,  to  whom  supremacy  on  the  sea  was  her 
very  life,  could  remain  neutral  when  such  threats  were 
about  to  be  reinforced,  or  at  least  tested,  by  a  struggle 
with  other  powers. 
13 


188  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Nevertheless,  English  policy  in  latter  years  appeared 
to  incline  to  the  maintainence  of  peace. 

A  certain  phenomenon  of  these  early  moments  must 
not  be  passed  over  without  comment.  On  the  Conti- 
nent, after  the  declaration  of  war,  the  various  cabinets 
were  strengthened  by  men  who  the  day  before  had 
been  irreconcilable  adversaries — Jules  Guesdes,  in 
France;  Vandervelde,  in  Belgium;  while  in  Germany 
the  great  mass  of  those  applauding  the  Kaiser  was 
made  up  by  the  Socialists  of  the  Reichstag  along  with 
his  electors,  all  organized  in  regiments  just  as  disci- 
plined as  those  that  had  marched  to  the  front.  But  in 
England  at  this  crucial  moment  three  prominent  mem- 
bers, champions  of  peace  at  any  price,  left  the  cabinet. 
There  was  opposition  even  among  the  supporters  of 
the  Liberal  government. 

We  do  not  mean  that  party  differences  regarding 
peace  at  any  price  did  not  terminate  shortly  after. 
The  supreme  voice  of  patriotism  was  heard  by  all,  ask- 
ing its  sacrifice  from  Irish  as  well  as  English,  and  all 
responded.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  if  Germany 
had  not  been  so  scornful  of  her  neighbor's  rights,  of 
treaties,  and  of  English  interests,  the  tacit  protest  of 
Morley  and  Burns  as  they  left  the  House  of  Commons 
might  have  materialized  into  a  preventive  action  on 
the  part  of  a  Parliament  whose  majority  was  much 
more  inclined  to  peace  than  to  war.  Old  Gladstone 
Liberals  and  young  members  of  the  Labor  Party,  that 


ENGLAND'S  DECLARATION  OF  WAR     189 

is  to  say,  the  two  extremes  of  which  the  government 
was  composed  by  the  repeatedly  expressed  preference 
of  the  people,  were  agreed  to  work  for  peace.  At  the 
beginning  of  1913  and  again  at  the  beginning  of  1914 
it  appeared  that  this  majority  would  split;  that  some 
would  follow  the  fiery  Winston  Churchill  and  others 
the  no  less  fiery  Lloyd  George,  and  all  because  of 
questions  touching  upon  a  possible  war;  only  the  au- 
thority of  Asquith  with  his  admirable  statesmanship 
was  able  to  prevent  it. 

It  would  have  been  difficult  for  the  English  govern- 
ment to  choose  an  opportune  moment.  She  had  to 
count  on  a  parliament  in  unison  with  the  people,  which 
state  of  harmony  was  an  easy  matter  only  where  pub- 
lic opinion  had  been  prepared  and  worked  up  as  in 
Germany. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Germany  on  her  side 
was  not  able,  in  spite  of  her  many  efforts,  to  penetrate 
the  intention  of  the  British  cabinet;  for  the  British 
cabinet  wished  in  any  case  to  have  its  hands  free. 

When  the  German  government  asked  the  British 
what  its  attitude  toward  Germany  would  be  if  the 
latter  maintained  the  Treaty  of  1839,  which  meant 
Belgian  neutrality,  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  wish  to 
compromise  himself  and  had  to  answer  that  he  had 
not  considered  that  point.  The  fact  was,  England  could 
not  consent  to  tie  her  hands.  It  was  in  the  order  of 
things  that  sooner  or  later,  when  the  French  shores 


190  THE  WORLD  WAR 

were  occupied,  her  own  interests  would  force  her  into 
the  conflict.  This  step  could  be  avoided  only  by  one 
of  those  aberrations  like  blinded  pacifism,  which  the 
masses,  more  enamored  of  an  absolute  principle  than 
a  reality,  undergo;  and  from  such  danger  the  English 
people  would  not  have  been  able  to  deliver  themselves. 
Between  entering  later  or  entering  at  once  the  English 
government  preferred  that  moment  when  Germany's 
merchant  fleet  was  scattered,  her  warships  off  duty. 
Only  in  that  way  could  she  prevent  being  surprised  as 
Russia  was  when  the  only  declaration  of  war  she 
received  from  Japan  was  the  sound  of  the  cannon  of 
Chemulpo. 


CHAPTER  XX 

TURKEY  AND  THE  CONFLICT 

THE  nation  that  from  the  first  resolved  to  follow 
the  Germanic  Empires  into  the  formidable  con- 
flict they  had  undertaken  was  Turkey.  Ever  since 
Turkey  penetrated  into  Europe  she  has  suffered  the 
heavy  consequences  of  not  having  accepted  Christian- 
ity. An  opposition,  tacit  when  not  violent,  has  made 
her  the  victim  in  political  life  of  her  religious  faith. 
It  appears  that  the  European  world  which  could  tol- 
erate less  logical  creeds  in  remote  continents  would 
not  compromise  with  Mohammedanism  at  the  gates  of, 
or  within,  Europe  itself.  Of  that  same  Tartar  race 
which  long  ago  sent  Bulgarians  and  Hungarians  to 
settle  in  Europe's  fertile  places,  and  accept  Europe's 
religion,  the  Turk  has  been  the  object  of  such  ani- 
mosity that,  to  his  detriment,  an  ideal  of  civilization  is 
absorbed  in  an  international  interest — to  expel  the 
Crescent  from  Europe  and  then  annihilate  it.  This 
appears  to  be  the  watchword  of  the  present  century. 
In  our  social  existence  nothing  is  worse  than  the  union 

191 


192  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  sentiment  with  interest  when  the  combination  is 
directed  to  harming  a  given  existence. 

The  glorious  history  of  Islam  has  been  for  some 
time  past  the  fullest  of  sorrows.  The  years  have 
brought  her  a  continuous,  unalterable  diminution  of 
power  and  loss  of  territory,  and  this  to  the  general 
satisfaction,  if  not  enthusiasm,  of  the  entire  world. 
And  yet  the  Turk  is  considered  by  those  who  have 
studied  that  part  of  the  Orient  to  have  a  good  dis- 
position and  great  personal  honesty.  Although  it  is 
not  to  the  credit  of  those  practising  Christianity  to 
say  it,  it  is  nevertheless  certain  that  of  all  the  peoples 
in  that  part  of  the  globe  the  Turk  inspires  most  con- 
fidence and  affection.  Writers,  diplomats,  Europeans 
and  Americans  who  reside  there,  and  commercial  trav- 
elers, all  testify  to  this  opinion. 

After  long  appearing  to  be  in  a  trance,  the  Turks 
awoke  not  many  years  ago  and  dethroned  Abdul  Amid, 
the  Red  Sultan,  and  put  on  the  throne  Mohammed  V. 
This  initiated  a  regime  of  liberty.  The  revolution  of 
the  Young  Turks,  which  for  years  had  been  hatching 
unsuccessful  plots,  was  at  last  able  to  conquer  by  a 
proclamation  and  without  great  battles. 

But  only  in  part  did  the  revolution  fulfill  its  mission. 
It  was  a  question  whether  the  new  regime  would  be 
able  to  build  up  a  solid  barrier  against  either  Slavic 
or  West  European  ambitions,  and  to  this  task  it  was 
not  equal.     On  the  disappearance  of  the  old  routine, 


TURKEY  AND  THE  CONFLICT    193 

foreign  covetousness,  stimulated  by  the  fear  that  the 
Young  Turk  party  might  make  conquest  more  difficult 
than  formerly,  awoke  with  more  savage  instinct  than 
ever;  and  this  very  party,  with  its  newly  acquired 
ambitions  for  the  old  empire,  encouraged  in  its  turn 
European  appetites. 

In  the  diplomatic  field  also  there  was  a  change. 
England  was  withdrawing  from  the  first  rank  she  had 
hitherto  occupied,  and  leaving  it  to  Germany;  and 
Germany  was  decided  to  open  a  road  through  Turkey 
to  Russia,  who  had  just  come  back  with  new  zest  into 
Balkan  politics.  The  work  of  the  German  ambassador 
Von  Marschall  found  the  field  abandoned.  Turks  of 
both  the  old  and  the  new  order  understood  that  they 
could  hope  nothing  from  Russia  favorable  to  their 
interests,  while  Germany  on  the  other  hand  could  not 
awaken  immediate  suspicion  even  in  the  most  wary. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Von  Marschall  whispered  the- 
ories of  legitimate  expansion  in  the  ears  of  the  most 
credulous  or  ambitious,  and  these  theories  must  have 
appeared  sincere.  Germans  and  Moslems  constituted 
two  great  compact  masses,  two  races  equally  warlike 
and  situated  in  favorable  positions ;  the  union  of  the 
two  ought  to  mean  their  glory  and  prosperity,  and 
together  they  ought  to  be  able  to  expel  the  smaller 
races  whose  early  boldness  had  acquired  formidable 
positions  and  had  carried  them  to  dreams  of  govern- 
ing of  the  world,  to  the  detriment  of  more  legitimate 


194  THE  WORLD  WAR 

interests.     These  and  other  theories  explained  pru- 
dently but  in  good  faith,  together  with  a  realization 
of  the  international  situation,  inclined  Turkey  most, 
decidedly  toward  the  great  Central  Empire. 

On  the  day  when  two  German  warships  pursued  in 
the  Mediterranean  took  refuge  in  the  Dardanelles, 
Turkey  not  only  received  them  but  decided  to  go  to 
war.  Russia,  instead  of  taking  prompt  action,  was 
slow  to  understand  that  the  moment  had  arrived  to 
liquidate  forever  the  account  that  had  been  standing 
ever  since  the  Congress  of  Berlin;  and  England 
alarmed  for  her  African  possessions,  also  threw  off 
that  arrogance  which  was  characteristic  of  all  the 
nations  in  times  of  peace,  and  adopted  a  too  conciliatory 
tone. 

Turkey  for  her  part  was  in  no  hurry  to  enter  the 
fight.  For  the  moment  she  merely  rechristened  the 
Goeben  after  the  famous  Sultan,  Selim  Yaruz  (whose 
companion  in  world  domination  was  Charles  V),  re- 
tained the  practical  German  seamen  who  manned  it, 
prepared  her  fortresses,  filled  them  with  Germans,* 
and  waited  until,  according  to  tradition,  "the  infidels 
would  oblige  her  to  give  Europe  peace  by  means  of  a 
war." 

In  all  this  period  preceding  the  declaration  of  war 
Turkey  acted  with  great  duplicity.  On  August  4, 
19 14,  the  grand  vizir  had  assured  the  English  repre- 


*  The  Times,  December  11,  1914,  account  by  Sir  Louis  Mallet. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  CONFLICT    195 

sentative  in  Constantinople  that  Turkey  renewed  her 
assurance  of  remaining  neutral.*  When  the  Goeben 
and  the  Breslau  entered  Turkish  ports  he  lied  and  said 
they  had  been  bought,  and  with  feigned  tears  induced 
the  English  Marine  Commission  not  to  abandon  Con- 
stantinople. As  to  what  happened  concerning  the  two 
German  warships,  the  same  grand  vizir  made  many 
salaams  and  tried  to  justify  himself  to  Ambassador 
Tallet  when  the  latter  arrived  in  Constantinople  after 
his  vacation,  August  18.  By  the  same  hypocritical 
procedure  the  Dardanelles  were  closed,  and  there  was 
even  more  hypocrisy  when  the  abolition  of  the  capitu- 
lations was  being  discussed.  This  page  in  the  history 
of  Turkish  diplomacy  is  hardly  in  accordance  with  the 
teachings  of  the  Prophet. 

It  appears  that  Enver  Pacha,  ardent,  patriotic,  and 
ambitious  to  the  point  of  aspiring  to  the  caliphate,  was 
the  decisive  factor  in  Turkey's  entrance  into  the  war. 
Enver  is  the  same  who  as  Bey  resisted  the  Italian  in- 
vasion in  Cirenaica,  and  who  led  the  vanguard  into 
Andrianoplis  when  it  was  reconquered ;  more  than  all, 
he  was  the  hero  of  the  coup  d'etat  by  which  the  mod- 
erate ministry  was  overthrown  (not  without  blood- 
shed) and  fell  into  his  hands  and  Talaat  Bey's,  with 
the  present  grand  vizir  and  the  minister  of  state  as 
decorative  figures.  The  prestige  of  Enver  Pacha  was 
great  in  the  army,  for  which  reason  Mohammed  V 


*  Second  English  Blue  Book,  document  number  3. 


196  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  his  heir  (Mohammed  had  got  the  throne  only 
through  an  army  conspiracy)  were  not  strong  enough 
to  oppose  his  plans.  If  in  a  country  like  Germany 
the  military  party  was  able  to  impose  itself  little  by 
little  on  the  whole  nation,  it  could  do  even  more  in  a 
country  like  Turkey.  Seeing  that  under  her  mantle 
of  neutrality  she  was  actively  preparing  for  war,  the 
three  allied  powers  sent  a  collective  note  asking  that 
all  Germans  who  filled  public  positions  in  Turkey 
should  be  sent  out.  While  the  cabinet  was  vacillating, 
the  war  party,  helped  and  perhaps  inspired  by  Ger- 
man officers,  committed  the  aggressions  that  provoked 
war.* 

The  Sultan  was  to  use  the  terrible  weapon  of  the 
Holy  War,  kept  as  a  threat,  in  order  to  make  Egypt 
and  India  rebel  against  England,  and  Tunis,  Algeria, 
and  Morocco  against  France.  His  armies  were  to 
assault  Russia  and  weaken  her  western  frontier,  while 
others  hastened  to  the  Suez  Canal.  By  this  means 
England,  in  order  to  defend  Egypt,  would  have  to 
abandon  France. 

It  would  appear  up  to  the  present  moment  that  the 
Islamic  world  is  not  to  carry  out  these  enterprises. 
The  Holy  War  has  not  accomplished  the  hoped-for 
result.  Apparently  the  true  instinct  of  the  masses, 
an  instinct  not  unknown  to  the  Mohammedans,  warned 


*  The  Times,  December  11,  1914;   article  cited;   also  Second 
English  Blue  Book  and  Second  Russian  Orange  Book. 


TURKEY  AND  THE  CONFLICT    197 

them  that  once  more  religion  was  being  made  to 
serve  political  ends,  and  that  the  statesmen  in  Con- 
stantinople invoked  the  Prophet  without  believing  in 
him.  Nor  was  the  expected  organization  of  the  masses 
easy.  Modern  warfare  demonstrates  that  the  machine 
has  taken  the  place  of  men  and  that  the  organization 
of  an  army  is  no  simple  task. 


CHAPTER   XXI 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY 


WHY  Italy  remained  neutral  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  is  not  generally  understood  in 
spite  of  the  copious  explanation  it  has  received.  The 
Italian  government  stated  its  course  clearly  and 
the  press  of  the  country  not  only  supplied  the  pub- 
lic with  a  great  assortment  of  data,  but  in  polemics 
against  both  underhanded  and  open  attacks,  it  set 
forth  many  just  arguments.  But  the  great  mass 
of  people  are  not  compelled  to  analyze  or  even  to  know 
the  factors  in  the  problem;  for  them  it  was  easier  to 
deliver  the  superficial  criticism  that  the  ally  in  peace 
did  not  continue  to  be  an  ally  in  war.  Not  only  did 
the  mass  express  itself  in  this  way,  but  also  certain 
writers  who,  forgetting  their  mission  of  elucidating 
events,  allowed  themselves  to  be  carried  away  by  the 
passion  of  the  moment  into  publishing  the  statement 
that  Italian  neutrality  constituted  treason.* 

The  remembrance  of  another  neutrality,  declared  in 


*  Hugo  Miinsterburg ;  "The  War  and  America,"  page  74. 

199 


200  THE  WORLD  WAR 

1870  when  the  French  government  was  hoping  for 
Italian  aid,  lends  some  color  to  this  accusation  from 
disappointed  Germans  who,  with  reason  or  without, 
were  hoping  to  see  the  Italian  army  on  the  battlefield 
of  1914  in  their  defense. 

There  is,  however,  a  definite  psychological  fact  back 
of  this  question.  Without  it  the  coincidence  of  help 
twice  expected  and  twice  failing  in  the  decisive  mo- 
ment could  not  be  explained;  it  is,  that  official  Italy 
has  never  been  sentimental  in  politics.  Going  a  step 
further  we  may  add  that  though  the  Italian  govern- 
ment has  never  been  sentimental  the  public  has  always 
been  so.  Admirable  dispensation  which  the  marvelous 
Latin  spirit  has  conceived,  and  which  northern  nations 
like  England  and  the  United  States,  where  government 
is  bound  down  to  public  opinion,  or  like  Germany 
where  government  dominates  public  opinion,  cannot 
understand.  Nevertheless  it  responds  to  a  salient  ne- 
cessity in  political  ethics.  The  government  is  a  super- 
intendent of  affairs.  It  must  weigh  advantages  and 
judge  motives.  Its  chief  care  must  be  to  harmonize 
the  immediate  and  tangible  good  with  the  intangible, 
and  not  to  violate  the  principles  of  collective  order; 
for  these,  accepted  and  respected  by  all,  constitute  a 
national  interest ;  but  neither  must  the  government  lose 
itself  in  abstractions  and  forget  realities.  The  public 
on  the  other  hand  is  the  expression  of  the  different 
phases  of  the  human  soul.     It  is  sentimental,  pas- 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  201 

sionate,  valorous,  cowardly,  fool-hardy,  prudent,  and 
at  times  brutal.  It  is  a  kaleidoscope  of  all  the  con- 
ditions, positive  and  negative,  of  the  human  morale. 

And  so  we  find  Italians  fighting  on  all  fields  and  for 
all  kinds  of  ideas.  In  America,  Greece,  Poland,  Hun- 
gary, Italians  have  offered  their  arms  and  their  lives. 
And  although  France  did  not  see  the  armies  of  Victor 
Emanuel  II  fighting  with  her  in  1870  as  hers  had 
fought  with  him  on  the  plains  of  Lombardy  in  1859, 
she  could  nevertheless  admire  Garibaldi's  red-shirted 
volunteers  in  the  Vosges  Mountains  and  around  Dijon. 

Sentimental  policy  on  the  part  of  the  Piedmontese 
government  first  or  of  the  Italian  afterward  would 
have  made  Italian  unity  impossible ;  for  had  this  unity 
been  suddenly  proclaimed  instead  of  patiently  achieved 
it  would  have  been  only  ephemeral.  Perhaps,  indeed, 
Metternich's  contemptuous  "Italy  is  only  a  geographical 
expression"  would  have  weighed  eternally  on  the  penin- 
sula. 

How  differently  was  the  Italian  unity  accomplished 
from  the  German.  The  latter  could  call  upon  the  best 
army  in  Europe ;  three  successful  wars  served  her  as  a 
pedestal — 1864,  '66,  and  '70,  all  of  that  easy  kind  of 
victory  which  proves  the  enemy's  inferiority.  More- 
over German  unity  was  an  amalgamation,  not  a  reno- 
vation. The  Italian  on  the  other  hand  had  only  the 
reduced  little  Piedmont  army — a  few  men  without  war 
material — and  Garibaldi's  group  of  soldiers.     Its  de- 


202  THE  WORLD  WAR 

feats  were  to  be  expected  and  its  few  successes  could 
neither  produce  enthusiasm  nor  give  hope.  Moreover 
Italian  unity  was  an  entire  renovation  ab  imis;  it  had 
to  struggle  against  the  head  of  the  Church  who  had 
held  Rome  from  the  time  of  Charlemagne  and  even 
before ;  it  had  to  struggle  against  the  secular  monarchy 
of  the  Bourbons  who  held  Naples;  and  against  Aus- 
trian princes  very  influential  in  the  court  of  their  birth. 
Those  who  know  Italian  history  understand  that  much 
resourcefulness  and  astuteness  had  to  be  employed  to 
hold  Napoleon  III  to  his  task  of  defeating  Austrians 
on  the  fields  of  Magenta  and  Solferino  in  1859;  and 
to  hold  the  English  as  friends  in  i860,  and  induce  them 
to  look  with  sympathy  on  Garibaldi's  expedition. 

Later,  in  1866,  and  without  alienating  the  good  will 
of  France,  Italy  allied  herself  with  Prussia  and  recov- 
ered Venice  from  defeated  Austria.  Three  years  after, 
she  attained  her  present  extent  by  occupying  Rome, 
which  act  Napoleon  III,  influenced  by  the  Catholic 
Party  so  powerful  in  his  court,  refused  to  recognize 
in  the  name  of  that  neutrality  which  he  represented  to 
France  as  benevolent,  to  England  as  a  natural  conse- 
quence of  the  League  of  Neutrals  initiated  by  her,  and 
to  Prussia  as  a  great  service  rendered  to  the  cause 
which  she  herself  was  sustaining.  Considering  the 
machinations  which  beset  modern  Italy  it  is  very  patent 
that  without  this  sort  of  secular  genius,  this  utilitarian 
statecraft  acquired  in  misfortune  and  prompting  her 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  203 

to  secure  her  rights  not  by  the  sword  but  by  words, 
she  would  never  have  been  able  to  accomplish  such 
results.  Had  the  sentimentality  of  the  populace  been 
guiding  public  affairs,  Italian  unity  would  still  be 
merely  a  patriotic  dream. 

Nearly  fifty  years  have  passed  since  Rome  was  made 
capital  of  the  new  Italian  Kingdom,  and  these  have 
been  years  of  unbroken  equilibrium  and  careful  safe- 
guarding of  the  country's  sacred  interests.  Austria, 
hated,  was  turned  into  a  useful  ally  while  France, 
the  Latin  sister,  became  a  feared  adversary.  Bis- 
marck, with  that  characteristic  astuteness  which  events 
have  not  discounted,  wanted  Italy  to  come  into  the 
Triple  Alliance,  led  there  by  Austria  in  such  a  way 
that  the  two  rival  nations  would  be  united  from  the 
start.  Italy  acceded  with  the  approbation  of  most  of 
her  public  men.  To  maintain,  after  unity  was  an  ac- 
complished fact,  the  same  principles  which  had  served 
its  formation  had  to  be  the  program  of  Italian  cabinets, 
for  the  period  of  consolidation  was  equally  difficult. 
There  was  the  covetousness  of  foreign  governments 
to  guard  against,  and  still  more  menacing,  an  internal 
enemy — the  Catholic  and  Apostolic  Church  of  Rome 
with  the  immense  number  of  faithful  adherents  who 
kept  up  their  protests  and  revindications,  and  who 
clamored  unceasingly  for  the  restoration  of  the  tem- 
poral power  of  the  Pope. 

Speaking  on  the  present  war  in  the  Chamber  of 
14 


204  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Deputies,  Salandra,  then  premier,  kept  to  this  same 
practical  policy.  "We  must  be  neither  of  one  side  nor 
the  other,"  he  said;  "we  must  be  exclusively  Italian. 
Our  neutrality  is  not  the  abandonment  of  positions 
conquered  nor  is  it  the  act  of  Pilate  washing  his  hands 
of  responsibility;  it  is  instead  the  solidest  attitude  for 
making  our  rights  recognized  and  our  aspirations 
satisfied/* 

Therefore  cool-headed  statesmen  smiled  benevolently 
at  the  noise  of  the  market-place  and  the  acclamations 
and  protests  of  the  hot-headed  crowd.  They  knew 
how  the  masses  applauded  great  ideas  and  aspired  to 
noble  actions;  how  they  were  ready  to  make  them- 
selves, even  in  their  relative  weakness,  the  champion  of 
brilliant  principles  of  ethical  equilibrium;  but  they,  the 
statesmen,  must  go  their  own  way,  laboring  for  the 
consecration  ad  perpetuam  memoriam  of  the  works 
which  others  had  so  successfully  carried  on. 

Examining  the  matter  in  the  light  of  this  rational 
criticism  it  is  easily  seen  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  a 
necessity  for  Italy.  When  it  was  formed,  Germany 
was  not  the  naval  power  that  she  is  to-day  and  there- 
fore her  friction  with  England  had  not  begun.  In- 
stead, although  the  increase  in  Prussia's  power  had 
somewhat  diminished  British  sympathy,  the  two  nations 
were  still  the  natural  allies  they  had  always  been. 
Italy  on  the  other  hand  had  a  war  fleet  which  was 
considered  strong  for  that  day  and  sufficient  to  neu- 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  205 

tralize  any  naval  action  on  the  part  of  France  against 
Germany.  Moreover  Italy  maintained  her  traditional 
friendship  with  England.  Germany's  powerful  army 
was  a  guarantee  to  the  new  kingdom,  defending  it  by 
its  prestige  and  upholding  the  authority  of  the  reign- 
ing house  of  Savoy  which  was  not  recognized  in  the 
south  of  the  peninsula;  above  all  it  put  a  curb  on 
French  inconstancy,  for  France  already  repented  hav- 
ing aided  in  creating  a  powerful  rival.  Of  this  the 
occupation  of  Tunis  convinced  even  the  most  stub- 
bornly Italian  and  the  most  decidedly  pro-French.  It 
even  alienated  Garibaldi  whose  French  sympathies  had 
survived  his  ill-treatment  at  the  Assembly  of  Bordeaux 
where,  in  spite  of  his  having  been  popularly  elected, 
they  did  not  wish  him  as  a  member  because  he  was 
not  French.  (This  incident,  it  may  be  recalled,  so  dis- 
gusted Victor  Hugo  that  he  left  the  assembly.)  On 
the  occupation  of  Tunis  Garibaldi  wrote  the  following: 
"The  treaty  which  France  has  made  with  the  Bey  of 
Tunis  has  shattered  my  good  opinion,  and  if  these 
unfair  proceedings  in  Africa  continue  they  will  force 
us  to  recall  that  Carthage  and  Nice  are  no  more  French 
than  I  am  Tartar;  and  that  Italy  has  as  much  right 
to  ancient  Carthage  as  France  has."  * 

For  Austria  the  Triple  Alliance,  besides  signifying 
defense  against  the  Slavic  world,  meant  the  recogni- 


*  "La  Triplice  Alianza.    Ricordi,  note,  ed  appunti  di  un  vecchio 
parlamentare."     (Garibaldi's  words  are  published  in  this  book.) 


206  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tion  by  Italy  of  her  holdings  across  the  Adriatic  and 
security  from  a  former  enemy  at  her  back,  always 
ready,  as  in  the  Austro-German  war  of  1866,  to  assault 
her  in  a  trying  moment. 

Difficult  days  of  conflicting  opinion  preceded  Italy's 
entrance  into  the  alliance  with  the  Central  Powers. 
Agostino  de  Pretis,  the  premier  who  in  1881  began 
to  exercise  almost  a  dictatorship  which  was  bound  to 
terminate  in  his  death,  advocated  ignoring  the  Tunis 
affair  and  continuing  the  friendship  with  France; 
Pasquale  Stanislao  Mancini,  the  celebrated  internation- 
alist and  scientist,  was  also  for  friendship  with  France 
but  sought  to  harmonize  it  with  intimacy  with  the 
Central  Powers.  A  third  diplomat,  Baron  de  Blanc, 
then  under-secretary  of  state  and  held  in  less  authority 
than  the  other  two,  was  most  vigorous  in  insisting  on 
the  alliance  with  the  Teutons  as  a  necessary  guarantee 
to  Italy's  future — a  defensive  alliance,  for  this  was  the 
only  aspect  which  the  matter  then  bore.  This  young 
diplomat  saw  most  clearly  into  the  problem  and  his 
argument  triumphed.  Bismarck  insisted  that  Victor 
Emanuel's  son  Humbert  I  of  Savoy  should  pass  in 
penitence,  so  to  speak,  through  Vienna  on  his  way  to 
Berlin ;  and  Humbert  I,  responding  to  a  political  neces- 
sity, went  to  Vienna  on  October  27,  1881.  (This  visit 
was  never  returned  by  Emperor  Franz  Joseph  in  spite 
of  the  many  succeeding  years  which  misfortune 
granted  him  on  the  throne.)     On  May  20,  1882,  was 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  207 

signed  the  defensive  treaty  whereby  Italy  entered  the 
already  existing  alliance  between  the  two  Central 
Powers,  henceforth  to  be  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance. 

We  do  not  know  the  complete  text  of  this  treaty; 
but  judging  from  the  repeated  declarations  of  states- 
men familiar  with  it  in  its  entirety,  and  judging  fur- 
thermore by  the  light  of  recent  eevnts,  the  alliance  in 
its  multiple  renewals  never  ceased  to  be  defensive. 

When  the  present  Kaiser  came  to  the  throne,  Bis- 
marck as  is  well  known  was  asked  to  retire.  He  was 
succeeded  by  General  Von  Caprivi.  One  of  Von 
Caprivi's  first  acts  was  to  write  an  official  letter  to 
Premier  Francisco  Crispi  of  Italy.  After  notifying 
him  of  his  new  dignity  of  chancellor  he  declared  that 
as  long  as  he  held  that  post  the  German  Empire  would 
work  for  peace  "but  without  departing  from  the  prin- 
ciple of  always  being  a  good  friend  to  its  friends.  This 
is  the  message  which  my  sovereign  has  charged  me  to 
send,  and  it  is  also  that  of  my  own  conscience."  Crispi 
answered  with  great  cleverness  detailing  the  duties  his 
nation  had  assumed  and  insisting  indirectly,  as  is  the 
manner  of  diplomatic  documents,  on  the  defensive 
conception  of  the  alliance.  "As  with  Prince  Bismarck" 
he  wrote,  "so  with  you  will  I  continue  conscientiously 
for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  But  if  the  unfortunate 
day  should  arrive  in  which  Italy  or  Germany,  attacked, 
should  find  themselves  in  the  sad  necessity  of  defending 
themselves,  you  will  see  me  following  the  example  of 


208  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  king  my  sovereign,  and  in  unison  with  the  whole 
Italian  nation,  ready  to  fulfill  worthily  and  to  the  last, 
the  duty  which  would  be  imposed  upon  us."  * 

These  words,  knowing  the  man  who  wrote  them  and 
the  satisfaction  with  which  they  were  received  in  Ber- 
lin, meant  more  than  they  said.  Crispi  was  the  states- 
man of  his  epoch  most  inclined  to  the  Central  Powers. 
Whenever  he  was  not  in  power  German  interests 
wanted  him  back,  and  Emperor  William  II  even  re- 
solved to  journey  to  Italy  especially  to  confer  with 
him.f  That  Crispi  was  hated  in  France  because  of  his 
political  manoeuvres  is  in  itself  significant.  If  any  man 
in  Italy  could  effect  a  change  in  the  nature  ol  the 
pact  which  bound  the  three  powers,  it  was  he;  more 
than  this  he  persistently  tried  to  change  it.  In  its 
existing  form  he  considered  it  insufficient.  It  did  not 
prevent  the  difficulties  with  France  which  Italy  was 
constantly  suffering,  since  its  strictly  defensive  charac- 
ter compelled  the  allies  to  cooperate  only  in  a  casus 
foederis.  But  fortunately  for  Italy,  every  time  that  a 
change  of  this  sort  appeared  imminent,  Crispi's  minis- 
try fell,  and  also  because  the  German  government, 
being  more  prudent  than  its  emperor,  feared  that  this 
restless  statesman  might  prove  a  dangerous  friend  and 
drag  Germany  into  war  at  an  inopportune  moment  for 


*  Francisco   Crispi ;   "Questioni   internazionali,   diario   e   docu- 
ment," pages  3  and  4. 
t  Francisco  Crispi;  work  cited,  page  291. 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  209 

a  cause  which  was  not  hers.  Hohenlohe  used  to  say 
"Crispi  keeps  Caprivi  uneasy  just  as  he  did  Marschall 
and  Holstein,  for  no  one  can  foretell  what  this  restless 
man  will  do  next;  especially  as  he  has  picked  up  a 
hot-head  like  Blanc  for  his  minister  of  foreign 
affairs. "  * 

When  the  Emperor  made  the  visit  mentioned  with 
the  idea  of  interviewing  Crispi  and  changing,  perhaps, 
the  clauses  of  the  treaty,  Italian  policy  had  returned 
to  its  habitual  tendency ;  that  is,  it  had  given  up  imper- 
ialism by  means  of  violent  and  audacious  blows  and 
had  buried  it  in  the  field  of  Adua.  It  had  realized  that 
the  African  defeat  was  the  natural  consequences  of  all 
international  acts  which  do  not  bear  the  right  relations 
between  the  means  employed  and  the  object  aimed  at. 

Since  Crispi  no  Italian  statesman  has  had  imperial 
hankerings ;  but  with  due  caution  all  have  followed 
Cavour's  policy  of  trying  to  establish  bases  for  ter- 
ritorial growth  without  colliding  with  other  nations 
bent  on  the  same  mission.  They  have  sought  to  pre- 
serve the  traditional  English  friendship,  to  make  com- 
pacts with  France  that  would  do  away  with  mischiev- 
ous economic  struggles  and  would  regulate  Mediter- 
ranean questions.  In  short  they  kept  endeavoring  to 
relax  the  too  tight  embrace  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
save  Italy  from  the  risks  which  the  other  two  mem- 


*  "Memoires  du  Prince  Clovis  de  Hohenlohe ;"  Volume  III. 


210  THE  WORLD  WAR 

bers  ran,  and  from  identifying  herself  too  closely  with 
the  various  questions  which  concerned  them. 

Thus  the  alliance  began  to  decline  and  in  1899  the 
Foreign  Minister  Guicciardini  affirmed  openly  in  the 
Senate  that  even  the  casus  foederis  would  not  be  suffi- 
cient to  drag  Italy  into  a  war  with  England.*  This 
statement,  which  neither  Austria  nor  Germany  chal- 
lenged, is  extremely  interesting.  Without  knowing  the 
secret  agreements  which  may  have  existed  it  would  be 
venturesome  to  suspect  that  Italy  had  been  dissolved 
from  her  obligations  in  the  event  of  a  casus  belli  pro- 
voked by  England.  But  whatever  may  have  been  the 
full  meaning  of  Guicciardini's  words,  they  undeniably 
indicated  that  the  force  of  the  treaty,  far  from  increas- 
ing as  Crispi  had  desired,  had  waned. 

After  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  a  revelation 
was  made  in  the  Italian  parliament  which  demonstrates 
not  only  the  permanently  defensive  character  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  but  also  that  the  present  case,  because 
it  had  had  an  identical  precedent  had  already  been  the 
subject  of  interpretation  by  the  Central  Powers.  Gio- 
vanni Giolitti,  then  premier,  speaking  with  all  the  au- 
thority of  that  high  position,  pronounced  the  following 
words :  "In  order  that  our  loyalty  may  be  above  all 
question  I  desire  to  make  known  to  you  a  precedent 
which  demonstrates  that  in  proclaiming  our  neutrality 


*  Benedetto  Cirmeni ;  Deutsche  Rundschau,  November,  1914. 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  211 

the  government  has  given  an  exact  interpretation  to  the 
treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  one  admitted  as  exact 
by  the  other  members  of  the  Alliance. 

"On  the  August  9,  1913,  I  received  while  absent 
from  Rome  a  telegram  from  the  Marquis  di  San  Giu- 
liano,  then  foreign  minister,  in  which  he  said :  Austria 
has  communicated  to  us  and  to  Germany  her  intention 
of  operating  against  Servia,  and  defines  such  action 
as  a  casus  foederis  for  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  defi- 
nition I  do  not  consider  applicable.  I  will  try  to  get 
in  touch  with  Germany  and  impede  this  action;  but 
it  may  be  necessary  for  us  to  say  that  we  do  not  con- 
sider this  possible  action  as  defensive,  in  which  case  we 
would  not  consider  the  casus  foederis  to  exist. 

"To  this  I  answered:  If  Austria  operates  against 
Servia  it  is  evident  that  no  casus  foederis  exists.  It 
would  be  an  action  carried  out  on  her  own  account  and 
not  in  her  defense  since  no  one  is  thinking  of  attacking 
her.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  declare  all  this  to 
Austria  in  the  most  serious  manner,  and  we  must  hope 
that  Germany  will  take  some  step  to  dissuade  Austria 
from  her  dangerous  venture. 

"This  was  done  and  our  proceeding  did  not  disturb 
in  the  least  our  good  relations  with  our  allies."* 

This  revelation,  which  provoked  long  commentaries 
in  all  the  foreign  press,  has  never  been  denied  either 


*  Session  of  the  Italian  Parliament,  December  5,  1914. 


212  THE  WORLD  WAR 

officially  or  privately.  This  declaration  made  so  sol- 
emnly was  accepted  by  all  not  only  as  certain  but  as 
conclusive.  Moreover  the  argument  was  so  evident 
that  to  discuss  it  would  have  been  stupid;  especially 
as  during  Italy's  war  against  Turkey,  Germany  and 
Austria  applied  the  same  theory.  More  than  this  they 
showed  themselves  hostile  and  limited  her  field  of 
action  in  the  war. 

Thus  we  see  that  on  the  breaking  out  of  the  present 
conflict  Italy's  obligation  was  the  following :  To  stand 
by  her  allies  if  the  war  was  defensive;  if  otherwise,  to 
reserve  her  liberty  of  action.  In  spite  of  all  that  has 
been  written  one  way  and  another,  and  in  spite  of  all 
the  differences  of  opinion  to  which  human  events  give 
rise,  no  one  has  been  able  to  establish  that  the  present 
conflict  came  about  through  an  attack  by  Russia, 
France,  England,  Belgium  or  Servia.  The  contrary  is 
self-evident.  The  judicial  fact  is  that  Germany  first 
declared  war  on  Russia;  and  as  to  the  case  between 
Austria  and  Servia  nothing  could  be  more  incontro- 
vertible than  that  the  first-named  declared  war  on  the 
second,  and  that,  up  till  August  i,  the  thesis  declared 
and  upheld  by  the  Central  Powers  was  that  the  ques- 
tion lay  entirely  between  those  two  states.  The  ma- 
terial fact  differs  in  nothing  from  the  judicial,  for 
even  if  Russia  was  arming  herself  she  was  doing  it  in 
order  that  her  prestige  in  the  Balkans  might  not  suffer ; 
she  was  seeking  a  solution  by  virtue  of  which  it  might 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  213 

not  appear  that  Austria  had  full  power  over  the  Balkan 
States,  forcing  them  through  fear,  while  Russia  left 
them  to  her  mercy.  Still  further  do  the  facts  support 
the  case,  for  it  was  not  Austria  who  complained  of 
the  attitude  of  Russia  and  declared  war  on  her,  but 
Germany— unexpectedly,  and  at  the  very  moment 
when  it  appeared  as  if  an  agreement  might  be  brought 
about. 

This  declaration  of  war  coming  from  Germany  and 
not  from  Austria  is  the  most  explicit  proof  that  the 
casus  foederis  did  not  exist  and  that  Germany  was  bent 
on  forcing  Austria's  hand  and  involving  her  in  a  Eu- 
ropean conflict. 

Writers  most  benevolent  to  Germany,  and  also  the 
official  documents  of  that  nation,  have  synthetized  her 
thesis  in  the  following  terms:  The  Triple  Entente, 
under  the  perfidious  guidance  of  England,  were  pre- 
paring to  make  war  when  conditions  were  most  advan- 
tageous to  themselves;  Germany  knowing  this,  chose 
the  moment  instead  of  waiting  for  her  enemies  to 
choose  it.  This  may  all  be  true ;  it  is  admissible  that 
these  were  the  reciprocal  intentions  of  the  belligerents ; 
but  setting  aside  all  the  occasional  causes  which  might 
have  presented  themselves  for  avoiding  the  conflagra- 
tion, as  they  always  do  if  given  sufficient  time,  and  ad- 
mitting that  Germany  rushed  into  an  offensive  war 
today  in  order  to  avoid  a  defensive  one  tomorrow,  all 
this  does  not  alter  the  problem  so  far  as  Italy  is  con- 


214  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cerned.  The  Triple  Alliance  stipulated  nothing  in  re- 
gard to  a  preventive  war,  and  in  any  case  Germany 
should  have  taken  counsel  with  all  members  of  the 
Alliance  if  she  wished  their  aid.  The  present  war 
should  have  been  decided  by  all  three  powers  with 
equal  voice. 

But  instead,  Italy  was  never  consulted,  never 
warned.  Austria's  note  to  Servia  surprised  Italy  just 
as  much  as  it  surprised  the  Triple  Entente.  Indeed  it 
surprised  her  more  than  it  did  England,  since  it  ap- 
pears that  something  of  its  contents  had  been  revealed 
to  the  latter  in  order  to  obtain  from  her  a  promise  of 
neutrality.  Everything  indicates  that  it  was  feared 
that  Italy's  good  offices  might  avoid  the  audacious 
blow  which  Austria  wished  to  strike,  and  so  she  was 
left  completely  in  the  dark.  It  is  not  thus  that  a  nation 
can  be  inveigled  into  a  war  for  a  cause  not  her  own. 
Even  had  the  Treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance  been  of- 
fensive Italy  would  have  had  every  reason  for  declin- 
ing to  comply.  With  justice  might  she  have  said  to 
the  Central  Powers,  "I  am  your  ally  but  not  your 
slave."  Once  more  had  Teuton  diplomacy  fallen  short 
of  its  aim.  Decidedly  Bismarck  had  embodied  all  the 
diplomatic  talent  of  a  whole  epoch. 

Italy  being  absolved  from  marching  to  war  beside 
the  Central  Empires,  to  have  done  so  unnecessarily 
would  have  been  treason  to  her  own  interests.  To 
begin  with  it  would  have  broken  her  traditional  friend- 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  215 

ship  with  England  which,  though  a  little  less  close  in 
the  last  few  years,  had  never  ceased  to  be  sincere  and 
useful.  As  a  result  of  this  break,  Italy,  with  hundreds 
of  miles  of  coast  exposed  and  with  a  fleet  inferior  to 
that  which  the  allies  could  assemble  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, would  alone  have  suffered  the  consequences  of 
naval  warfare.  Her  commerce  and  her  railroads, 
nearly  all  coastal,  would  have  been  destroyed;  her 
principal  cities  would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  the 
enemy,  for  although,  by  the  uses  and  conventions  of 
maritime  warfare,  these  should  have  been  inviolate, 
we  have  seen  how  little  respect  the  rules  laid  down  in 
time  of  peace  receive  in  time  of  war;  a  pretext  could 
easily  have  been  found  for  bombarding  them.  An- 
other matter  to  consider  is  that  the  Italian  people  have 
not  the  German  conception  of  the  state;  they  are  not 
accustomed  to  an  iron  social  discipline.  And  soon, 
with  industries  paralyzed,  exportations  and  importa- 
tions made  most  difficult  (for  deprived  of  the  sea  no 
route  would  be  open  except  through  Austria  and  Aus- 
tria herself  engaged  in  war)  there  would  have  been 
seething  dissatisfaction;  add  to  this  the  unpopularity 
of  the  cause,  and  one  may  see  that  public  agitation 
might  have  risen  to  any  degree. 

Although  Italian  military  leaders  have  always  held 
in  high  respect  the  German  military  organization,  the 
general  opinion  has  nevertheless  been  that  England 
could  not  be  beaten ;  that  her  indisputable  dominion  of 


216  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  seas  would  neutralize  every  enemy  victory  on  land 
and  put  her  at  last  in  a  position  to  dictate  peace  terms. 
Thus  no  battle  lost  by  England  could  redound  to  the 
adversary's  practical  benefit.  Only  when  the  enemy  is 
at  the  mercy  of  the  victor  can  terms  be  dictated  and 
compensation  received  for  all  the  sacrifices  of  blood 
and  money ;  and  even  in  this  case,  considering  the  suf- 
fering and  ruin  which  modern  war  presupposes,  the 
compensation  is  never  adequate. 

Even  more;  granting  that  fortune  had  smiled 
throughout  on  the  arms  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  Italy 
would  not  have  come  out  benefited.  As  has  been  said, 
after  the  French  occupation  of  Tunis  and  the  Franco- 
Italian  conventions  of  September  28,  1896,  Italy  had 
directed  her  energies  toward  the  eastern  end  of  the 
Mediterranean.  She  looked  toward  the  trade  high- 
ways of  Asia.  Later  we  find  these  aspirations  coincid- 
ing with  those  of  Germany  and  Austria,  and  affecting 
the  interests  of  Turkey.  Austria  was  trying  to  reach 
down  to  Salonica  and  dominate  those  waters;  Ger- 
many was  dreaming  of  a  great  empire  from  the  North 
Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf ;  and  Turkey,  having  been 
stripped  to  almost  nothing  in  Europe,  naturally  wished 
to  maintain  her  Asiatic  possessions. 

Another  Italian  aspiration,  and  one  necessary  to  the 
defense  of  her  own  coasts,  was  Albania.  Her  inter- 
ests demanded  either  a  weak  state  there  or  her  own 
flag;  but  Austria  also  wanted  Albania.     A  war  vie- 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  217 

torious  for  the  Triple  Alliance  would  have  meant  that 
Italy  must  abandon  her  policy  in  Mediterranean  Asia. 
As  prelude  to  this  she  must  withdraw  her  troops  from 
those  islands  in  the  ^Egean  Sea  which  she  had  been 
occupying  since  the  war  with  Turkey.  It  would  also 
have  meant  the  installing  of  Austria  in  Avlona  and 
Durazzo,  facing  Italy's  own  southern  coasts  and  only 
a  few  hours  distant.  Italy  might  have  received  in  ex- 
change Tunis  and  Corsica;  at  least  it  is  affirmed  that 
these  were  offered  to  her  if  she  would  side  with  the 
Central  Powers.  But  Tunis  and  Corsica  were  of  little 
importance  compared  with  what  she  was  aspiring  to. 
They  meant  but  little  in  the  commercial  sense  and 
nothing  in  the  military.  Weakened  at  the  back  and 
with  the  then  existing  equilibrium  of  Europe  broken, 
Italy  would  have  passed  from  an  ally  into  a  vassal  of 
the  Central  Powers.  Without  a  doubt  Germany  and 
Austria  would  be  united  more  closely  than  ever  after 
a  favorable  war  and  after  the  death  of  the  aged 
Francis  Joseph,  perhaps  in  a  common  national  bond. 
If  this  were  consummated  it  would  throw  back  the 
international  situation  of  Europe  to  the  times  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  which  period,  as  history  shows, 
was  not  one  of  great  fortune  or  great  glory  for  Italy. 
On  the  other  hand  defeat  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
would  also  have  signified  disaster  for  Italy.  It  would 
have  endangered  all  her  colonies  and  probably  Sicily 


218  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  Sardinia,  islands  which  are  really  an  integral  part 
of  her  territory. 

These  reflections  on  the  results  of  the  war  ought  to 
be  sufficient  even  to  the  theorists  and  defenders  of 
German  acts  to  explain  why  Italy  did  not  adhere  to 
the  Central  Powers.  Such  writers  have  defended 
Germany's  act  in  breaking  the  Belgian  Neutrality 
Treaty,  because  to  do  so  was  a  necessity  of  state. 
Chancellor  Von  Bethmann  Hollweg  from  the  tribune 
of  the  Reichstag  enunciated  the  theory  that  a  treaty 
could  be  broken  for  urgent  reasons  of  state ;  Von  Jagow 
expressed  the  same  to  the  English  ambassador.  Using 
this  same  theory,  Italy,  in  spite  of  her  treaty  to  cooper- 
ate with  her  allies  in  case  of  war,  was  justified  in  dis- 
regarding the  piece  of  paper  which  imposed  upon  her 
an  anti-national  obligation.  The  foregoing  is  said, 
however,  merely  to  demonstrate  how  slippery  is  human 
logic  when  influenced  by  passion.  It  is  necessary  to 
insist  on  the  fact  that  there  was  no  treaty  obliging 
Italy  to  go  to  war  against  her  own  interests,  when  this 
war  was  offensive,  almost  aggressive.  The  Italian 
government  was  right  then,  when  on  August  3  she 
declared  her  neutrality  to  all  the  belligerents. 

Even  with  this  much  settled,  a  serious  question  re- 
mained unanswered :  did  the  Triple  Alliance  still  exist 
or  had  it  terminated?  This  problem,  profound  from 
the  theoretical  point  of  view,  also  involved  great  prac- 
tical consequences.     Evidently  a  treaty,  like  a  private 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  219 

contract,  terminates  when  the  time  expires  for  which 
it  was  concerted.  But  also  a  treaty  like  a  private  con- 
tract cannot  exist  when  its  cause  has  ceased  to  exist. 
The  Triple  Alliance  had  for  basis  the  reciprocal  de- 
fense of  the  contracting  parties  in  case  of  attack.  Ger- 
many and  Austria  having  entered  war  de  facto  could 
not  have  fulfilled  this  obligation  toward  Italy  had  she 
been  assaulted  by  a  third  power  outside  of  the  entente. 
Nor  could  Italy  expect  such  aid  had  she  joined  them 
in  the  armed  conflict,  for  the  clauses  of  the  compact 
would  not  then  have  applied.  Italy  being  attacked, 
and  it  being  proven  that  the  case  came  within  the 
clauses  concerted,  it  would  be  patent  that  during  a 
war  which  seriously  compromised  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria, Italy  might  remain  neutral;  and  in  a  war  that 
compromised  Italy,  Germany  and  Austria  might  re- 
main neutral.  The  legal  precautions  would  not  be 
understood.  The  justice  that  could  measure  either 
case  does  not  exist  in  international  law;  for  in  inter- 
national law  more  than  anywhere  else,  self-interest 
dominates,  and  even  had  the  two  powers  been  able 
to  stand  by  the  treaty  they  would  not  have  done  so 
unless  opportune  for  themselves. 

A  war  is  the  dissolvent  of  international  cohesion. 
Weakening  some  nations,  strengthening  others,  it 
breaks  the  compacts  which  bind  them.  Even  a  victori- 
ous war  changes  the  relation  of  the  victors.  What- 
ever the  future  may  bring  the  treaty  which  now  binds 
15 


220  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Germany  to  Austria  will  certainly  be  changed.  A  war 
changes  the  whole  field  of  diplomatic  action  and  there- 
fore all  kinds  of  relationship;  and  certainly  it  changes 
all  treaties  unless  these  refer  to  fixed  situations.  The 
Triple  Alliance  was  invented  in  order  to  maintain  a 
supposed  European  equilibrium  in  the  interests  of  gen- 
eral peace.  It  was  to  serve  as  a  check  on  the  French 
desire  for  revenge  against  Germany,  on  Russian  domi- 
nation in  the  Balkans  to  the  prejudice  of  Austria,  and 
on  the  expansion  of  France  to  the  prejudice  of  Italy. 
In  short  its  mission  was  to  prevent  war.  On  this 
rested  its  defensive  character. 

The  Triple  Alliance  disappeared  both  in  deed  and 
in  word  the  day  that  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia 
and  France;  nor  could  Italy,  after  her  declaration  of 
neutrality,  expect  any  aid  whatever,  nor  could  the 
Central  Powers  give  it  to  her  or  receive  it  from  her. 
The  treaty,  then,  had  terminated  for  failure  of  its 
raison  d'etre.  To  suppose  that  it  still  existed  would 
be  to  oblige  Italy  to  renounce  all  benefit  from  the  con- 
flict, to  render  her  powerless  to  defend  her  own  inter- 
ests, and  to  condemn  her  to  maintain  a  shadow  with- 
out a  substance. 

All  this  discussion  leads  to  the  question  whether 
Italy  was  free  to  incline  to  one  side  or  the  other. 
Italian  statesmen  like  Salandra,  like  the  late  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano,  and  Sonnino,  his  successor  as  foreign 
minister,  all  considered  that  she  was.     Of  the  same 


ITALIAN  NEUTRALITY  221 

mind  were  students  and  eleventh-hour  pacifists  and 
socialists  like  Napoleon  Colajanni  and  Arturo  Labri- 
ola.  Men  like  Enrique  Ferri,  Sacchi,  Bissolati,  the 
aged  statesman  Giovanni  Giolitti,  never  even  admitted 
that  it  could  be  otherwise  when  speaking  in  parlia- 
ment; and  so  the  Bettolo  resolution  to  that  effect  was 
voted  by  the  whole  Chamber  and  the  whole  Senate, 
except  for  weak  protests  from  a  few  orthodox  social- 
ists. 

For  Italy  the  war  was  now  narrowed  down  to  a 
question  of  opportunity  and  advantage.  If  peace  could 
satisfy  the  national  aspirations  it  would  be  maintained ; 
if  not  she  would  go  forth  on  the  battlefield  and  claim 
what  was  due  her,  thus  to  make  sure  that  her  confines 
might  not  be  limited  by  the  peace  concert. 

The  National  Zeitung  took  occasion  to  remind  Ital- 
ians of  Macchiavelli's  opinion  on  neutrality  as  once  ex- 
pressed to  Vettori ;  but  the  caustic  journal  overlooked 
the  fact  that  it  was  not  this  same  kind  of  neutrality 
which  the  Florentine  Secretary  was  condemning,  but 
another  sort  inspired  by  his  own  extraordinary  doc- 
trines— doctrines  not  sufficiently  understood  or  appre- 
ciated by  the  simple-minded  average  person,  who  is 
sentimental  only  where  another's  interests  are  con- 
cerned.   Here  is  the  Zeitung  paragraph  in  full :  "It  is 
exactly  four  hundred  years  ago  this  fourth  of  De- 
cember that  Macchiavelli  had  the  opportunity  of  ex- 
pressing his  mind  on  neutrality.     In  answer  to  Fran- 


222  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cesco  Vettori,  Florentine  envoy  in  Rome,  who  asked 
him  what  ought  to  be  the  attitude  of  the  Pontifical 
State  as  between  France,  England,  and  Venice,  on  the 
one  side,  and  the  Swiss,  Spain,  and  the  German  Em- 
peror, on  the  other,  Machiavelli  replied  that  to  be  neu- 
tral was  of  no  use  to  a  state  unless  it  was  stronger  than 
the  belligerents.  The  neutral  was  exposed  to  the  hatred 
of  the  vanquished,  to  the  contempt  of  the  victor;  it  was 
obliged  to  make  contracts  first  with  one  then  with  the 
other,  and  each  one  of  them  thinking  it  might  be 
cheated ;  the  neutral's  fate  was  often  to  be  taken  over 
by  the  conqueror."  * 

The  words  of  Machiavelli  applied  to  a  neutrality 
which  could  trust  the  words  of  the  belligerents  and 
the  principles  of  international  law  which  guarantees, 
or  ought  to  guarantee,  to  neutrals  the  undisturbed  en- 
joyment of  peace.  But  the  good  German  critic  knew 
perfectly  well  that  to  trust  in  the  statutes  of  inter- 
national law  is  not  as  tranquilizing  in  this  century, 
aspecially  after  the  cases  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg, 
as  it  was  in  the  fifteenth.  Italian  statesmen  did  not 
have  to  recall  the  words  of  their  illustrious  compatriot, 
and  still  less  did  they  need  the  veiled  threat  of  the 
Berlin  newspaper.  This  has  been  demonstrated  by 
subsequent  events. 


*  National  Zeitung,  December  5,  1914. 


CHAPTER   XXII 
Italy's  participation 

NEUTRALITY  having  been  declared  and  having 
been  accepted  patiently  by  the  Central  Empires 
and  joyfully  by  the  Entente,  it  was  not  difficult  to 
detect  that  other  events  were  shaping  themselves  which 
would  cause  Italy  to  act  more  in  harmony  with  her 
interests.  These  interests  were  concrete  and  popular 
— to  consolidate  her  national  unity,  to  assure  her  do- 
minion in  the  Adriatic,  to  hold  the  Mgean  Islands 
occupied  since  the  war  with  Turkey,  and  to  establish 
a  sphere  of  influence  political  and  commercial  in  Asia 
Minor.  Thus  far  it  had  been  her  two  allies  who  ob- 
jected most  to  these  aspirations.  To  Austria  the  first 
two  enumerated  were  especially  unwelcome.  For  her  to 
voluntarily  cede  Italian  provinces  forming  part  of  her 
empire  so  that  Italy  might  complete  her  unity,  would 
mean  raising  the  most  dangerous  internal  questions. 
To  the  multiple  peoples  tied  to  the  chariot  of  the 
Hapsburgs  it  would  teach  a  solution  of  their  own 
problem  which  they  are  now  prevented  from  contem- 

223 


224  THE  WORLD  WAR 

plating  by  the  iron  principle  of  integrity.  All  this 
Austria  knew  only  too  well;  hence  her  constant  nega- 
tive to  every  Italian  claim. 

As  far  back  as  December,  19 14,  when  Baron  Son- 
nino  became  foreign  minister,  Italy,  with  precision  and 
ability,  brought  up  a  question  which  was  bound  to 
present  itself  and  which  slowly  led  her  to  declare  war. 
Sonnino  instructed  the  Italian  ambassador  in  Vienna, 
the  Duke  of  Avarna,  to  ask  the  Austro-Hungarian 
government  what  compensation  it  was  disposed  to 
make  to  Italy  in  accordance  with  Article  VII  of  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance,  the  claim  being  based  on  the  Ital- 
ian occupation  of  certain  territory  in  the  Balkans.* 
The  aforesaid  Article  states  with  all  clarity  that  if  one 
of  the  powers  should  make  territorial  occupation  it 
must  previously  fix  the  compensation  which  the  other 
would  concede.  Its  clauses  had  prevented  Italy  from 
acquiring  European  territory  while  she  was  at  war 
with  Turkey;  and  Austria  then  applied  its  terms 
with  such  severity  that  in  case  of  not  being  heeded, 
or  rather  not  being  obeyed,  she  prepared  to  invade 
Italy;  this  was  in  accord  with  the  plans  of  the 
General  Staff  whose  chief,  General  Conrad  Von 
Hertzendorff,  most  vehemently  desired  such  inva- 
sion. Now  Italy  through  the  subtle  penetration  of 
her  statesmen  was  reciprocating  and  using  the  same 
arguments,  all  of  them  drawn  from  the  very  notes 


*  Italian  Green  Book,  document  number  1. 


ITALY'S  PARTICIPATION  225 

which  Austria,  unconscious  of  the  future,  had  sent 
during  the  Italo-Turkish  war. 

Count  Berchtold,  in  the  name  of  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy, affirmed  that  the  military  operations  against 
Servia  did  not  signify  territorial  occupation  either  per- 
manent or  temporary.  Baron  Sonnino  replied  that  be- 
cause of  the  precedent  which  existed  in  the  war  with 
Turkey  he  could  not  accept  this  argument.  "At  that 
time  Austria-Hungary"  he  said  "on  the  basis  of  Article 
VII,  prevented  us  not  only  from  making  momentary 
occupations  but  even  from  the  most  simple  war  opera- 
tions." *  In  Sonnino's  note,  which  is  a  magnificent 
document  of  strict  logic,  three  despatches  are  repro- 
duced:  one  sent  November  5,  191 1,  by  which  the 
Italian  Government  is  informed  of  Count  Ahrenthal's 
declaration  "that  any  Italian  action  on  the  Ottoman 
coast  of  European  Turkey  or  on  the  islands  of  the 
yEgean  Sea  would  not  be  admitted  by  either  Austria  or 
Germany,  because  contrary  to  the  Treaty  of  Alliance ;" 
the  second  despatch,  of  November  7,  191 1,  says  "that 
Count  Ahrenthal  considered  the  bombarding  of  ports 
in  European  Turkey,  like  Salonica,  Cavala,  etc.,  con- 
trary to  Article  VII  of  the  treaty";  and  in  the  third, 
dated  April  21,  191 2 — the  time  of  the  Italian  attack  on 
the  Dardanelles — Count  Berchtold  himself  says:  "If 
the  Royal  Italian  Government  wants  back  its  liberty  of 


*  Italian  Green  Book,  document  number  6. 


226  THE  WORLD  WAR 

action  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  could  ask 
the  same;  but  it  cannot  admit  that  Italy  should  carry 
out  such  operations  or  any  others  contrary  to  the  point 
of  view  manifested  in  previous  conversations.  If  such 
operations  were  carried  out  the  consequences  would  be 
grave." 

Faced  with  precedents  so  concrete  the  Austrian  min- 
ister changed  his  tactics  and  began  to  temporize.  He 
had  to  transfer  the  defense  of  his  point  of  view  to 
another  field. 

Meanwhile  Prince  Von  Biilow  was  sent  to  Rome 
to  replace  the  German  ambassador  Von  Flotow.  Both 
these  men  were  well  known  Italophiles,  the  former  hav- 
ing married  into  one  of  the  most  distinguished  Italian 
families,  the  Camporeale.  (It  may  be  remarked  in 
passing  that  the  late  mother  of  the  Princess  Von 
Biilow,  in  her  youth  a  beauty  at  the  court  of  Napoleon 
III,  nearly  occupied  the  throne  of  France  instead  of 
the  Spanish  Eugenia  de  Montijo.) 

Von  Biilow  arrived  in  Italy  with  both  good  and  bad 
intentions.  His  prestige  was  at  stake,  and  he  had  to 
show  the  emperor  who  had  relieved  him  of  the  chan- 
cellorship that  he  knew  how  to  serve  his  country  on 
all  occasions.  The  good  intentions  consisted  in  obtain- 
ing for  Italy  the  most  favorable  concessions  from 
Austria.  The  bad  consisted  in  suborning  the  internal 
politics  of  the  country  by  fair  means  or  foul.  With 
the  coming  of  Von  Biilow,  all  that  strength  which  the 


ITALY'S  PARTICIPATION  227 

German  Government  can  call  into  play  in  a  nation 
which  had  long  depended  on  her,  began  to  make  itself 
felt. 

But  there  is  a  popular  instinct  which  easily  under- 
stands events  and  foils  all  intrigues.  The  masses — 
even  the  pacifists,  antimilitarists  and  socialists — all 
rushed  to  the  public  squares  and  in  loud  voices  clam- 
ored for  war  against  Austria. 

In  Austria,  the  recently  appointed  chancellor,  Baron 
Burian,  a  man  careful  and  clever,  abandoned  the  thesis 
of  Berchtold  and  adopted  another,  namely :  that  it  was 
impossible  for  Austria  to  cede  territory  because  while 
in  a  state  of  war  she  could  not  give  that  which  a  treaty 
of  peace  might  not  leave  in  her  power.  By  this  thesis 
Burian  interpreted  the  Seventh  Article  of  the  treaty 
in  the  sense  that  territorial  compensations  could  only 
come  out  of  conquests.  A  few  days  later,  in  February, 
he  amplified  it,  formulating  an  accusation  against 
Italy  and  demanding  compensations  from  her  because 
she  had  shortly  before  occupied  a  part  of  Albania,  and 
also  because  of  the  ^gean  Islands  occupied  long 
before. 

Baron  Sonnino  and  the  Duke  of  Avarna  replied  that 
Italy  was  not  asking  for  territory  which  would  be  the 
object  of  conquest  but  of  territory  which  belonged 
exclusively  to  Austria,  since  Article  VII  spoke  of  com- 
pensations, not  of  partitions;  they  claimed  that  the 
occupation  of  Avlona  was  in  fulfilment  of  the  pact  of 


228  THE  WORLD  WAR 

London  which  obliged  the  powers  united  or  separate 
to  maintain  order  in  Albania;  and  if,  as  it  happened, 
Italy  had  gone  alone  with  her  army,  it  was  because  she 
was  the  only  one  of  the  signatory  nations  who  was  not 
a  belligerent ;  and  as  to  the  ^Egean  Islands  their  occu- 
pation depended  on  the  fulfilment  of  the  Italian-Turk- 
ish treaty  of  peace  signed  in  Lausanne,  and  that  Count 
Berchtold,  in  a  telegram  of  May  23,  191 2,  had  "re- 
nounced on  that  occasion  the  right  to  receive  compen- 
sation. " 

In  the  second  half  of  February  the  Duke  of  Avarna 
plainly  informed  his  government  that  "the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  will  never  consent  to  make 
cession  of  territories  belonging  to  the  monarchy  in  the 
present  conditions.,,  *  And  at  the  same  time  Sonnino 
virtually  indicated  to  Austria  that  if  she  would  not 
accept  Italy's  interpretation  of  Article  VII,  the  treaty 
would  be  considered  null  and  void. 

Burian  multiplied  his  arguments  with  admirable  fer- 
tility and  spun  his  web  cleverly,  but  Italy  was  not  to  be 
caught.  Instead  she  obliged  him  to  withdraw  much 
of  his  thesis,  and  so  conversations  were  kept  up  and 
time  was  running  on.  It  was  not  until  the  beginning 
of  March  that  the  Austrian  government  consented  to 
go  to  the  bottom  of  the  question,  forced  to  do  so  evi- 
dently by  the  German  chancellor,  Bethmann-Hollweg. 
But  then  arose  another  point  no  less  serious — at  what 


*  Italian  Green  Book,  document  number  27. 


ITALY'S  PARTICIPATION  229 

date  must  the  cession  of  territory  be  made.  The  Italian 
government  insisted  that  it  should  be  immediate  and 
the  Austrian,  at  the  end  of  the  war.  And  this  time 
she  had  Germany's  full  support. 

About  this  time  the  Italian  parliament  was  expected 
to  open  and  Von  Biilow  began  to  operate,  so  to  speak, 
on  the  men  composing  it.  Most  important  among 
these  was  Giovanni  Giolitti,  and  he  it  was  who  received 
most  of  the  busy  diplomat's  attention.  It  is  to  be  re- 
called that  not  long  before,  Giolitti  had  voluntarily  re- 
signed from  the  premiership  in  favor  of  Salandra  who, 
separating  from  his  political  leader  Sonnino,  had  lately 
attached  himself  to  Giolitti,  while  Sonnino,  yielding 
to  the  difficulties  of  the  moment,  consented  to  become 
Salandra's  foreign  minister;  but  the  majority  of  the 
cabinet  was  still  inclined  towards  the  former  premier, 
Giolitti.  He,  as  Von  Biilow  knew,  was  pacifist  by  tem- 
perament and  would  have  preferred  to  satisfy  popular 
aspirations  without  entering  a  war  whose  issue  he  con- 
sidered doubtful. 

Lobbying  was  incessant  and  gave  rise  to  much  suspi- 
cion. None  fell  on  Giolitti  but  much  on  his  alter  ego; 
and  the  suspicion  of  subornation  was  confirmed  in  an 
imprudent  moment  by  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg.*  Pop- 
ular agitation  increased  considerably,  and  parliament, 
for  the  most  part  contrary  to  abandoning  neutrality, 
was  won  over  little  by  little. 

♦Discourse  of  Von  Bethmann  Hollweg  in  the  Reichstag,  May 
29,  1915. 


230  THE  WORLD  WAR 

By  the  end  of  March  Austria  put  aside  the  previous 
questions  and  got  to  the  point  of  formulating  concrete 
propositions.  In  exchange  for  benevolent  neutrality 
she  offered  a  part  of  the  Trentino,  but  Italy  was  to 
renounce  every  other  pretention  both  during  and  after 
the  war.  Baron  Sonnino  answered  by  sending  a  draft 
embodying  the  following :  The  Trentino  must  be  ceded 
in  its  totality;  the  Italian  western  frontier  must  include 
Gradisca  and  Goritzia;  Trieste  and  its  hinterland  must 
constitute  an  autonomous  state;  the  Curzolari  Islands 
in  the  Adriatic  must  be  ceded  to  Italy;  Austria  must 
recognize  Italy's  sovereignty  over  Avlona  and  its  sur- 
roundings, and  renounce  her  interest  in  Albania.  In 
consideration  of  all  this  Italy  would  bind  herself  to 
strict  neutrality  and  renounce  all  later  compensations. 

Meanwhile  the  rumor  ran  that  Germany  and  Austria 
would  make  a  separate  peace  with  Russia;  and  both 
groups  of  the  belligerents  let  it  run  undenied,  each 
hoping  that  it  would  cause  Italy  to  decide.  Austria 
thought  she  could  impress  her  into  accepting  what  had 
been  offered,  while  the  Allies  supposed  that  the  fear  of 
a  prompt  termination  of  the  war  would  hasten  her. 

Count  von  Burian  did  not  accept  the  Italian  counter- 
proposition  in  its  entirety — merely  consenting  to  giving 
up  the  Trentino. 

Then  Italy,  whether  for  fear  that  matters  were 
drawing  to  a  conclusion  or  whether  for  other  reasons, 
repudiated  the  Triple  Alliance  with  the  entire  approval 


ITALY'S  PARTICIPATION  231 

of  her  people,  asked  parliament  for  full  powers,  and 
prepared  for  war.  And  on  May  24,  191 5,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  "His  Majesty  the  King  declares  that  Italy 
considers  herself  in  a  state  of  war  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary from  tomorrow." 

During  the  pourparlers  both  nations  were  preparing. 
Italy  had  changed  her  artillery,  filled  the  arsenals  which 
the  war  with  Turkey  had  depleted,  and  reformed  her 
armament.  Austria  had  fortified  herself  in  the  Alps 
and  the  Isonzo,  had  organized  new  army  corps,  and 
improved  her  intrenched  camps  till  they  were  supposed 
to  be  impregnable. 

The  people  of  the  two  countries,  who  had  always 
been  opposed  even  when  the  famous  alliance  was  at  its 
meridian,  were  filled  with  choler  and  hatred.  The 
Italo-Austrian  war  represented  an  historic  necessity, 
and  Italy  knew  how  to  choose  the  moment.  Von 
Biilow  was  right  when  he  said  in  his  Imperial  Germany 
"Austria  and  Italy  may  be  either  allies  or  enemies" ;  for 
the  day  that  the  alliance  terminated  which  Bismarck 
and  events  had  forced  on  them,  they  were  enemies. 

Von  Biilow  now  had  to  abandon  his  post  in  Italy, 
for  although  war  was  not  declared  against  Germany, 
diplomatic  relations  were  broken.  The  declaration 
came  later  as  a  logical  consequence ;  and  in  the  present 
encounter  of  the  Teutonic  and  Latin  armies  on  the 
fertile  plains  of  northern  Italy,  history  is  repeating 
itself. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

BELLIGERENT  AND  NEUTRAL  BALKAN  STATES 

THE  European  War  was  initiated  in  the  Balkans 
and  there,  in  that  agitated  peninsula,  source  of  so 
many  past  political  contentions  and  pretext  for  German 
imperialism  to  engender  the  present  one,  it  will  end. 
This  is  an  opinion  which  has  found  many  adherents  in 
both  belligerent  camps.    With  this  conviction  the  Ger- 
mans and  their  allies  prepared  and  carried  out  the  Ser- 
vian invasion  at  the  risk  of  other  frontiers  where  they 
were  heavily  engaged  by  superior  enemy  numbers ;  and 
with  this  same  conviction  English,  French,  Italian  and 
Russians,  sent  or  prepared  military  contingents.     It 
was  this  belief  that  made  them,  the  Allies,  fear  the 
grave  consequences  of  an  adverse  action,  a  fear  which 
produced  important  consequences  in  the  political  field, 
such  as  the  retirement  of  Delcasse,  and  later  of  Viviani 
and  his  cabinet.    It  was  this  fear  which  brought  about 
the  retirement  of  Sir  Edward  Carson  and  the  reform 
of  the  English  cabinet  as  to  its  functions;  also  the 
reappointment  of  a  chancellor  in  Russia,  a  post  which 

233 


234  THE  WORLD  WAR 

had  been  vacant  since  the  time  of  Gorstchacoff,  and 
the  resignation  of  Sazonoff  who,  as  foreign  minister, 
had  been  for  years  promoting  good  friendship  with 
England  and  strengthening  the  alliance  with  France. 

Among  the  nations  at  war  only  Italy  failed  to  pay 
serious  attention  to  recent  events  in  the  Near  East. 
Her  disregard  was  probably  influenced  more  by  oppo- 
sition to  Servia  and  Greece  in  their  Adriatic  aspira- 
tions, than  by  her  clear  vision  of  things.  In  such  an 
agitated  period  when  the  slightest  move  might  bring 
irremediable  consequences  it  was  not  easy  to  discern 
the  safest  path. 

In  this  war  it  has  been  affirmed  that  England  has 
twice  been  tricked — once  by  Turkey,  once  by  Bulgaria. 
The  reproach  for  this  falls  on  those  calculating  states- 
men who  worked  on  that  party  passion,  always  plenti- 
ful in  democracies  in  spite  of  sacred  unions,  and  mag- 
nified certain  ill-advised  events  with  that  judgment 
which  comes  so  easy  the  day  after.  Also  it  is  affirmed 
that  the  Allies  committed  a  grave  error  in  not  acting 
with  rapidity  and  violence  against  Bulgaria  and  Greece. 
This  is  another  easy  judgment  which  may  be  tolerated 
in  the  abstract  but  which  cannot  stand  practical  exami- 
nation. The  fact  is  that  no  one  parliamentary  critic  or 
publicist  was  able  to  indicate  what  should  have  been 
done  in  the  respective  cases.  England  could  not  pro- 
ceed against  Turkey  without  first  explaining  to  the 
suicidal  government  of  the  latter  the  benefits  of  neu- 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  235 

trality,  and  recalling  past  relations  to  her  that  had  been 
more  than  friendly.  Undoubtedly  the  British  ambas- 
sador must  have  besought  the  grand  vizir  not  to  bring 
up  the  problem  of  Constantinople  by  entering  into  war, 
for  it  would  serve  to  arouse  new  aspirations  on  the 
part  of  Russia,  and  these  to  the  detriment  not  only  of 
Turkey  but  also  of  England. 

It  would  appear  that,  granted  the  hatreds,  the  ambi- 
tions, the  enormous  convergence  of  difficulties,  and  the 
general  greediness  of  the  Balkan  States,  their  problem 
can  be  solved  only  by  the  sacrifice  of  one  of  the  com- 
ponent parts.  Neither  the  Treaty  of  Paris  nor  that 
of  San  Stefano,  nor  of  Berlin  nor  Bucharest,  could 
successively  say  the  last  word  because  of  the  confusion 
of  races  in  the  peninsula,  and  the  prolonged  crisis 
which  they,  so  long  under  a  foreign  yoke,  were  then 
passing  through.  Whether  important  or  not  for  the 
objects  and  success  of  the  Great  War,  this  last  Balkan 
complication  effaces  all  the  past  hard  work  which 
Europe  had  to  do  in  their  behalf.  To  know  this  past 
work  is  necessary  if  one  is  to  appreciate  what  is  to  be 
done  in  the  future  and  to  anticipate  the  consequences 
of  the  present  struggle. 

In  a  mountainous  region  of  limited  extent,  with 
scanty  vegetation  or  mineral  riches,  are  gathered  to- 
gether less  than  nineteen  million  souls  of  many  different 
races.    They  represent  opposing  civilizations  and  as  a 

16 


236  THE  WORLD  WAR 

consequence  of  their  successive  domination  within  the 
group  they  hold  different  ideals;  and  the  wars  they 
have  made  on  each  other  are  legion.  Greece  bathed  by 
the  yEgean  Sea  can  recall  a  race  and  a  grandeur  of 
other  days,  the  quintessence  of  a  whole  illustrious  era. 
Bulgaria  on  the  Black  Sea  and  with  one  insignificant 
port  on  the  Mediterranean,  holds  a  mixture  of  Tartars 
and  Slavs  who  under  their  Czar  Simeon  in  the  ninth 
century  dreamed  of  conquering  Constantinople,  and  the 
Russians,  and  all  the  Latin  peoples.  Servia,  on  the 
central  mountain  chain,  represents  the  purest  branch  of 
the  Jugo-Slavs,  who  still  sing  the  deeds  of  the 
Nemesios  de  Ettiene  and  of  Duscian,  emperor  of 
Servia  and  Greece,  to  say  nothing  of  the  less  dis- 
tant heroisms  of  Kara  George  and  Miloch.  Albania 
near  the  Adriatic  is  a  mixture  of  Greeks  and 
Wallachian-Slavs.  Montenegro  to  the  south  has  a 
population  of  Servian  origin  but  which  has  diverged 
into  customs  of  its  own.  These  people  had  a 
political  affinity  with  Russia  of  such  long  standing 
that  far  back  in  the  time  of  Peter  the  Great  they  were 
declared  vassals  of  the  Muscovite  Empire.  In  the 
northeastern  part  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  is  Rumania, 
whose  population  of  Dacio-Latin  origin  is  the  rarest 
tessera  in  all  this  rare  mosaic  of  races.  The  Ru- 
manians can  look  back  to  the  glorious  services  they  lent 
to  Christianity  in  its  long  struggle  with  the  Turks,  a 
struggle  in  which  Mircea  the  Elder,  John  the  Terrible, 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  237 

and  Michael  the  Brave  made  immortal  names.  In  the 
southeast  are  the  Turks  with  a  past  which  few  nations 
can  surpass  for  heroism;  and  here  and  there,  all  over 
the  peninsula,  are  mixed  indigenous  elements  of  the 
Roman  period,  Turkish  elements  which  did  not  with- 
draw from  the  region  when  their  empire  lost  it,  Bul- 
garians whose  presence  might  be  construed  into  an 
anticipation  of  their  country's  political  aspirations,  and 
Spanish  Jews,  and  Greeks,  and  Italians.  And  within 
any  one  of  these  groups  are  subdivisions  caused  either 
by  ancestral  ties  or  by  customs  acquired  during  years 
of  political  attachment  to  other  groups. 

Swept  thus  together  in  the  "racial  dust-bin  of 
Europe"  these  various  elements  have  had  to  defend 
themselves  against  invaders  and  against  each  other. 
The  very  inclemency  of  the  region  has  saved  them 
from  being  politically  absorbed ;  likewise  it  has  helped 
them  to  maintain  their  personality  against  foreign 
occupation  and  to  congregate  in  their  mountain  fast- 
nesses and  resist  contact  with  the  conqueror.  But 
against  these  good  qualities  must  be  set  a  lack  of  public 
spirit  in  most  of  them.  It  is  this  which  has  prevented 
them  from  forming  into  a  single  state  for  common 
defense,  an  easy  matter  in  the  past  century  when  their 
arch  enemy  the  Turk  was  falling  into  decadence  and 
when  the  current  of  thought  was  favorable  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationality.  But  Greeks,  Slavs,  Tartars  and 
Latin  colonists  had  noconception  of  thejstate.     All 


238  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  them  in  spite  of  their  different  origin  possess  one 
common  patrimony — love  of  the  small  autonomous  or 
independent  municipality.  That  this  form  of  govern- 
ment proved  to  be  an  obstacle  in  the  historic  evolution 
through  which  they  were  passing  is  more  than  evident. 
They  needed  and  lacked  a  coordinated  army  for  ener- 
getic action  against  a  common  oppressor.  Rumanian, 
Bulgarian,  or  Servian  greatness,  when  separately 
achieved,  could  only  fall  after  a  brief  period  because 
victories  cannot  in  themselves  constitute  greatness  but 
merely  stepping  stones  toward  it;  confronted  by  an 
enemy  better  prepared  and  with  a  better  interior  or- 
ganization, even  victories  do  not  mean  final  triumph. 

When  fighting  the  Turk,  the  Balkan  States,  thanks 
to  Europe,  were  able  to  gain  their  independence.  Such 
was  the  influence  of  the  moral  (rather  than  religious) 
idea  in  the  past  century.  But  they  would  never  have 
conquered  the  Crescent  had  they  not  united  to  form 
the  Balkan  League.  For  one  brief  moment  they  knew 
the  strength  of  union;  then  before  they  could  enjoy 
the  spoils  of  victory  or  even  sheathe  the  triumphant 
sword,  they  began  to  attack  each  other. 

It  is  a  case  where  the  difference  of  race,  of  past,  and 
of  psychology  could  not  converge  toward  that  solid- 
arity which  would  have  given  them,  as  fruit  of  their 
triumph,  both  greatness  and  the  respect  of  the  world. 

The  most  important  Balkan  state  is  Rumania  with 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  239 

Wallachia  and   Moldavia,   the   two   great   provinces 
awarded  her  on  the  partition  of  European  Turkey. 
Rumania  contains  seven  million  inhabitants  and  had  an 
annual  commerce  exceeding  two  hundred  million  dol- 
lars.    During  three  centuries  the  Rumanians  suffered 
the  direct  domination  of  the  Mohammedans.     Shel- 
tered sometimes  by  Russia,  they  found  intermittent 
respite  from  the  horrors  of  a  regime  of  ferocious  oppo- 
sition.    The  Treaty  of  Koutchouc-Kainardji  bettered 
their  situation  but  this  lasted  only  a  short  time.    The 
privileges  conceded  by  the  hatti  sherif,  or  imperial 
rescript,  and  later  by  the  treaties  of  Bucharest  in  1812 
and  Adrianopolis  in   1829,   created  a  new  state  of 
things.     The  Rumanian  principality  was  henceforth 
free  to  carry  on  commerce,  to  name  princes   from 
among  its  nobility  at  first  for  seven  years  and  later 
for  life ;  and  best  of  all,  it  was  left  to  the  local  authori- 
ties to  fix  taxes. 

The  Congress  of  Paris  could  not  look  favorably  on 
any  Balkan  state  and  least  of  all  on  Rumania,  con- 
tiguous to,  and  protected  by,  Russia.  This  was  the 
period  of  the  "Slav  peril,"  one  of  the  many  hoaxes  that 
have  frightened  the  world;  and  consequently  Rumania, 
in  spite  of  her  protests  and  in  spite  of  the  usual  jus- 
tice of  Napoleon  Ill's  policy,  could  not  obtain  the 
satisfaction  she  hoped  for,  and  saw  herself  organized 
into  a  sort  of  federation  over  which  presided  the  Sul- 


240  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tan  of  Turkey  with  full  authority  over  everything 
except  legislation. 

But  an  internal  movement  annulled  Europe's  diplo- 
matic measures  taken  in  favor  of  Turkey.  Wallachia 
and  Maldavia  named,  contrary  to  the  statutes,  the 
same  hospodar  or  political  chief.  This  was  Alexander 
Conza  who  in  1861  assumed  the  title  of  Prince  Alex- 
ander John  I,  and  became  the  great  reformer  of  Ru- 
mania, the  great  initiator  of  her  modern  organization, 
and  the  direct  forerunner  of  her  independence.  A 
Turkish  decree  of  September  10,  1861,  recognized 
Conza  as  vassal  prince,  and  authorized  the  constituting 
of  a  single  assembly  and  a  central  administration  for 
the  two  Turkish  provinces. 

As  always  happened  in  the  Balkans  the  victory  which 
Turkey  and  other  foreign  foes  could  not  win  by  arms 
alone  was  given  to  them  by  internal  dissensions.  The 
new  prince  was  attacked  in  his  work  of  regeneration 
by  the  former  interests — local  aristocrats  on  the  one 
side  and  revolutionists  on  the  other.  His  premier  was 
assassinated  June  20,  1862,  just  after  having  ad- 
dressed his  adversaries  in  the  legislative  assembly  in 
these  vigorous  terms :  "Do  what  you  will  you  cannot 
frighten  me.  You  may  crush  me,  but  while  a  drop 
of  blood  runs  in  my  veins  I  will  defend  society,  the 
family,  and  public  order."  Four  years  later  Conza 
himself  was  forced  by  a  military  conspiracy  to  abdi- 
cate in  favor  of  the  journalist  Rossetti,  chief  of  the 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  241 

plot;  and  thus  closed  the  most  brilliant  parenthesis  of 
Rumania's  history.  More  bound  to  Turkey  now  than 
during  the  grave  question  of  secularizing  religious 
properties  (which  had  been  done  with  courage  and 
decision  by  Conza),  the  Rumanians  thought  of  taking 
a  foreign  prince  whose  family  influence  would  save 
them  from  whatever  future  international  difficulty 
might  permit  Turkey  to  exercise  a  sovereignty;  for 
already  they  were  looking  upon  her  sovereignty  as  only 
nominal.  In  short  they  offered  the  crown  to  a  brother 
of  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  the  Count  of  Flanders ; 
but  Napoleon  III  did  not  approve  and  suggested  in- 
stead Charles  Hohenzollern,  who  was  substituted  for 
the  national  Rumanian  prince. 

It  appears  that  again  on  this  occasion  Bismarck 
resorted  to  his  customary  duplicity  and  pretended  that 
the  King  of  Prussia,  head  of  the  house  of  Hohen- 
zollern, would  not  give  the  necessary  authorization; 
by  which  ruse  he  made  Napoleon  beg  it  all  the  more 
insistently.  As  was  hoped,  Napoleon's  candidate,  a 
prince  of  one  of  the  most  powerful  houses  of  Europe 
and  sanctioned  by  the  King  of  Prussia,  brought  to 
Rumania  all  the  personal  prestige  which  would  protect 
her  from  the  jurisdiction  which  Turkey  in  accordance 
with  the  treaties  claimed. 

In  1877,  Rumania  having  helped  Russia  with  great 
forces,  her  independence  came  as  a  natural  thing.  It 
was  provided  for  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  and 


242  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ratified  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin;  but  it  cost  her  the 
province  of  Besarabia  which  she  was  forced  to  cede  to 
Russia  in  exchange  for  a  swampy  and  sterile  district. 
Rumania  as  an  independent  kingdom  enjoyed  a  long 
era  of  peace  and  began  to  nurse  expansionist  dreams. 
She  wanted  to  unite  all  Rumanians  still  living  under 
foreign  domination  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Prussian 
prince,  and  to  vindicate  her  right  to  all  those  regions 
which  they  inhabited. 

These  aspirations  however  have  been  kept  within 
prudent  limits.  Rumania  has  followed  the  wise  policy 
of  not  mixing  in  dangerous  adventures  nor  yearning 
for  excessive  dominion ;  instead  she  appeared  to  under- 
stand that  the  greatness  of  a  race  does  not  consist  in 
the  number  of  square  miles  it  can  claim,  and  that  even 
the  justest  of  causes  must  bide  its  time  since,  as  hap- 
ens  in  international  relations,  there  is  no  organism  for 
the  dispensing  of  justice. 

More  than  this.  Rumania  was  able  to  establish 
friendship  with  the  former  oppressor,  to  keep  up  a 
cordiality  with  Russia,  to  live  in  peace  with  the  other 
Balkan  States,  and  even  to  avoid  giving  any  uneasi- 
ness to  Austria  who  held  many  Rumanians  under  her 
jurisdiction.  When  the  Balkan  Alliance  was  formed 
against  Turkey  it  was  impossible  to  persuade  Rumania 
to  join  it.  The  Bulgarian  premier  even  went  so  far 
as  to  indicate  to  the  Rumanian,  Majoresco,  the  neces- 
sity of  arriving  at  some  agreement  in  case  of  a  possible 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  243 

catastrophe  to  the  Ottoman  Empire;  but  the  latter 
refused  to  enter  into  conversations,  answering  that 
when  the  catastrophe  arrived  it  would  be  time  to  talk, 
and  that  meanwhile  there  would  be  no  misunderstand- 
ing between  Rumanians  and  Bulgarians.  Later  when 
the  Bulgarian  minister  in  Bucharest  brought  up  the 
same  matter,  Majoresco  made  the  same  answer.  The 
Bulgarians  were  afraid,  and  rightly  as  subsequent 
events  showed,  to  leave  an  undecided  neighbor  at  their 
back. 

When  the  Second  Balkan  War  broke  out,  not  against 
Turkey,  but  to  the  shame  of  all  concerned,  among  those 
who  had  just  been  joined  to  defeat  her,  Rumania  went 
in,  hoping  to  arbitrate  the  destinies  of  the  combatants. 
She  allied  herself  with  Greece  and  Servia,  sent  her 
army  to  threaten  Sofia,  and  forced  the  Bulgarians  to 
sue  for  peace.  On  the  opening  of  the  present  conflict, 
and  for  some  time  after,  she  maintained  an  attitude  of 
vigilant  neutrality.  Like  Italy,  who  was  her  ally  in 
Balkan  affairs,  she  knew  how  to  navigate  in  troubled 
waters  without  shipwrecking  either  her  dignity  or  her 
interest.  Germany  filled  the  country  with  spies  and 
intriguers  of  all  sorts.  Bucharest  saw  an  influx  of  the 
class  of  women  specially  useful  in  that  capacity.  But 
in  spite  of  Germany's  efforts,  Rumanian  neutrality 
was  punctuated  by  frequent  manifestations  in  favor 
of  the  Allies. 

When  Italy  joined  the  fray  it  was  expected  that 


244  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Rumania  would  instantly  follow.  But  the  government 
wanted  still  more  time  to  consider  and  prepare;  and 
this  excess  of  prudence  was  her  undoing.  Her  declara- 
tion of  war  against  the  Central  Empires  came  late, 
when  they,  animated  by  new  enthusiasms,  could  dis- 
pose of  seasoned  troops  to  hurl  against  her.  The 
deep  indentation  made  by  Hungary  into  the  middle  of 
the  Rumanian  scissor-like  frontier  favored  their  quick 
invasion  of  the  unfortunate  land. 

Greece  was  the  first  nation  to  separate  from  the 
Balkan  empire  which  Turkey  constituted  in  the  period 
of  her  splendor.  This  can  be  explained  on  the  ground 
that  in  the  prerailroad  days  the  current  of  Western 
European  civilization  could  more  easily  reach  this  sea- 
bound  country  than  those  inland.  But  there  was  also 
another  and  less  practical  reason,  and  that  was  Greece's 
past  gift  of  art  and  beauty  to  the  world.  The  Hel- 
lenism of  the  early  nineteenth  century  contributed 
much  toward  overcoming  diplomatic  doubts. 

On  January  13,  1822,  after  a  brief  revolution,  a 
Greek  assembly  met  in  Epidaurus  to  proclaim  Greek 
independence  and  draw  up  a  constitution.  This  is  the 
period  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  Sovereigns  felt  the  need 
of  strengthening  their  positions.  They  had  not  yet 
recovered  from  the  consternation  which  France  caused 
in  1789  and  1793;  and  on  hearing  the  word  revolu- 
tion governments  as  well  as  sovereigns  trembled.    The 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  245 

very  people  themselves,  worn  out  by  the  harrowing 
Napoleonic  period,  were  longing  for  a  term  of  tran- 
quillity, even  of  debility  with  its  peril  of  cruel  relaxa- 
tion. But  not  the  Greeks.  Greece  was  really  animated 
by  those  very  principles  which  were  inspiring  so  much 
terror;  it  was  the  reverberation  of  the  great  revolu- 
tion that  roused  her  from  her  lethargy.  Back  in  1793 
the  Hetaria,  a  cosmopolitan  association  which  had  for 
object  the  complete  expulsion  of  the  Turks  from 
Europe,  was  founded ;  and  soon  it  spread  from  Vienna 
over  the  entire  continent.  Later,  in  Athens  itself,  was 
organized  another  called  the  Friends  of  the  Muses, 
of  literary  guise,  but  in  reality  with  the  same  political 
purpose  back  of  its  cult  of  Hellenism. 

The  new  preachings  incited  the  Greeks  to  deliver 
their  country  from  the  yoke  of  a  race  so  opposite  in 
origin  and  religion,  and  to  again  raise  it  to  its  apogee 
of  glory.  The  study  of  the  great  Greek  monuments 
of  art  and  literature  by  the  two  cosmopolitan  societies 
named  stirred  Greek  ambitions;  and  these  are  still  far 
from  appeased  in  spite  of  the  satisfactions  time  has 
granted. 

At  the  head  of  the  agitation  were  Capo  dTstria 
and  Ypsilanti.  They  seized  upon  the  insurrection  in 
Albania  as  a  favorable  starting  point  for  their  own 
projects,  and  straightway  Greece  and  the  .ZEgean 
Islands  flew  to  arms.  Ypsilanti  hastened  north  in  the 
hope  of  getting  the  Moldavian  and  Wallachian  dis- 


246  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tricts  to  rise,  but  in  vain;  they  could  not  be  led  by  a 
foreigner.  Meanwhile  Ali,  Pasha  of  Janina,  had  re- 
belled against  the  Sublime  Porte  and  was  in  arms. 
The  provinces  of  Epirus,  north  of  the  Gulf  of  Corinth, 
and  Morea,  south,  proclaimed  the  revolution  from 
Patras,  and  the  revolutionaries  occupied  Rumelia. 

But  the  sovereigns  of  Europe,  seeing  the  bonfire 
lighted,  feared  for  their  thrones.  In  that  very  year, 
1 82 1,  voices  were  heard  on  every  side  reminiscent  of 
past  liberty;  conspiracies  were  unearthed;  the  police 
everywhere  noticed  a  something  strange  bubbling  irre- 
pressibly  to  the  surface;  in  short,  there  was  a  feeling 
of  revolution  in  the  air.  And  so,  in  spite  of  the  Hel- 
lenism that  had  attracted  France  and  England,  in 
spite  of  Russia's  advantage  in  ejecting  the  Sultan  from 
Europe,  and  finally,  in  spite  of  the  Christian  ideal  and 
religious  influence,  the  powers  of  Europe,  from  the 
very  first  moment,  took  the  side  of  the  Mohammedan 
Empire  against  the  little  Christian  country  which  was 
struggling  with  such  ardor  and  success. 

The  Sultan  was  not  impressed  by  the  first  Greek 
success ;  in  face  of  the  danger  he  had  only  to  do  what 
is  impossible  in  Christian  Europe:  to  declare  a  Holy 
War  and  call  all  his  coreligionists  to  come  and  defend 
the  green  banner  of  the  Prophet.  The  effects  of  the 
Holy  War  however  were  not  to  be  visited  on  the  revo- 
lutionists alone,  but  on  all  Christians;  and  thus  while 
the  Mohammedan  army,  exalted  by  religious  fervor, 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  247 

went  conquering  the  weak  little  Greek  forces,  the  ex- 
cited Islamic  population  in  Stamboul  committed  hor- 
rible massacres  of  the  Christians. 

Excess  of  defense  was  the  system  always  adopted 
by  the  Turks  and  proved  to  be  the  cause  of  their  many 
misfortunes.  Greece  was  losing  all  the  battles.  Of 
the  districts,  or  provinces,  which  had  risen  in  favor  of 
nationalism  there  remained  only  Morea  or  southern 
Greece  and  a  few  islands.  There  was  every  prospect 
of  complete  victory  for  Turkey,  when  Europe,  hear- 
ing of  the  massacres,  saw  that  she  could  no  longer 
leave  the  Christians  of  the  Orient  defenseless.  It  was 
not  the  time  to  oppose  such  legitimate  aspirations  as 
those  of  Greece.  It  was  not  the  time  for  sovereigns 
to  fall  back  on  reactionary  generalizations  which  per- 
mitted their  own  moral  interests  to  be  prejudiced  by 
such  spectacles  of  blood.  Among  the  many  devotees 
of  Hellenism  was  Czar  Alexander  I,  who  saw  that 
his  prestige  and  his  amour  pro  pre  would  suffer  if  he, 
as  protector  of  Christians  living  under  the  Turkish 
Empire,  should  consent  to  such  slaughter. 

Next  England  entered  the  lists.  Under  pressure  of 
public  opinion,  which  for  centuries  has  been  a  potent 
factor  in  that  country,  she  tried  to  reconcile  her  role 
of  moral  protector  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  with  the 
dictates  of  western  civilization.  France  also  experi- 
enced a  wave  of  opinion  directed  by  Greekophile  com- 
mittees which  were  sending  arms  and  munitions  to 


248  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  little  nation.  But  the  circumstance  most  propitious 
for  Greece  was  the  misgivings  which  began  to  insin- 
uate themselves  in  the  various  European  cabinets. 
Each  feared  that  the  other  might  solve  the  grave 
problem  in  its  own  favor,  or  at  least  force  a  general 
crisis  which  might  be  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the 
rest;  and  so  the  very  same  reactionary  conspiracy 
which  had  been  alarmed  at  seeing  in  Greece  the  begin- 
ning of  many  popular  revindications  (which  were  later 
in  the  middle  of  the  century  to  explode  terribly)  now 
began  to  consider  the  question  from  another  point 
of  view — European  equilibrium  and  Christian  senti- 
ment. 

Thus  it  happened  that  when  hope  was  least  expected 
it  came  from  those  very  powers  who  had  shown  them- 
selves hostile  at  the  beginning.  Nicholas  I,  successor 
to  Czar  Alexander,  began  by  declaring  that  he  wished 
to  intervene  alone  and  straighten  out  the  difficulties, 
in  disregard  of  the  principle  of  Ottoman  integrity. 
Rather  than  this,  when  Athens  was  taken  by  the  Turks 
in  June  of  1827,  a  convention  of  the  powers  raised  a 
voice  and  obliged  Turkey  to  give  autonomy  to  Greece 
under  penalty  of  combined  military  action. 

This  much  accomplished,  successive  mistakes  on  the 
part  of  the  Turks  promoted  her  from  autonomy  to 
full  independence.  As  the  Sublime  Porte  would  not 
accept  the  ruling  of  the  convention,  Russia  declared 
war  on  him  and  arrived  at  the  gates  of  Constanti- 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  249 

nople.  On  February  3,  1830,  another  conference  of 
the  powers  convened  in  London  and  determined  that 
Greece  should  be  created  an  independent  state  with 
a  Christian  king.  Leopold  of  Saxe-Coburg-Gotha,  the 
first  chosen,  declined  the  post  (and  was  soon  after 
elected  King  of  Belgium)  and  it  was  given  to  Prince 
Otto  of  Bavaria. 

But  Greece  had  not  the  moderation  of  Rumania; 
her  ambitions  kept  growing.     Logical  enough,  consid- 
ering that  her  independence  was  born  amid  shouts  of 
praise  and  sentiments  of  the  highest  idealism.     She 
and  all  her  sympathizers  were  dreaming  of  "the  glory 
that  was  Greece,"  and  forgetting  meanwhile  that  to 
recover  the  soil  of  antiquity  and  live  on  it  could  not 
in  itself  bring  grandeur  and  power.    In  the  eyes  of  the 
patriots  the  little  kingdom  appeared   a  small  thing 
hardly  worth  the  bitter  struggle  it  had  cost ;  soon  they 
wished  to  extend  their  independence  to  other  Greeks. 
Disturbances  began  and  King  Otto  declared  war  on 
Turkey  with  the  support  of  the  whole  nation ;  but  the 
Greeks,  being  defeated,  made  their  king  pay  the  pen- 
alty as  was  their  custom.    Dethroned  by  the  revolution 
of  1862  he  was  succeeded  by  Prince  George  of  Den- 
mark, head  of  the  present  dynasty.    As  this  king  never 
identified  himself  with  the  spirit  of  the  country  he 
governed,  he  could  with  more  calmness  handle  difficult 
situations  and  assuage  the  undisciplined  passions  of  his 
subjects. 


250  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Nothing  but  a  moment  of  weakness  could  have  sent 
this  house  to  war  in  1908.  It  was  an  inexplicable 
disaster  for  Greece.  Thanks  once  more  to  Europe 
peace  was  not  purchased  too  dear.  The  Greeks  were 
to  retrieve  themselves  a  few  years  later  when  the 
Balkan  Alliance  nearly  drove  the  Turks  from  Europe, 
and  to  regain  their  military  prestige  soon  after  in  the 
war  against  Bulgaria. 

In  both  these  wars  the  Greeks  were  intimately  allied 
to  the  Servians  and  continued  the  alliance.  They 
bound  themselves  to  support  Servia  in  war  should  any 
Balkan  nation  attack  her ;  but  present  events  show  how 
the  Germanic  theory  that  treaties  are  mere  pieces  of 
paper  makes  easy  converts.  Greece  under  the  influ- 
ence of  King  Constantine  assumed  an  equivocal  atti- 
tude. There  was  talk  of  an  entente  with  Bulgaria, 
which  if  not  formal  and  direct,  existed  through  the 
medium  of  Germany.  There  was  talk  of  having  re- 
served the  right,  because  of  her  maritime  situation,  to 
maintain  a  benevolent  neutrality  towards  the  Allies.  It 
is  probable  that  the  cabinets  of  Athens,  Berlin,  and 
Sofia,  had  never  even  taken  up  the  matter,  but  again 
as  in  past  times  national  interests  and  family  ties  were 
the  main  influence,  as  explained  in  Chapter  XXVI. 

Greece  had  so  long  languished  under  the  Ottoman 
yoke  that  her  liberation  did  not  at  first  awaken  great 
enthusiasm  for  commerce  and  agriculture.  Only  in 
recent  years  did  the  economic  renovation  commence. 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  251 

The  country  lacks  a  hinterland;  the  coastal  regions 
suffer  from  a  scarcity  of  water,  and  the  remoter  dis- 
tricts suffer  from  lack  of  communications;  only  re- 
cently were  the  few  railroads  constructed.  On  the 
other  hand  sea  traffic  has  progressed  enormously.  The 
gross  tonnage  of  steamers  under  the  Greek  flag 
amounted  in  19 14  to  820  thousand  tons,  having  risen 
from  139  thousand  in  1898;  this  increase  of  fifty  per- 
cent is  something  which  no  other  nation  has  attained. 
Exportation  doubled  itself  in  the  last  nine  years  pre- 
ceding the  war,  having  gone  from  80  to  158  million 
francs ;  but  the  replenishing  of  war  material  after  the 
defeat  of  1898  and  the  subsequent  victorious  wars  ex- 
hausted the  Greek  exchequer,  and  the  nation  had  fre- 
quently to  turn  to  France.  France  and  England  held 
Greek  prosperity  and  even  Greek  political  expansion  in 
their  power,  but  Germany  controlled  the  throne,  the 
court,  the  general  staff,  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
press. 

Of  all  the  Balkan  States,  Servia  has  always  been  the 
most  turbulent.  She  was  the  principal  cause  of  the 
Eastern  or  Byzantine  Emperor's  calling  the  Turks  into 
the  peninsula  centuries  ago;  and  today,  if  not  to  blame 
for  the  German  invasion  of  that  same  peninsular,  at 
least  she  was  the  pretext  for  it.  This  Slav  people  first 
appear  in  history  about  the  year  600  when  they  came 
from  beyond  the  Carpathians  and,  with  the  permission 
17 


252  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  the  Eastern  Emperor,  established  themselves  in  the 
rude  mountains  which  are  today  called  Servia.  Little 
by  little  the  Servians  developed  and  began  to  dream 
of  unbounded  grandeur;  their  hero  Duscian  wanted 
to  march  on  Constantinople  to  save  which  the  emperor, 
who  still  enjoyed  a  vestige  of  the  old  Roman  prestige, 
called  the  Turks  to  his  defense.  Servians  and  Turks 
met  at  Kossovo,  in  1389,  and  that  battle  destroyed 
every  illusion  and  prostrated  the  land  under  five  hun- 
dred years  of  oppression.  The  Servian  Empire  had 
succeeded  in  comprising  the  present  country  of  that 
name,  Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Albania,  Dal- 
matia,  Bulgaria,  and  Macedonia.  The  right  to  Greece 
also  existed  in  the  title  assumed — Emperor  of  Servia 
and  Greece — but  was  not  consummated.  It  is  to  the 
brilliant  epoch  of  Duscian  that  Pan-Servian  aspira- 
tions hark  back,  as  if  the  great  historic  periods  were 
parantheses  to  be  opened  and  closed  at  will. 

The  logical  consequence  of  Ottoman  cruelty  was 
Servian  revolt.  At  the  beginning  of  the  last  century 
the  semi-political  brigandage  gave  way  to  coordinated 
rebellion.  In  1803  the  chiefs  of  the  little  country,  in 
laying  their  grievance  before  the  Sultan,  made  known 
a  political  and  moral  state  of  surpassing  horror.  "Our 
life,  our  religion,  our  honor,  are  threatened.  Not  a 
husband  can  be  sure  of  protecting  his  wife  from  out- 
rage, nor  a  father  his  daughter,  nor  a  brother  his 
sister.     Cloisters,  churches,  monks,  popes — none  are 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  253 

safe  from  desecration."  In  spite  of  the  Sultan's  con- 
ciliatory words  the  consequence  of  this  petition  was 
more  repression,  and  out  of  the  goading  of  the  people 
rose  the  figure  of  Kara  George  (George  the  Negro) 
as  the  Turks  called  the  national  hero  George  Petro- 
vitch.  By  his  Turkish  appellation  he  has  come  down 
to  fame  and  by  it  the  dynasty  which  he  founded  is 
known. 

But  the  hero  is  not  always  the  victor,  and  by  181 3 
the  Sultan  had  triumphed.  Nevertheless  he  had  prom- 
ised in  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  signed  the  preceding 
year,  that  de  motu  propio  he  would  grant  certain 
autonomy  to  Servia.  Shortly  after,  he  made  use  of 
Miloch  Obrenovitch,  who  later  became  head  of  the 
second  or  rival  Servian  dynasty,  to  organize  this 
autonomy.  But  after  bridging  over  the  moment  of 
danger  the  Sultan  did  not  keep  his  compact  and  Miloch 
Obrenovitch  began  a  new  revolt,  at  the  same  time  do- 
ing away  with  Kara  George  by  having  him  assassinated 
in  his  sleep. 

By  the  convention  of  Akkerman  and  the  Peace  of 
Adrianople,  Servia  secured  better  treatment;  and  a 
little  later,  in  1830,  a  hatti  sherif  gave  the  principality 
organization  and  legal  personality.  In  1856,  the 
Treaty  of  Paris,  of  celebrated  memory,  put  this  statu- 
tory organization  under  the  guarantee  of  the  powers. 
Soon  after,  the  last  Servian  fortress  was  evacuated  by 
Turkish  soldiers;  and  the  Congress  of  Berlin  held  in 


254  THE  WORLD  WAR 

1878  recognized  Servia' s  complete  independence. 
With  this  the  green  banner  of  Islam  ceased  to  float 
over  the  land.  Of  all  this  amelioration  Russia  was 
the  moving  spirit. 

The  Obrenovitch  dynasty  was  to  pay  dear  for  the 
unscrupulousness  of  its  founder  Miloch.  King  Milan 
put  himself  at  the  service  at  the  house  of  Austria  and 
with  his  hands  in  Francis  Joseph's  pocket,  decided  the 
fate  of  his  kingdom  and  initiated  the  difficulties  of  the 
modern  Balkan  period.  At  the  instigation  of  the 
Vienna  government  he  attacked  Bulgaria  in  1885;  but 
his  first  small  successes  were  later  turned  into  decisive 
defeat.  He  was  forced  to  abdicate  and  his  son  and 
successor  was  the  king  who,  along  with  his  queen 
Draga,  was  the  victim  of  the  well-known  tragedy  of 
1903.  This  shocking  assassination,  including  as  it  did 
the  queen's  brothers  and  several  cabinet  ministers,  put 
Servia  for  awhile  beyond  the  pale  of  civilization. 

But  the  new  king,  Peter  I,  a  descendant  of  Kara 
George,  prudently  gave  Servia  a  Russian  orientation 
which  later  led  to  the  Balkan  League  and  Servian  ex- 
pansion. The  league  was  principally  the  work  of 
Servia  and  Bulgaria.  It  was  a  splendid  conception 
which  might  later  have  produced  favorable  results  for 
all  concerned  and  have  been  a  blessing  to  Europe  and 
the  cause  of  civilization;  but  Balkan  appetites  were 
as  ever  exorbitant;  and  just  as  in  physics,  no  two 
bodies  can  occupy  the  same  space  at  the  same  time, 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  255 

so  in  politics  no  one  territory  can  belong  to  two  nations 
at  the  same  time. 

Servia's  program,  as  we  shall  see,  included  con- 
quests difficult  to  make  and  detrimental  to  other  na- 
tion's interests;  she  had  to  be  brought  within  more 
modest  bounds.  Turbulent,  agitated,  always  causing 
new  complications,  she  has  long  been  Europe's  chief 
anxiety.  Her  proximity  to  Austria  was  partial  justi- 
fication for  her  temper,  for  it  is  well  known  that  all 
peoples  who  have  misgivings  get  a  certain  amount  of 
reactionary  influence  from  the  adversary.  The  men- 
tality of  the  Servian  masses,  like  all  collective  mental- 
ity, could  not  dissimulate.  Therefore  confronted  by 
Austria  who  wished  to  check  her  development,  her 
ambition  enlarged  till  it  became  a  veritable  lust  of 
territory. 

Economically  subject  to  the  Dual  Monarchy,  she  be- 
came tributary  to  it  to  such  a  point  that  in  1884,  when 
Milan  was  king,  seventy-eight  percent  of  her  exporta- 
tion went  to  Austria  who  sent  back  ninety  percent  of 
the  importations.  Austria,  with  that  sinister  intuition 
characteristic  of  her  dealings  with  subject  countries, 
knew  of  the  situation  and  tyrannized  over  Servia  eco- 
nomically. From  1906  to  19 10  she  declared  a  tariff 
war  which  impoverished  the  country  still  more. 

Servia's  total  foreign  commerce  in  normal  years 
amounted  to  less  than  200  million  francs;  while  her 
public  debt  at  the  beginning  of  19 13  reached  nearly 


256  THE  WORLD  WAR 

659  million  francs.  From  that  time  her  commerce 
continued  to  decrease  and  her  debt  to  augment.  Today 
she  is  a  ruined  nation  fighting  heroically,  feeling  the 
full  weight  of  a  war  of  annihilation ;  and  in  the  Euro- 
pean peace  concert  she  will  have  an  implacable  adver- 
sary, Austria ;  an  enemy,  Germany ;  a  reluctant  friend, 
Italy,  two  sentimental  allies,  England  and  France ;  one 
decided  but  inefficient  defender,  Russia. 

On  each  one  of  these  post-bellum  elements  depends 
her  future. 

In  1907  Bulgaria  by  way  of  celebrating  her  libera- 
tion from  Turkey  unveiled  the  statue  of  the  Czar  Lib- 
erator. Her  homage  to  Russia  was  of  the  fullest.  In 
that  nation  she  recognized  the  source  of  her  inde- 
pendence. The  following  year  Ferdinand  I  took  the 
title  of  Czar  of  the  Bulgarians  and  formally  declared 
the  independence  which  had  already  been  verbally  ac- 
knowledged by  the  Congress  of  Berlin  and  by  innum- 
erable subsequent  acts.  The  somewhat  presumptuous 
title  of  Czar  easily  found  heraldic  experts  to  corrob- 
orate it  by  unearthing  the  precedent  of  Czar  of  the 
Bulgarians  and  the  Greeks  which  Bulgarian  rulers  had 
assumed  in  her  period  of  greatest  splendor,  when  she 
was  dreaming  of  conquering  all  the  Latins  and  the 
Slavs. 

Bulgaria  has  no  upper  middle  class.  Lacking  it, 
there  is  no  great  concentration  of  riches;  property  is 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  257 

quite  evenly  divided  and  agriculture  is  the  only  source 
of  income.  Her  history  as  a  free  state  is  her  present- 
day  history,  and  her  political  inclinations  are  emphat- 
ically liberal.  The  race  is  more  liberty-loving  than 
the  Servian,  more  vigorous  in  political  life  than  the 
Greek,  and  less  diplomatic  than  the  Rumanian.  Many 
consider  her  the  most  consistent  of  the  Balkan  States. 

The  origin  of  the  Bulgarian  has  not  been  determined 
with  exactness,  owing  to  the  many  elements  which 
have  gone  to  his  making.  He  came  originally  from 
the  shores  of  the  Volga.  To  this  Mongolian  stock  was 
added  Thracian-Illyrian-Slav,  and  after  that  all  the 
ethnic  mixtures  possible  in  that  locality.  Somewhat 
akin  originally  to  the  Turk  the  Bulgarians  have  always 
tried  to  differentiate  themselves  from  their  kinsman 
during  their  long  period  of  subjection,  but  have  suc- 
ceeded less  than  the  Servians. 

Like  the  other  Balkan  peoples  the  Bulgarians  had 
their  day  of  power.  Their  capital  Tirnova  pretended 
to  outshine  Constantinople,  which  city  their  Czar 
Simeon  would  have  accupied  had  not  their  rivals  the 
Servians  attacked  his  army  in  the  rear.  At  its  height 
of  splendor  the  empire  extended  as  far  as  the  Adriatic, 
comprising  Thrace,  Macedonia,  Servia,  etc. — in  brief, 
the  greater  part  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Bulgaria 
has  made  war  on  Greeks,  Rumanians,  Venetians,  Hun- 
garians, and  all  others  within  reach;  only  to  be  con- 
quered  with  them   all   at   Kossovo   by  the  common 


258  THE  WORLD  WAR 

enemy  the  Turk.  This  sealed  Bulgaria's  doom.  She 
was  effaced  from  the  map. 

It  would  appear  from  a  study  of  the  psychology 
and  history  of  the  Bulgarians  that  the  blood  of  the 
primitive  Volga  stock  in  their  veins  counts  for  more 
than  their  early  annals  indicate.  They  can  rise  rapidly 
in  grandeur,  stand  firm  in  victory;  but  let  misfortune 
overtake  them  and  they  sink  into  lethargy.  This  ex- 
plains why  the  "Bulgarian  Atrocities"  which  so  roused 
the  righteous  indignation  of  Gladstone  found  but  faint 
echo  in  the  subjects  of  these  atrocities.  Looking  back 
over  Bulgarian  history  we  find  that  while  the  Greeks 
were  heartened  by  the  French  revolution,  while  the 
Rumanians  were  trying  to  throw  off  the  Turkish  yoke, 
while  Servia  was  appealing  to  the  great  Napoleon  for 
aid,  Bulgarian  men  submitted  to  seeing  their  women 
violated  and  bent  their  own  backs  to  the  heavy  blows 
of  the  Kurds.  Not  until  1876  did  they  rebel,  and  then 
but  timidly.  The  movement  needless  to  say  was  quickly 
submerged  by  the  oppressor's  Bashi-Bazouks  under  a 
sea  of  Bulgarian  blood — the  "atrocities"  which  so  re- 
volted the  noble  soul  of  the  English  premier. 

Russia,  partly  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  in  1877 
and  partly  by  her  insistence  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
the  following  year,  was  able  to  present  Bulgaria  with 
an  informal  independence,  which  was  ratified  into  the 
absolute  and  formally  recognized  condition  a  little 
later ;  hence  the  statue  to  the  Czar  of  Russia.    Rumelia 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  259 

was  added  in  the  course  of  events  and  nominally  sepa- 
rated from  Turkey,  both  acts  being  corollaries  to  a 
problem  already  solved. 

Like  Greece,  Bulgaria  has  known  two  reigning 
houses  within  a  brief  period;  first  the  Prince  of  Bat- 
tenburg  who  soon  relinquished  the  honor,  and  next 
the  present  ruler  Ferdinand  who,  by  custom  and  in- 
clination is  Germanic,  in  spite  of  the  blood  of  Louis 
Philippe  which  flows  through  his  veins. 

While  the  economic  organization  is  favorable  to  an 
equitable  distribution  of  material  benefits  it  does  not 
produce  a  rapid  development  of  riches.  Thus  Bul- 
garia's condition  of  independence  has  not  brought  her 
the  prosperity  she  hoped  for.  With  an  area  of  96  thou- 
sand square  kilometers  and  a  population  of  nearly 
four  and  a  half  million  she  had,  before  the  Balkan 
War,  an  exportation  of  184  million  francs  and  an 
importation  of  about  200  million.  Her  public  debt  was 
over  600  millions  and  this  sum  doubled  itself  and  more 
after  the  Balkan  Wars.  Both  politically  and  econom- 
ically the  Bulgarian  situation  is  grave.  Politics  have 
been  generally  in  a  chaotic  state  and  some  of  the 
most  important  men  in  the  kingdom  have  been  im- 
prisoned on  the  government's  order;  and  as  to  the 
nation's  credit,  a  loan  made  in  Germany  shortly  after 
the  war  began,  was  at  the  rate  of  seven  and  a  half 
percent,  and  with  other  usurious  conditions  besides. 


260  THE  WORLD  WAR 

There  have  probably  been  more  loans  at  a  higher  rate 
since. 

Until  the  aggressive  conduct  against  her  quondam 
allies  which  provoked  the  Second  Balkan  War,  Bul- 
garia enjoyed  the  general  sympathy  of  Eurpoe.  In 
much  greater  degree  than  Servia  she  stood  for  liberal 
institutions  and  was  simple,  thrifty,  disciplined,  and 
of  a  high  order  of  military  virtue;  but  that  unex- 
pected and  crafty  assault  on  those  who  had  been  her 
brothers  in  arms  the  day  before,  apprised  Europe  that 
the  Mongolian  with  all  his  traditional  defects  was  in 
her  midst.  Next  she  turned  against  Russia;  and  to- 
day the  Russian  Czar  Alexander,  the  Liberator  of  Bul- 
garia, must  smile  from  his  bronze  pedestal  as  he 
watches  soldiers  march  through  Sofia  and  listens  to 
the  roar  of  the  cannon  on  the  Varna.  And  if  his 
disembodied  spirit  has  taken  cognizance  of  the  pres- 
ence of  Turkish  troops  in  that  land  which  he  freed 
from  them  at  the  cost  of  so  much  Russian  blood,  he 
must  be  convinced  of  the  madness  of  the  whole  human 
family. 

The  Bulgarians  will  probably  continue  to  regard  the 
statue  with  respect  while  they  carry  on  their  policy  of 
unlimited  ambition,  of  hatred  and  vengeance  against 
Servia;  but,  at  the  same  time,  they  will  never  be  per- 
suaded of  the  faithlessness  of  their  present  attitude. 
Did  not  RadoslavorT,  one  of  the  most  important  states- 
men of  the  Stambuloff  interregnum,  announce  to  an 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  261 

astonished  world  that  Bulgaria  had  long  been  in  a 
state  of  legitimate  defense  against  Russia?  When  it 
comes  to  such  a  statement  the  conscience  has  lost  all 
equanimity  and  is  incapable  of  judgment. 

i 

Montenegro  as  a  state  is  a  negligible  quantity,  but 
not  so  as  a  moral  entity.  The  little  race  which  com- 
poses it  has  written  epic  pages  in  history.  Of  Servian 
origin  the  Montenegrins  climbed  from  the  shores  of 
the  Don  to  occupy  the  high  mountains  and  have  held 
these  tenaciously  against  inclement  nature  and  con- 
tentious enemies.  This  mere  handful  of  the  earth's 
inhabitants  offers  more  poetry  than  sociology  to  the 
student.  Isolated  in  their  mountains  they  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  resist  the  Byzantine  emperors,  the  Bulgarian 
invasion,  and  the  ever-returning  Ottoman.  War  was 
their  mission,  violent  death  their  destiny;  and  to  this 
day  when  a  child  is  baptized  at  the  font  It  is  with  the 
pious  prayer  "God  save  thee  from  dying  in  thy  bed !" 
When  the  Turks  had  conquered  all  the  Balkan  regions, 
conquered  the  Hungarians,  reached  the  gates  of 
Vienna,  the  Montenegrins  were  still  defending  their 
territory  with  heroism  and  success. 

Nominally  dependent  on  the  Sultan  when  not  actu- 
ally at  war  with  him,  they  nevertheless  had  their  own 
dynasties  ruling  with  a  sort  of  semi-theocracy,  and 
keeping  up  direct  relations  with  other  states.  It  was 
not  until  1878  that  the  Sublime  Porte  recognized  Mon- 


2te  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tenegro's  independence  after  thoroughly  despoiling 
her,  with  the  complicity  of  all  Europe  and  the  active 
aid  of  Albania,  of  all  that  territory  which  had  been 
accorded  her  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano.  But  in 
spite  of  its  small  extent  the  present  king,  Nicholas  I, 
who  succeeded  on  the  assassination  of  his  uncle  Danilo, 
accomplished  much  for  his  people.  By  means  of  clever 
diplomacy,  by  his  frank  and  sincere  conduct,  by  the 
important  marriages  made  by  his  children,  and  by  the 
admitted  and  admired  valor  of  his  subjects,  he  suc- 
ceeded in  raising  his  little  kingdom  to  international 
importance;  and  yet  its  whole  wealth,  its  debts,  its 
assets,  its  commerce,  would  not  equal  that  of  an  average 
city.  Nicolas  I  played  his  part  in  the  Balkan  Wars  but 
European  interests  deprived  him  of  his  share  of  the 
spoils.  What  they  gave  him  was  not  the  prize  he 
sought.  Throughout  all  he  continued  faithful  to 
Servia  and  has  kept  at  her  side  in  the  present  war. 
Once  more  the  Montenegrin  warriors  are  seeking  vio- 
lent death,  and  chanted  war  songs  are  the  daily  bread 
of  the  people. 

The  only  time  the  Balkan  States  were  able  to  con- 
quer the  Turks  was  the  day  they  united.  In  that  his- 
toric moment  they  forgot  the  suspicions  and  enmities  of 
the  past  and  stood  together  with  a  common  interest. 
They  at  last  apprehended  the  necessity  of  suiting  their 
acts  to  their  interests,  a  conception  formerly  too  diffi- 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  263 

cult  for  them  to  grasp.  But  unfortunately,  both  for 
themselves  and  the  peace  of  Europe,  this  correlation 
between  action  and  the  common  good  lasted  but  a 
short  time.  Covetousness  and  passion  again  gained 
the  ascendancy  which  they  hold  over  weak  states  just 
as  they  do  over  weak  individual  consciences. 

The  Italo-Turkish  War  of  191 1  was  bound  to 
weaken  Turkey  and  diminish  her  prestige;  conse- 
quently it  was  natural  that  those  nations  who  still  had 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  their  own  race  subjected  to 
the  Turk  should  try  to  get  some  benefit  from  the 
defeat.  Europe  however  was  not  at  all  anxious  to  see 
the  conflict  extend  to  the  Balkans  and  forbade  Italy 
to  carry  the  war  farther  than  Africa  and  the  sea.  The 
Balkan  States,  as  we  have  seen,  were  products  of  suc- 
cessive European  Congresses,  and  were  living  in  con- 
tinuous tutelage  of  the  great  powers;  but  the  famous 
phrase  Italia  fard  da  se  was  repeated  by  the  politicians 
of  those  countries,  and  their  increasing  military 
strength  gave  each  one  of  them  the  right  to  apply  it  to 
herself.  Let  the  Balkans,  they  said,  also  do  for  them- 
selves whatever  their  interests  dictate. 

To  allow  a  favorable  situation  to  pass  by  would  be 
a  great  mistake;  so  the  idea  of  an  alliance  surged  up 
spontaneously,  and  the  members  of  the  various  govern- 
ments, either  through  diplomacy  or  directly,  set  forth 
the  grounds  on  which  they  could  agree.     Under  the 


264  THE  WORLD  WAR 

pressure  of  circumstances  they  arrived  at  signing  a 
treaty. 

The  preamble  of  this  compact  is  extremely  signifi- 
cant in  the  present  moment.  It  begins :  "His  Majesty 
Ferdinand  I,  King  of  the  Bulgarians,  and  his  Majesty 
Peter  I,  King  of  Servia,  penetrated  with  the  convic- 
tion of  the  community  of  interests  and  the  similarity 
of  purpose  of  the  two  sister  nations,  Bulgaria  and 
Servia,  do  hereby,  etc.,  etc."  It  is  well  to  keep  this 
language  in  mind  when  examining  subsequent  acts. 

After  the  treaty  came  military  conventions  and  secret 
appendices  which  all  virtually  form  an  offensive  alli- 
ance against  Turkey,  with  the  design  of  taking  from 
her  all  her  European  possessions  except  Constantinople. 
This  was  to  be  done  under  the  patronage  of  Russia 
who,  from  protector  of  the  Christians  living  in  that 
part  of  the  globe,  had  become  the  active  friend  and 
defender  of  all  the  new  Balkan  States. 

From  the  first  moment  grave  obstacles  to  the  alliance 
presented  themselves;  the  discussions  revealed  deep 
jealousies  and  suspicions,  from  which  it  was  easy  to 
predict  what  afterwards  actually  happened. 

When  Guechoff,  the  Bulgarian  premier,  had  an 
interview  with  Milovanovitch,  the  Servian  premier, 
both  were  simultaneously  enthusiastic  over  the  idea 
of  the  union;  but  later  when  Rizoff,  Servian  repre- 
sentative in  Rome,  and  Standoff,  in  Paris,  took  up 
with  Milovanovitch  the  question  of  how  Macedonia 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  265 

should  be  divided  (when  won)  difficulties  arose.  The 
same  thing  happened  after  the  Greek  representative  in 
Bulgaria,  Panas.  declared  officially  that  "if  Bulgaria 
could  promise  her  participation  in  a  war  in  which 
Greece  might  be  attacked,  he  was  authorized  to  state 
that  Greece  would  reciprocally  participate  in  a  war  in 
which  Bulgaria  might  be  attacked."  The  Bulgarian 
cabinet  agreed  unanimously  to  the  clause,  but  later 
came  difficulties  which  could  not  be  settled  without 
resorting  to  posterior  arbitration.  The  Czar  of  Russia 
was  selected  as  arbiter.  In  fact,  Article  II  of  the 
secret  addendum  to  the  treaty  between  Servia  and 
Bulgaria  terminates  thus :  "The  two  contracting  par- 
ties bind  themselves  to  accept  as  definitive  frontier  (of 
the  future  conquests  set  forth  above)  the  line  which 
His  Majesty  the  Czar  of  Russia,  within  the  limits  indi- 
cated above,  may  find  most  in  conformity  with  the 
rights  and  the  interests  of  both  parties."  And  in  Arti- 
cle IV  of  the  same  addendum  more  scope  is  given  to 
the  arbitration  by  the  clause :  "All  differences  which 
may  arise  as  to  the  interpretation  and  execution  of  any 
clause  whatsoever  of  the  treaty,  or  of  the  present  secret 
appendix,  or  of  the  military  convention,  shall  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  final  decision  of  Russia." 

In  the  minds  of  some  of  the  statesmen  arranging 
these  affairs  there  was  a  presentiment  of  future  trouble 
in  spite  of  their  efforts  to  provide  a  solution  for  every 
question.    But  this  was  offset  by  the  belief  that  Russian 


266  THE  WORLD  WAR 

influence  would  count  for  much  and  that  the  Czar's 
judgment,  given  in  the  interests  of  peoples  equally 
friendly,  would  be  respected. 

The  diplomatic  situation  and  the  military  organiza- 
tion being  all  prepared,  and  the  public  mind  worked 
up  to  the  proper  pitch,  partly  through  Turkey's  own 
acts,  the  war  broke  out.  Turkey  could  do  little  to 
defend  herself  and  victory  crowned  the  efforts  of  the 
Balkan  allies.  These  efforts,  as  the  following  figures 
show,  were  not  uniform :  Bulgaria  had  over  sixty  thou- 
sand dead  and  wounded,  Servia  about  fifteen  thousand, 
and  Greece  less  than  eight  thousand.  Bulgaria  it  will 
be  seen  bore  the  principal  burden  of  the  war. 

All  Europe,  but  especially  Russia,  followed  the 
campaign  closely.  She  alone,  as  hers  was  to  be  the 
grave  responsibility  of  arbiter,  knew  the  secret  com- 
pacts. In  those  days  Europe  was  living  on  a  volcano 
and  any  new  Balkan  trouble  might  have  widespread 
and  terrible  consequences. 

When  Bulgaria  threatened  Constantinople  and  could 
easily  have  taken  the  last  trench  which  opposed  her 
invasion,  she  was  checked.  Russia,  although  favorable 
to  expansion,  had  fixed  its  Columns  of  Hercules  in 
Adrianopolis.  The  occupation  of  Tchataldja  was 
vetoed.  And  this  because  Constantinople  constituted 
the  age-old  aspiration  of  Russian  policy.  Its  posses- 
sion meant  a  brilliant  and  assured  economic  future  for 
the  whole  south  of  the  immense  empire.     Therefore 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  267 

Russia  preferred  to  see  it  remain  in  the  hands  of  a 
decadent  state  like  Turkey,  who  was  bound  to  be  ex- 
pelled one  day  or  another  from  Europe,  rather  than  in 
the  hands  of  a  young  and  vigorous  nation  like  Bul- 
garia. The  Muscovite  Empire  had  given  its  full  sup- 
port to  the  Slavs  or  Slavized  population  of  the  Bal- 
kans. She  had  fought  for  them  many  times,  had 
thrown  the  weight  of  her  European  influence  on  their 
side,  and  had  covered  them  even  when  they  were  in 
error  with  the  mantle  of  her  power;  but  she  was  not 
ready  to  give  them  her  most  precious  aspiration. 

And  so,  although  the  allied  Balkan  States  conquered 
all  along  the  line  and  occupied  all  the  former  Ottoman 
possessions,  Europe  decreed  that  they  should  not  cross 
the  line  of  Tchadaldja  nor  partition  Albania  and  thus 
arrive  at  the  Adriatic — a  curious  phenomenon  which 
demonstrates  once  more  how  relative  are  human 
affairs ;  these  same  states  had  been  vanquished  by  Tur- 
key and  in  their  very  defeat  they  had  found,  because 
Europe  willed  it  so,  the  satisfaction  of  many  of  their 
ambitions;  now  they  had  vanquished  Turkey  and  by 
will  of  that  same  Areopagus  of  powers  they  were  to 
be  deprived  of  their  prize.  In  the  first  instance  they 
did  not  inspire  fear  and  Turkey  did;  now  it  was  just 
the  contrary. 

The  two  Adriatic  nations,  Italy  and  Austria,  were 
of  Russia's  mind.  They  did  not  wish  a  young,  vio- 
lent, and  audacious  state  established  at  the  entrance  to 
18 


268  THE  WORLD  WAR 

their  sea,  so  they  too  placed  their  veto  and  in  far  more 
brutal  form  than  Russia's.  By  it  the  Balkan  States  of 
Greece,  Montenegro,  and  Servia,  saw  the  territory  they 
had  expected  to  divide  considerably  reduced.  To  have 
bowed  to  superior  force  would  have  been  prudent. 
Had  they  not  felt  its  benefits  in  other  days?  Should 
not  the  one  have  compensated  the  other? 

But  they  could  not  see  it  that  way.  In  misfortune 
the  statesmen  of  the  three  countries  mentioned  lost 
the  serenity  of  more  fortunate  days.  Discussions  and 
accusations  began ;  and  while  they  were  disputing,  the 
various  armies  started  fighting  each  other.  War  broke 
out,  and  the  victory,  as  is  known,  did  not  favor  Bul- 
garia. Attacked  at  three  points  she  could  not  resist  and 
had  to  submit.  The  treaty  of  alliance  was  broken  by 
the  sword  and  with  it  went  the  question  of  Russia's 
arbitration. 

Bulgaria  had  to  suffer  the  blame.  Perhaps  as  a 
nation  she  did  not  deserve  it  but  certain  it  is  that  the 
nation,  either  by  order  of  the  king  or  by  military  edict, 
accepted  the  deeds  committed.  There  could  have  been 
no  cabinet  resolution  to  this  effect  for  the  cabinet  still 
hoped  for  the  arbitration  provided  for  in  the  treaty,  and 
which  meant  Russia's  support:  its  representative 
Danoff  was  in  the  Russian  capital  at  that  very  mo- 
ment to  secure  it ;  yet  no  one  can  deny  that  the  whole 
nation,  cabinet  included,  was  full  of  joy  over  the  first 
small  successes  obtained. 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  269 

(The  Servians  and  the  Greeks,  as  pointed  out  in  an 
article  in  the  Le  Temps,  hardly  appeared  grief-stricken 
by  the  affair  and  it  is  probable  that  the  assault  carried 
out  by  the  Bulgarians  was  not  altogether  contrary  to 
their  own  desires.) 

When  peace  was  restored,  the  Balkan  States  in  spite 
of  their  reprehensible  conduct  did  not  suffer  grave 
consequences.  Bulgaria  to  be  sure  did  not  receive  what 
she  wished  nor  even  what  was  at  first  offered;  and 
yet  she  was  able  to  add  twenty  percent  more  territory 
to  her  kingdom,  by  deducting  it  from  the  region  ceded 
to  Rumania,  and  sixteen  percent  to  her  population. 
Her  new  23  thousand  square  kilometers  were  in 
Thrace  and  Macedonia  and  with  them  she  received  633 
thousand  inhabitants  and  a  port  on  the  iEgean  Sea. 
The  cession  of  Cavala,  so  hotly  disputed,  was  forcibly 
upheld  by  Russia  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Bulgaria's 
leaning  toward  Austria  was  already  discernible;  but 
it  was  impossible  to  take  it  from  the  two  conquering 
states.  Servia  got  seventy  percent  more  territory  and 
a  million  and  a  half  more  inhabitants,  which  meant  an 
increase  of  fifty  percent  over  her  previous  figure,  and 
Greece  received  eighty-eight  percent  more  of  both  land 
and  population,  the  latter  doubling  by  the  fact. 

Thus  we  see  that  compensation  was  in  the  inverse 
ratio  to  sacrifices  made;  Bulgaria  who  thought  her- 
self entitled  to  so  much  came  out  with  little.  She,  a 
country  of  agriculturists,  dreamed  of  playing  in  the 


270  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Balkans  the  same  role  that  Prussia  played  in  the  Ger- 
man confederation,  and  so  the  remaining  states, 
through  fear,  limited  her  powers. 

Germany's  decision  to  carry  the  war  into  the  Bal- 
kans bears  the  stamp  of  an  offensive  tending  to  avoid 
an  aggression.  Germans  possess  a  special  mentality 
which  has  led  them  to  believe  too  much  in  acquired 
rights ;  but  in  a  war  of  this  importance  only  the  treaty 
at  the  end  can  determine  what  those  rights  are,  and  a 
nation  can  be  conquered  even  while  it  holds  enemy 
territory.  It  has  been  said  that  General  JofTre,  cold- 
bloodedly measuring  events,  exclaimed :  "That  France 
should  be  a  battlefield  afflicts  me,  and  I  grieve  for  my 
compatriots  in  the  occupied  territory;  but  as  for  con- 
quering the  enemy,  it  does  not  matter  whether  the 
field  of  action  be  in  France  or  elsewhere."  This  apt 
thought  which  on  the  face  of  it  might  have  emanated 
from  an  English  brain,  applies  to  past  wars  also ;  Fred- 
erick the  Great  might  have  handed  it  down  to  his 
descendants. 

To  invade  Servia  meant  to  ungarrison  the  new 
Russian  fronts,  reduce  the  forces  on  the  western  front, 
and  increase  the  danger  of  an  Italian  invasion;  that 
Germany  took  such  risks  must  have  been  the  conse- 
quence of  one  of  two  facts ;  either  Turkey  threatening 
to  make  a  separate  peace,  must  have  implored  aid  with 
such  insistence  that  it  could  not  be  denied,  or  else, 
warned  by  the  Balkan  monarchs  of  the  possibility  of 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  271 

their  joining  the  Allies  under  the  influence  of  public 
opinion,  the  German  governing  powers  with  the  Kaiser 
at  their  head  wanted  to  terrify  their  enemies  by  sheer 
power  and  take  all  the  warlike  spirit  out  of  them.  No 
other  hypothesis  appears  admissible. 

To  follow  the  road  which  would  threaten  Egypt 
has  all  the  pretentiousness  of  an  expedition  in  the 
Napoleonic  style— that  into  Russia,  for  example,  but 
with  the  addition  that  the  Servian  campaign  would 
have  the  same  form  as  the  Napoleonic  wars  in  Spain. 
To  suppose  that  Germany  went  to  Turkey  to  get  men 
would  be  to  suppose  her  ignorant  of  Ottoman  affairs, 
which  was  not  the  case ;  or  that  she  went  to  Constanti- 
nople in  order  to  make  the  Sultan  declare  a  Holy  War; 
for  the  fact  is  that  the  Holy  War  lost  its  raison  d'etre 
the  moment  Turkey  allied  herself  with  a  government 
not  Mohammedan;  furthermore  Germany  must  have 
known  that  the  Arabs  feared  an  increase  of  Turkish 
power  and  that  the  Arab  was  the  only  element  that  the 
Turk  could  make  into  an  army. 

Whatever  the  German  design  may  have  been  her 
activity  in  the  Balkans  modifies  the  whole  Balkan 
question.  Before,  there  may  have  been  some  predeter- 
mined scheme;  today  there  must  be  another  radically 
different. 

The  prospect  of  a  satisfying  partition,  of  commercial 
outlets  in  the  Adriatic,  of  the  internationalizing  of  the 
Dardanelles,  were  all  possible,  even  easy.    The  Quad- 


2>]2  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ruple  Entente  had  tried  to  find  a  solution  which  for  a 
moment  appeared  to  be  acceptable.  It  gave  satisfaction 
to  all  and  annulled  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  which  had 
been  the  cause  of  so  much  resentment.  But  Bulgaria 
committed  under  the  inspiration  of  this  very  solution 
the  same  error  that  she  committed  the  day  she  ordered 
her  armies  to  assault  her  allies.  After  two  wars  in 
which  the  flower  of  her  youth  perished,  after  an  ex- 
penditure of  more  than  a  thousand  millions,  we  find  her 
within  three  years'  time  in  another  war,  allied  to  a 
nation  whose  interests  are  contrary  to  her  own,  who 
holds  the  theory  of  domination  by  virtue  of  brute  force, 
and  who  used  to  declare  that  the  Balkan  nation  was  not 
worth  the  slightest  effort.  Such  an  act  must  have 
been  dictated  by  passion  not  by  reason. 

The  fact  is  that  each  one  of  the  Balkan  States  is 
aspiring  to  again  build  up  an  empire  such  as  existed 
in  an  entirely  different  epoch,  which  will  comprise  iden- 
tical territory  whose  centers  will  vary.  For  the  con- 
venience of  the  moment  they  can  accept  an  arrange- 
ment, but  real  alliance  is  impossible.  Considering  the 
insatiable  ambitions  of  each  one  it  is  necessary,  if  an 
equilibrium  is  ever  to  be  attained,  that  one  of  the 
states  must  be  sacrificed.  There  must  be  an  epoch  of 
general  agreement  to  make  them  understand  that  they 
must  submit  to  the  interests  of  stronger  nations  which 
have  historic  reasons  or  acquired  rights.  When  one  is 
weak  he  must  respect  these  rights.     Above  all  their 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  273 

many  disillusionments  should  have  made  them  see  that 
there  is  no  attaining  all  in  a  single  moment;  and  that 
after  the  results  of  the  war  against  Turkey  they  should 
have  felt  satisfied  and  contented  for  a  reasonable 
period.  Even  Bismarck,  whom  no  one  exceeded  in 
ambition,  was  content  to  rest  on  the  laurels  of  his 
victories. 

The  question  of  the  Dardanelles  and  that  of  the 
Adriatic  are  more  ancient  than  the  Balkan  question, 
but  are  related  to  it  geographically  if  not  politically. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  immediate  reason  for 
Italy's  not  sending  a  contingent  to  the  Orient,  and 
whatever  may  have  been  the  direct  cause  of  Italy's 
policy  of  reservations,  the  latent  antagonism  to  Servia 
was  at  the  bottom  of  it.  If  conventions  and  treaties 
existed  these  had  not  been  able  to  alter  it,  and  to  the 
Servian  antipathy  must  be  added  that  against  Greece, 
also  based  on  conflicting  interests. 

On  these  two  states  being  formed  and  with  relative 
strength,  Italy,  farsighted,  looked  toward  Rumania  to 
whom  she  was  attached  in  sincere  friendship.  Be- 
tween these  two  Latin  nations  a  treaty  exists  but  its 
terms  are  unknown.  Certainly  it  must  have  for  basis 
the  Balkan  statu  quo  in  the  interests  of  Rumania,  and 
especially  the  statu  quo  of  the  Epirus  and  of  Albania  in 
the  interests  of  Italy. 

But  the  Pan-Serbs  aspire  to  dominate  the  whole 
eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic  from  Trieste  to  the  sea. 


274  THE  WORLD  WAR 

They  base  their  aspirations  on  the  rights  of  the  ancient 
Illyrians;  they  claim  to  represent  the  Eastern  Roman 
Empire ;  they  declare  the  Servians  to  be  the  successors 
of  all  the  eastern  tribes  who  imbibed  their  ideas  from 
this  same  empire;  they  remember  the  greatness  of 
their  king-conquerors.  They  go  even  further, — they 
claim  that  Venice  and  the  coast  south  of  it  were  once 
in  their  hands  and  that  the  city  was  founded  by  Slavs. 

Historically  true  or  false  as  these  statements  may 
be  they  have  the  defect  of  ignoring  all  posterior  his- 
tory, of  forgetting  the  work  done  by  the  Venetians,  or 
that  done  long  before  by  the  Romans,  or  that  of  the 
Popes ;  they  overlook  the  Italianizing  process  that  had 
gone  on  for  centuries,  and  above  all,  the  actual  present- 
day  state  of  things. 

Even  setting  aside  all  these  precedents  the  Servians 
would  reduce  to  uniformity  the  mixture  of  races,  types, 
and  tendencies  that  exists  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
Adriatic.  And  yet  they  have  not  been  able  to  har- 
monize their  interests  with  those  of  one  tiny  portion 
of  Albania  which  they  have  occupied.  The  tribal 
rainbow  in  that  part  of  the  Adriatic  not  only  is  diverse 
through  origin,  but  because  of  its  lack  of  social  dis- 
cipline it  could  never  submit  to  any  state  unless  that 
state  could  rapidly  endow  it  with  commercial  riches 
and  the  political  force  of  well  ordered  administration. 

Italy  at  this  moment  is  not  fighting  Austria  in  order 
to  create  at  her  back  an  enemy  even  more  ambitious. 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  275 

Any  one  who  does  not  know  the  preceding  cannot 
explain  Italy's  anxiety. 

In  the  Dardanelles  it  was  the  same  story.  Russia 
fought  for  centuries  against  Turkey,  created  one  Bal- 
kan state  after  another  with  the  one  sole  object  of  be- 
ing able  to  liberate  her  products  from  the  tyrannous 
master  of  the  Straits  who  might  choose  not  to  let  them 
pass  through.  When  Bismarck  inclined  Russia  toward 
Asiatic  expansion  he  knew  that  she  might  thus  attain 
enormous  proportions  but  not  enrich  herself.  Russia 
might  have  acquired  vast  new  regions,  whole  Asiatic 
nations,  and  an  immense  number  of  square  miles.  She 
could  have  become  colossal  in  the  German  style;  but 
not  great  according  to  Latin  ideology.  Russia  has  no 
outlet,  for  she  can  export  her  products  by  the  north 
only  during  a  few  months  of  the  year;  in  the  south 
she  is  tributary  to  Turkey  or  whomever  may  possess 
the  Dardanelles;  in  the  west  she  is  at  the  mercy  of 
Germany  and  to  a  certain  extent  of  Sweden;  and  in 
the  east  she  is  far  from  the  coast.  The  present  war 
has  demonstrated  that  Russian  vastness  is  not  great- 
ness, since  it  has  no  sure  sea  route. 

For  centuries  Russian  statesmen  have  understood  this 
and  all  their  international  action  has  been  directed 
toward  obtaining  Constantinople.  It  appeared  outrag- 
eous to  Russia  that  little  nations  of  three  or  four 
million  inhabitants  without  industry,  without  sufficient 
strength  to  serve  as  a  guarantee — nations  who  like 


276  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Bulgaria  owe  their  whole  existence  to  her — should 
come  to  dispute  this  right  with  her.  That  England, 
who  made  herself  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean,  of 
India,  and  then  of  Egypt,  and  who  secured  great  in- 
fluence in  Persia — that  England  should  have  fought  to 
prevent  her  occupying  Constantinople  was  easy  to  un- 
derstand ;  that  England  should  have  always  upheld  the 
integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  thus  dissembled 
her  self-interest,  was  almost  just;  that  France,  Eng- 
land and  the  little  Piedmont  kingdom  should  have 
joined  in  the  Crimean  War  was  explicable;  but  that 
upstart  tribes  of  yesterday,  elevated  to  the  category  of 
states,  should  wish  to  oppose  the  vital  ideal  of  their 
protector,  was  truly  exorbitant. 

Russia  entered  this  war  with  a  fixed  idea  of  securing 
Constantinople.  To  defeat  this  end  is  Turkey's  only 
extenuation,  for  the  war  for  many  reasons  is  contrary 
to  her  interests.  It  is  said  that  when  the  present  French 
president,  Raymond  Poincare,  was  foreign  minister  he 
signed  an  agreement  by  which  he  bound  France,  in  case 
of  a  general  war,  to  support  Russia  in  the  occupation 
of  Constantinople.  It  is  further  stated  that  this  secret 
treaty  was  unknown  to  the  English  until  after  they 
had  intervened  in  the  present  conflict.  If  this  is  true, 
and  it  is  entirely  within  probability,  the  English  action 
in  Gallipoli  would  appear  a  consequence  of  the  secret 
Franco-Russian  treaty  rather  than  a  necessary  military 
action.     If  the  Russians  get  down  to  Constantinople 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  277 

they  will  hold  the  city,  they  will  hold  the  Straits,  they 
can  have  a  commerce ;  but  even  then  they  will  not  be 
the  masters  of  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  nor  will 
they  dominate  the  road  to  India.  If  the  Germans  can 
realize  their  dream  the  Bagdad  route  is  already  inter- 
cepted. 

The  Balkan  tangle  has  its  explanation,  but  it  is  not 
such  a  serious  thing  as  to  be  decisive  in  the  life  of 
Europe.  For  years  it  has  been  a  thorn  in  the  side 
of  statesmen,  but  today  it  is  chanting  its  de  profundis. 
The  Balkan  intervention  in  the  general  conflict  is  the 
tram  onto  of  an  old,  old  question.  Others  will  be  the 
problems  of  the  future. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

BELLIGERENTS  AND  NEUTRALS  IN  LATIN  AMERICA 


w 


HEN  President  Wilson  declared  war  on  Ger- 
many, it  was  with  the  hope  that  the  greater  part, 
if  not  the  whole,  of  Latin  America  would  follow  him 
into  the  conflict.  Had  this  happened  it  might  have  cre- 
ated an  international  wave  of  condemnation  as  effica- 
cious as  armies;  or  even  had  it  yielded  less  result  than 
its  illustrious  author  expected,  it  would  nevertheless 
have  affected  the  cause  of  civilization  most  favorably. 
It  would  have  weakened  kaiserism  not  only  in  the  three 
nations  which  today  serve  as  a  pedestal  to  that  cult, 
but  also  within  the  confines  of  Germany  itself. 

But  it  must  be  confessed  that  Latin  America  re- 
sponded only  in  small  part.  Later,  as  Teutonic  vio- 
lence became  more  unbridled  on  the  seas,  the  countries 
in  question  appeared  better  disposed  to  understand  the 
serious  duties  incumbent  on  them  in  the  present  tragic 
period.  In  November  of  191 5  we  published  in  Le 
Matin,  of  Paris,  an  article  declaring  all  moral  neutral- 
ity to  be  a  crime;*  today  we  go  further  and  declare 


*Le  Matin,  November  15,   1915;   "Une  neutralite  qui  est  un 

279 


crime." 


280  THE  WORLD  WAR 

all  judicial  neutrality  a  crime  at  a  moment  when  the 
fate  of  the  world  is  compromised.  Not  to  participate 
in  the  struggle  favors  the  cause  of  social  retrogression 
championed  so  strongly  by  the  Central  Empires. 

The  first  to  follow  President  Wilson's  lead  were 
Cuba  and  Panama  on  April  7  and  10  respectively. 
On  the  nth,  Brazil  handed  the  German  minister  his 
passports  but  did  not  reach  the  point  of  declaring  war 
till  some  eighteen  months  had  passed.  Bolivia  broke 
diplomatic  relations  on  April  13  and  Guatemala  on  the 
28th.  On  May  18  and  19,  Honduras  and  Nicaragua 
followed  suit,  and  on  June  9  and  n,  Haiti  and  Santo 
Domingo.  Last  on  the  list  come  Peru.  San  Salvador, 
and  Uruguay,  who  found  that  they  could  no  longer 
treat  with  German  representatives  who  were  propagan- 
dists rather  than  diplomatic  agents. 

Cuba  had  the  honor  of  following  the  United  States 
immediately.  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  the  only 
groups  represented  in  the  parliament  of  the  little  re- 
public, promptly  decided  to  commit  their  country's  fate 
to  the  immense  international  conflict.  This  was  a 
logical  step.  Unlimited  submarine  warfare  being  the 
issue  between  America  and  Germany,  an  island  coun- 
try could  not  consent,  through  silence,  to  the  hallowing 
by  force  of  a  principle  which  handed  neutrals  over  to 
the  mercy  of  belligerents.  Least  of  all  could  the  larg- 
est and  most  important  of  the  Antilles  do  so.  She 
who  had  suffered  much  did  not   feel  herself  called 


LATIN  AMERICA  281 

upon  to  submit  to  hunger  and  desolation  for  other 
peoples'  quarrels.  The  German  theory  would  have 
endangered  Cuba  out  of  all  proportion  to  her  size  and 
wealth. 

The  Cuban  congress  put  a  touch  of  sentiment  to  the 
decision.  As  the  step  taken  by  the  United  States  was 
its  first  act  of  international  hostility  since  the  war 
with  Spain  undertaken  precisely  for  the  purpose  of 
liberating  Cuba,  it  was  natural  that  the  latter  should 
now  respond  by  a  generous  support  which  would  re- 
pay, as  far  as  possible,  the  debt  then  contracted.  More- 
over, Cuba,  while  still  a  Spanish  colony,  had  always 
kept  alive  the  principles  of  civilization  and  progress 
and  had  given  to  the  world  her  modest  contribution 
accordingly;  in  her  struggle  for  independence  she  al- 
ways sought  to  relate  this  personal  or  national  effort 
to  the  general  cause  of  human  liberty.  In  reaching 
her  decision  regarding  the  world  war  she  did  not  for- 
get that  in  the  conflict  with  Spain  in  1898,  Germany 
would  have  put  a  check  on  the  nation  who  championed 
Cuba's  cause,  and  would  have  sought  some  other  solu- 
tion than  the  natural  one  had  England  not  prevented. 

It  cost  no  effort  for  Panama  to  follow  Cuba.  She 
of  all  nations  could  least  afford  to  remain  neutral  after 
the  United  States  had  taken  a  stand,  for  she  owed 
her  life  to  its  ex-President  Theodore  Roosevelt,  who, 
to  favor  the  high  principles  of  progress,  did  not  hesi- 
tate before  an  act  of  international  violence  (which  he 


282  THE  WORLD  WAR 

had  the  courage  to  leave  nakedly  as  such  with  no  at- 
tempt to  clothe  it  in  the  dubiously  sentimental  mantle 
of  modern  diplomacy).  Panama's  neutrality  would 
have  put  the  Canal  Zone  in  grave  peril.  It  might  have 
permitted  Germany  to  use  the  ports  temporarily,  or 
German  citizens  to  flock  into  the  small  republic  in  great 
numbers  and  form  perhaps  terrorist  nuclei  acting  on 
orders  from  Berlin.  The  United  States  did  not  ter- 
minate France's  work  of  uniting  the  two  great  oceans 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  it  at  the  disposition  of  fan- 
atics. She  knew  too  well  from  her  own  experience 
what  the  compatriots  of  Von  Papen  and  Boy-Ed  were 
capable  of.  In  deciding  to  protect  it  the  Panama  Re- 
public anticipated  the  desires  of  the  White  House  and 
gave  proof  of  discreet  foresight. 

Supposing  on  the  other  hand  that  the  United  States 
were  defeated,  it  is  easy  to  sketch  the  story  of  Panama 
as  the  prey  of  German  land-lust.  The  second  step  in 
the  march  of  German  hegemony  over  the  earth  would 
bring  it  to  the  fertile  and  weakly  governed  states  of 
Central  America.  In  which  case  the  Panama  Canal 
would  play  a  more  important  part  than  the  Suez  Canal 
plays  in  the  present  stage  of  history.  Once  in  posses- 
sion of  it  Teuton  power  would  receive  its  eternal  con- 
secration, for  it  would  dominate  the  two  great  oceans 
and  with  them  the  commerce  of  the  world.  If,  under- 
standing this,  Panama  had  remained  neutral  either 
because  she  selfishly  expected  salvation  through  the 


LATIN  AMERICA  283 

efforts  of  others  or  because  she  thought  her  influence 
negligible,  she  would  have  shown  that  she  was  un- 
worthy of  her  present  political  status;  her  secession 
and  the  act  of  Roosevelt  in  her  behalf  would  have  had 
hardly  the  justification  of  success. 

The  nations  of  America  who  have  not  responded  to 
the  call  and  who  do  not  stand  beside  the  United  States 
and  the  Allies,  are  acting  contrary  to  the  dictates  of 
their  own  interests.  The  human  struggle  now  being 
enacted  does  not  admit  of  specators;  he  who  watches 
indifferently  the  frightful  debacle  which  may  hurl  hu- 
manity back  into  medievalism  is  a  traitor  to  the  high 
principles  of  civilization.  Latin  America,  standing  by 
unconcerned  in  such  a  moment,  gives  the  lie  to  both 
history  and  geography. 

No  serious-minded  student  of  the  question  can  doubt 
that  a  German  victory  would  reinforce  kaiserism  with 
all  its  principles  of  military  strength;  it  would  serve 
as  a  pedestal  to  the  emperor;  for  the  whole  nation, 
even  those  who  have  clamored  for  their  rights,  would 
prostrate  themselves  before  the  colossus.  The  history 
of  the  Hohenzollerns  tells  us  that  their  ambition  knows 
no  limits.  From  the  little  corner  of  Brandenburg  to 
the  wide  expanse  of  modern  Germany  they  have  found 
the  road  easy  in  spite  of  Napoleon  and  in  spite  of  Aus- 
tria. Nor  does  history  give  us  any  promise  of  a 
change  of  their  tendency;  excepting  the  moribund 
Frederick  II,  of  brief  reign,  they  have  all  had  one 
19 


284  THE  WORLD  WAR 

single  idea,  clung  to  tenaciously  by  opposed  fathers 
and  sons  alike — one  single  principle,  one  single  faith : 
an  insatiable  greed  for  territory. 

Should  they  succeed  in  their  present  designs  it  is  not 
difficult  to  foresee  the  future  state  of  the  world.  Ger- 
many dominating  it,  and  some  Friedrich  or  Wilhelm 
dominating  Germany  from  the  Gulf  of  Riga  to  the 
Straits  of  Calais;  England  reduced  to  a  second-class 
power,  France  a  vassal,  Italy  again  invaded,  Russia 
Teutonized,  and  the  seas  in  the  grip  of  the  conqueror. 
All  the  past  which  Rome  bequeathed  us,  destroyed ;  all 
the  political  regeneration  which  England  has  been  com- 
pounding in  the  enormous  crucible,  lost;  all  the  ideal- 
istic grandeur  of  the  French  Revolution,  vanished ;  the 
Latin  soul,  practical  and  sentimental,  and  the  Saxon, 
analytical  and  sedulous,  swept  away  into  the  mists  of 
the  past. 

That  this  should  not  come  to  pass  is  worth  a  super- 
human effort  on  the  part  of  the  nations;  and  those 
who  will  not  make  the  effort  may  sit  to-morrow  in  self- 
reproach  or  in  that  deep  remorse  which  is  the  ener- 
vating price  paid  for  improvidence. 

If  Latin  America  voluntarily  excludes  herself  from 
the  great  current  of  events,  if  she  envelops  herself  any 
longer  in  an  emasculated  neutrality  which  is  blind  both 
to  great  human  ideals  and  to  her  own  interests,  she 
will  put  herself  out  of  the  concert  of  civilized  powers. 
It  still  appears,  in  spite  of  the  decomposition  of  Rus- 


LATIN  AMERICA  285 

sia  and  the  defeat  of  Rumania  and  Italy,  that  the 
Allies  would  win  their  cause.  The  day  after  there  will 
be  no  room  for  those  Latin-American  nations  who 
have  lagged  behind  listening  to  the  far-off  roar  of 
the  furious  battle.  The  little  American  republics  who 
have  not  feared  danger  will  be  part  of  the  new  society 
of  nations,  but  not  so  the  larger  ones.  It  was  Faust 
who  said  that  liberty  was  worth  conquering  anew  each 
day;  and  so  in  international  politics,  recognized  rights 
are  always  the  corollary  of  a  historic  duty  fulfilled 
resolutely  and  without  flinching. 

Whatever  be  the  victory  of  the  Allies,  complete  or 
partial,  let  us  repeat  that  neutrality  will  still  have  been 
a  crime  so  far  as  the  interests  of  the  Latin-American 
nations,  separately  or  collectively,  are  concerned.  The 
hegemony  of  the  United  States  on  each  side  of  the 
canal  would  remain  recognized  and  sanctioned.  It 
would  be  theirs  for  having  sacrificed  their  blood  and 
their  material  interests  with  a  generosity  unprece- 
dented; it  would  be  theirs  for  having  responded  even 
at  the  cost  of  interior  disturbances  to  the  appeal  of  a 
historic  duty,  in  an  hour  of  supreme  necessity;  and 
finally  it  would  be  theirs  because  they  would  have 
welded  themselves  in  close  friendship  to  the  European 
nations  who,  in  future  international  affairs,  would 
accord  them  a  freehand  in  all  the  American  continent. 
There  would  be  no  grounds  for  expecting  anything 
else,   and   some   future   secretary   of    foreign   affairs 


286  THE  WORLD  WAR 

could  say,  with  regard  to  Patagonia,  "these  territories 
interest  us  because  the  sphere  of  influence  which  we 
exercise  over  them  obliges  us  to  observe  a  continuous 
and  vigilant  tutelage/'  It  would  be  but  a  repetition  of 
what  the  present  secretary,  Robert  Lansing,  said  in 
his  report  on  the  purchase  of  the  Danish  Antilles  and 
apropos  of  the  people  of  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

Argentine,  Mexico,  Chile,  Peru,  Uruguay,  all  hav- 
ing discontinued  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany 
would,  by  declaring  war,  insure  a  brighter  destiny  for 
Latin  America  and  give  her  a  place  in  the  society  of 
nations  which  is  forming  on  the  battlefield  where  im- 
perious necessity  has  brought  into  being  that  which 
the  exhortations  of  students  and  dreamers  was  power- 
less to  create.  Were  these  countries  to  declare  war, 
the  United  States  would  not  have  the  right  to  affirm 
before  History,  as  she  may  with  more  than  justice  if 
the  present  conditions  continue,  that  while  her  armies 
went  forth  and  her  citizens  gave  their  lives  and  money, 
the  greatest  republics  of  Latin  America  were  sunk  in 
selfishness.  Were  these  to  declare  war  on  Germany 
they  would  pay  a  debt  of  long  standing  and  one  from 
which  their  circumstances  have  exempted  them  until 
now.  It  is  just  about  a  century  ago  that  a  reaction- 
ary wave  swept  over  Europe.  It  culminated  in  the 
formation  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  reconstituting, 
mutatis  mutandis,  of  the  statu  quo  ante.  The  reaction- 
ary spirit,  like  the  spirit  of  liberty,  flies  swift  and  far 


LATIN  AMERICA  287 

and  from  the  coast  of  Europe  it  looked  toward  that 
of  South  America.  It  was  when  Europe  was  strug- 
gling hardest  for  liberty  that  South  America  freed 
itself ;  and  in  the  minds  of  the  governments  interested 
and  of  their  reactionary  statesmen  who  were  directing 
the  Holy  Alliance,  the  restoration  of  the  statu  quo  ante 
was  projected  to  that  new  continent.  Then  as  now, 
but  in  very  different  proportion,  the  United  States  was 
the  most  important  power  in  the  New  World ;  the  at- 
tempt to  revert  to  former  times  was  not  aimed  at  it, 
but  at  that  portion  which  had  belonged  to  Spain. 
Vessels  lay  anchored  in  the  Bay  of  Cadiz  awaiting  the 
word  to  sail,  and  even  from  remote  Russia  aid  came 
for  the  project. 

The  United  States,  weak  economically  and  without 
an  army,  imposed  the  first  veto,  and  in  doing  so  jeop- 
ardized her  national  existence.  The  scheme  failed; 
and  without  going  into  a  discussion  as  to  whether  the 
failure  was  due  most  to  her  action  or  to  other  factors, 
the  truth  remains  that  she  was  a  powerful  instru- 
ment in  fixing  the  status  of  South  America,  raising 
it  from  a  colony  into  a  free  continent  both  in  fact 
and  in  letter. 

This  debt  has  never  been  paid.  There  came  no  end 
of  suspicions  and  reciprocal  misunderstandings  of  the 
sort  that  fill  the  annals  of  international  relations.  But 
in  presence  of  a  tremendous  crisis  like  the  present,  the 
hollows  and  depressions  in  the  waving  line  that  de- 


288  THE  WORLD  WAR 

scribes  the  relations  of  states  should  be  overlooked, 
and  only  the  high  peaks  of  generous  intention  and  ser- 
vice rendered  should  hold  the  eye.  The  question,  for 
Latin  America,  narrows  down  to  this :  Is  it  the  just 
spirit  of  President  Monroe  that  animates  her  various 
peoples  or  is  it  that  of  a  triumphant  Kaiser  coveting 
the  domination  of  the  seas.  The  answer  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  give. 

As  all  know  now,  the  ruling  passion  of  the  German 
mind  is  the  dominion  of  the  seas.  This  comprises 
not  only  a  hegemony  over  Latin  America  but  also  its 
conquest,  by  which  the  retrogressive  spirit  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  of  1815  would  be  renewed.  That  such  aspira- 
tions were  entertained  in  Germany  has  been  revealed 
by  Pan-Germanic  Leagues  of  all  shades,  and  even  more 
so  by  German  scholars  who  in  the  countries  in  ques- 
tion often  play  the  role  of  moral  vanguard  to  the 
armies.  Gustave  Schmoller,  the  eminent  rector  of  the 
University  of  Berlin,  expressed  the  desire  to  see  in 
Brazil  a  new  German  empire  in  the  form  of  a  very 
powerful  colony  supported  and  defended  by  Central 
Europe.  Wilhelm  Sievers  pronounces  Latin  America 
the  res  nullius  in  the  political  world  and  claims  it  for 
Germany,  since  she  is  the  last  power  to  arrive  on  the 
colonizing  field.  Adolph  Wagner,  Alfred  Funck, 
Lange  Friedrich  all  think  the  same,  and  Richard  Tan- 
nenberg,  who  partitions  the  world  among  the  elect, 
awards   Argentine,    Chile,    Uruguay   and    Paraguay, 


LATIN  AMERICA  289 

along  with  a  third  of  Brazil  and  the  southern  part  of 
Bolivia,  to  Germany.* 

In  all  Latin  America,  Germany  with  the  "disinter- 
ested" object  so  indiscretely  revealed  by  her  writers, 
has  been  busy  opposing  North  American  influence  by  a 
system  of  intrigue.  In  Mexico  every  incident,  large 
and  small,  was  turned  to  use.  The  German  minister 
there,  Von  Eckhart,  a  man  of  much  tenacity  but  small 
talent,  tried  to  apply  the  same  methods  as  those  which 
will  go  down  in  French  history  as  Boloism.  In  Colom- 
bia, German  propaganda  struck  deep  roots  after  the 
segregation  of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  Everywhere 
the  efforts  were  furthered  by  the  Conservative  element, 
the  Catholic  Church,  and  the  immigrants  from  Spain; 
but  likewise  they  encountered  a  barrier  in  the  tradi- 
tional spirit  of  liberty  and  rebellion  characteristic  of 
that  part  of  the  world. 


Edgardo  de   Magalhaes,  article   in   the  Nineteenth   Century. 


CHAPTER   XXV 

SPANISH   NEUTRALITY 

T?OR  many  long  years  Spain  has  sat  aloof  from  the 
-*-  concert  of  nations.  In  international  politics  the 
Pyrennees  have  represented  a  real  barrier,  and  the  fact, 
instead  of  keeping  Spanish  diplomats  on  the  alert,  was 
made  an  excuse  for  abandoning  themselves  to  a  state 
of  helplessness.  At  the  time  of  the  war  with  the  United 
States  in  1898  Spain  was  sleeping,  and  even  losing 
the  last  remains  of  her  great  colonial  empire  hardly 
served  to  awaken  her.  Every  nation  has  its  peculiar 
qualities  and  its  traditional  defects,  and  the  fact  is  that 
Spain,  a  great  nation  in  many  ways,  is  not  so  in  the 
field  of  international  politics.  Her  public  men  ap- 
proach the  subject  in  a  spirit  of  benighted  chivalry 
which  is  little  short  of  fantastic  in  the  careful  and 
practical  business  of  treating  the  relations  between 
states.  Spaniards  do  not  like  obligations  nor  cleverly 
prepared  rulings ;  they  prefer  the  success  of  force  and 
the  satisfactions  of  amour  pro  pre  which  in  the  eyes 
of  the  masses  constitutes  national  honor,  and  in  the 

291 


292  THE  WORLD  WAR 

eyes  of  statesmen,  a  vanity  gratified.  Spain's  whole 
history,  long  and  glorious  as  it  is,  is  full  of  such  de- 
ductions; the  most  casual  observer  cannot  fail  to  find 
them  both  in  the  past  and  present. 

In  the  agitated  events  which  the  world  has  been 
witnessing  since  1914,  in  the  confusion  of  ideas  and 
interests  which  naturally  followed,  Spanish  diplomacy 
has  been  vacillating,  insecure,  unable  to  find  a  view 
point  which  would  permit  the  country  to  participate 
in  the  struggle  and  claim  some  of  the  benefits.  Nor 
has  the  government  of  Don  Alfonso  XIII  made  a 
program  of  practical  utility  out  of  neutrality  but  in- 
stead, a  species  of  dogma,  of  abstract  conception  that 
cannot  be  discussed,  of  noli  me  tangere,  in  the  same 
way  as  years  ago  the  Carlists  made  the  Virgin  Mary 
generalissimo  of  the  armies  of  the  Pretender. 

Spain  has  long  nursed  two  traditional  aversions: 
England  and  France.  Her  two  great  glories  selected 
with  as  much  lack  of  logic  as  of  historic  truth,  are 
the  "Second  of  May"  and  Trafalgar.  From  time  to 
time  both  deeds  supply  the  theme  for  brilliant  orators 
to  turn  their  best  phrases  before  an  enthusiastic  public. 
Time  has  diminished  but  not  effaced  these  aversions. 
In  this  tenacity  we  see  the  same  inflexible  tempera- 
ment which  spurred  the  Conquistadors  to  prodigious 
deeds  in  America.  Gibraltar,  held  by  the  English,  is 
a  thorn  in  the  side  of  every  Spaniard,  and  the  invasion 
by    Bonaparte's    soldiers    is    a    never-to-be-forgotten 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  293 

nightmare.  Today  England  is  fighting  fraternally  be- 
side Frenchmen,  and  on  the  very  fields  where  she  once 
fought  against  them ;  Italy  is  struggling  with  an  enemy 
who  yesterday  was  her  ally;  Prussians  and  Austrians 
have  put  aside  Sadowa:  Bulgarians  are  shedding  the 
blood  of  the  Russians  who  liberated  them.  To  the  un- 
compromising Spanish  integrity  such  things  are  beyond 
all  understanding  and  that  is  why,  having  lost  the 
power  which  one  day  made  Spain  rule  the  world,  she 
has  gone  on  ceding  her  place  as  a  first  rate  power  to 
new  nations.  She  lacks  that  peculiar  ability  or  rather 
flexibility  which  others  have  known  how  to  substitute 
for  strength. 

To  grievances  of  long  standing  was  recently  added 
the  conquest  of  Morocco  by  France.  Over  this  ter- 
ritory Spain  not  only  claimed  rights  but,  so  far  as 
the  part  nearest  her  own  peninsula  was  concerned,  she 
had  made  good  her  claims  by  conquest.  Certain  pain- 
ful incidents  made  it  difficult  to  maintain  friendly  re- 
lations between  the  two  and  in  every  instance  Spanish 
diplomacy  was  unequal  to  the  task  of  defending  the 
interests  of  the  kingdom;  instead  of  prompt  action  it 
had  recourse  to  the  usual  posthumous  regrets  and  ran- 
cors. In  the  Conference  of  Algeciras,  the  Marques  de 
Almodovar  del  Rio,  Spanish  plenipotentiary  and  presi- 
dent of  the  gathering,  instead  of  trying  to  extract 
some  benefit  for  his  country  out  of  the  situation  created 
between  France  and  Germany,  passed  his  time  making 


294  THE  WORLD  WAR 

declarations  as  to  his  probity.  With  Spain's  approval 
and  even  cooperation  the  question  of  Morocco  was  con- 
secrated by  the  conference,  yet  it  only  served  to  aug- 
ment the  useless  rancors  in  the  souls  of  the  Spanish 
people. 

Nevertheless,  there  have  been  two  friendly  conven- 
tions between  Spain  and  France  and  England :  that 
of  1907  and  that  of  1913.  One  was  signed  by  An- 
tonio Maura  and  the  other  was  fathered  by  Count 
Romanones,  two  ex-premiers  who  are  the  faithful  ex- 
ponents of  the  two  parties  which  until  recently  stood 
in  close  formation  and  alternately  disputed  the  power 
— the  Conservative  and  the  Liberal.  The  conventions 
in  question  brought  Spain  out  of  her  isolation  for  a 
moment  and  gave  her  the  chance  of  raising  her  voice 
in  Mediterranean  affairs,  but  they  were  two  separate 
acts  and  not  part  of  a  system  or  policy.  Later,  the 
men  who  carried  them  out  almost  tried  to  excuse  them- 
selves for  having  done  so.  Count  Romanones  affirmed 
that  by  putting  through  the  convention  of  19 13  he  had 
merely  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Conservatives; 
and  Maura  affirmed  that  imperious  circumstances 
forced  him  into  the  convention  of  19 13.  "Those  agree- 
ments did  not  respond  to  any  effort  of  the  imagina- 
tion but  to  a  reality,  to  a  conjunction  of  incoercible, 
imperative,  evident  realities."  * 


*  Discourse  of  Don  Antonio  Maura  in  the  Royal  Theatre  of 
Madrid,  April  21,  1915. 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  295 

The   marriage   of    King   Alfonso    XIII    with    the 
Princess  of  Battenberg  did  not  bind  the  English  gov- 
ernment to  the  Spanish;  we  might  almost  say  that  it 
hardly  united  the  two  royal  families  to  any  appre- 
ciable degree.     Nor  did  the  frequent  and  dangerous 
visits  of  the  king  to  Paris  and  of  the  president  of 
the  French  Republic  to  Madrid  have  any  results.    Offi- 
cial colloquies  of  this  sort  usually  prove  to  be  useless 
or  else  are  a  revelation  of  something  previously  pre- 
pared ;  but  between  France  and  Spain  there  was  never 
anything  well  prepared.     If  it  were  possible  for  Spain 
to  act  in  the  present  moment  it  is  probable  that  the 
balance  would  fall  to  the  side  of  the  Teutonic  Em- 
pires.   The  Army  and  the  Church,  the  two  great  forces 
in  Spanish  politics,  are  decidedly  Germanophile.     The 
masses,  though  divided,  are  in  the  majority  similarly 
inclined.    The  aristocracy  has  made  an  article  de  luxe 
out  of  Germanism  and  the  bureaucracy,  a  most  import- 
ant element,  has  the  same  ideas.    Only  the  literary  men 
take  the  opposite  side.    The  young  generation,  inspired 
in  the  French  school,  understand  the  problem  which  is 
being  resolved  on  the  battlefield.    One  great  dramatist, 
Jacinto  Benavente,  is  rabidly  pro-German,  but  nearly 
all  the  rest,  headed  by  the  aged  Galdos,  the  most  patri- 
otic and  broad-minded   of   all    Spanish  writers,   are 
favorable  to  the  Allies. 

In  countries  of  fervent  Catholism,  the  literary  man 
counts  for  little  in  the  forming  of  public  opinion.    In- 


296  THE  WORLD  WAR 

stead  this  is  formed  from  the  pulpits  and  the  sacristies. 
The  word  of  the  artist  does  not  rouse  ready  echo  like 
the  word  of  the  confessor.  For  this  reason  it  is  truly 
extraordinary  that  in  such  a  hostile  atmosphere,  Spain's 
literary  men  have  been  able  to  take  a  just  and  well- 
defined  stand;  for  it  is  generally  admitted  that  in  all 
times  the  man  of  letters  has  followed  the  counsel  of 
vEschylus,  to  be  "prudent  and  cautious  and  to  obey 
always  the  one  in  command." 

In  short,  public  opinion  is  that  which  commands,  and 
in  Spain  public  opinion  is  contrary  to  the  tendencies 
of  the  enlightened  class.  The  press,  a  very  great  power, 
although  discredited  in  all  nations,  is  emphatically  pro- 
German;  and  a  few  sheets  in  Madrid  which  formerly 
hardly  managed  to  exist  today  are  prosperous  and 
have  a  great  circulation,  precisely  because  they  con- 
stantly predict  the  imminent  and  decisive  victory  of 
the  Central  Empires.  The  Correo  Espanol,  an  ultra- 
montane organ,  and  La  Tribima  lead  the  movement; 
then  come  the  A.  B.  C,  which  pretends  to  be  impar- 
ital  but  is  hardly  less  passionate,  and  the  Universo,  3. 
clerical  organ  like  the  Correo  Espanol,  but  less  ag- 
gressive. The  publications  of  the  so-called  Newspaper 
Trust  cover  all  the  ground  from  a  strictly  maintained 
moral  neutrality  to  a  weak  defense  of  the  interests  of 
the  Allies;  and  also  on  their  side  are  some  republican 
newspapers  of  small  importance.     Generally  speaking 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  297 

the  Germanophile  dailies  have  the  greater  circulation 
and  make  a  greater  impression  on  the  public. 

In  spite  of  the  agitated  state  of  the  country,  poli- 
ticians have  maintained  great  prudence  in  their  words. 
An  exception  is  the  factious  orator,  Vasquez  Mella, 
who  represents  the  Carlist  Pretender,  Don  Jaime,  and 
the  Church.  Mella  knows  that  Don  Jaime  will  never 
sit  on  the  throne  of  Spain,  but  it  pleases  him  to  take 
the  apocalyptic  tone  so  beloved  by  races  of  little  judg- 
ment. When  he  says  "there  can  be  conciliation  with 
France  but  never  with  England"  the  public  applauds 
with  frenzy.  This  road  leads  the  ultra-Catholic  orator 
to  the  same  exaggeration  which  made  up  the  vigorous 
synthesis  of  the  Torquemadas,  the  Cisneros,  the  Riban- 
daneiras ;  and  in  the  face  of  the  blood  of  innocent  non- 
combatants  he  can  laud  ecstatically  "the  audacious 
Zeppelins  which  know  how  to  extend  their  wings  like 
the  triumphant  wings  of  victorious  Germany."  But 
Mella  is  an  exception,  let  it  be  repeated.  He  belongs 
in  every  way  to  the  fifteenth  century. 

Maura  is  also  clerical,  but  although  of  saner  lan- 
guage, in  the  depths  of  his  soul  he  feels  anything  but 
affection  for  the  enemies  of  Germany.  In  the  speech  in 
the  Royal  Theatre  of  Madrid,  already  mentioned,  he 
answered  the  Germanophiles  in  the  following  sense: 
We  have  no  other  solution  than  the  present  one  since 
we  are  not  at  liberty  to  go  into  the  fight  in  favor  of 
the  Central  Empires.     Melquiades  Alvarez,  the  Radi- 


298  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cal  leader  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  completed  the 
idea  by  stating,  "Those  who  wish  to  unite  us  to  the 
cause  of  Germany  would  commit  suicide;  therefore  I 
say  emphatically  that  if  it  should  be  necessary  some 
day  to  abandon  neutrality,  which  I  hope  not  to  be  the 
case,  we  ought  to  put  ourselves  most  decidedly  on  the 
side  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  The  solidarity  of 
interests  which  has  united  us  to  both  these  countries  is 
such  that  their  hostility  would  mean  the  ruin  of 
Spain."  *  In  another  discourse  he  amplified  this  by 
saying  that  "only  these  two  countries  could  threaten 
the  independence  of  our  territory."  f  These  two  po- 
litical chiefs,  Conservative  and  Radical,  are  the  anti- 
thesis of  each  other  in  fundamental  ideas,  but  there  is 
the  same  thought  back  of  each  one's  words,  namely: 
The  geographical  situation  of  Spain  leaves  us  only  one 
way  out — a  benevolent  attitude  to  England  and  France, 
for  they  could  easily  destroy  us  in  short  time.  It  was 
natural  that  Alvarez,  modern  and  republican,  should 
feel  a  sympathy  toward  these  two  liberal  nations; 
Maura,  who  gave  the  head  of  Ferrer  to  the  Jesuits, 
bowed  to  necessity  but  champed  at  the  bit. 

Count  Romanones,  official  head  of  the  Liberal  party, 
was  the  only  politician  of  any  responsibility  who  lifted 
a  frank  and  friendly  voice  for  the  Allies.    The  Count 


*  Declaration  by  Melquiades  Alvarez  in  the  Impartial,  August, 

1914- 
t  Speech  by  Melquiades  Alvarez  in  Granada,  May  1,  1917. 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  299 

had  to  change  his  tone,  had  to  go  on  believing  that  this 
empirical  Spanish  neutrality  was  "a  neutrality  that 
kills,"  had  to  be  silent  and  yield  his  power  later  to  the 
chief  of  the  dissenting  Liberals,  Garcia  Prieto;  this  to 
the  great  scandal  of  those  who  had  applauded  for  so 
many  years  the  close-knit  organization  of  the  two  Span- 
ish parties  regularly  succeed  each  other  in  power.  Also 
the  Revolutionist  Lerroux,  feared  though  but  little 
esteemed,  raised  the  banner  of  the  Allies  from  the  very 
first  moment.  His  action  was  more  unfortunate  than 
that  of  Romanones;  in  fact,  the  fighting  deputy  on 
returning  from  France  was  stoned  in  the  streets  and 
had  to  return  instantly  whence  he  came. 

The  clergy  and  the  army  are  two  corner  stones 
on  which  the  whole  Spanish  edifice  rests.  So  it  was 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  so  it  is  to-day.  Of  little  cul- 
ture, excessively  intransigent,  without  a  notion  of  mod- 
ern ideas,  the  Spanish  clergy  is  refractory  to  all  spirit 
of  liberty  and  hostile  to  all  reform.  It  has  taken  pos- 
session of  the  popular  mind  and  moves  it  according 
to  its  designs.  It  intervenes  in  public  affairs,  creates 
mayors,  names  deputies,  influences  ministers.  It  does 
not  use  the  pulpit  for  preaching  the  doctrine  of  Christ, 
but  for  directing  politics  and  dictating  rules  of  life. 
It  exercises  both  functions  with  the  same  intolerance 
with  which  in  former  days  it  used  to  order  autos  de  fe. 

From  the  very  first  moment  of  the  present  war  the 
Spanish  clergy  took  the  side  of  the  Central  Empires. 
20 


300  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Kaiser  is  considered  the  restorer  of  the  faith ;  for 
the  Spanish  firmly  believe  that  he  only  awaits  the 
moment  of  victory  to  throw  off  the  Lutheran  so  antipa- 
thetic to  his  soul,  and  announce  his  conversion  to 
Catholicism ;  just  as  the  Mohammedans  believe  that  he 
only  awaits  the  moment  of  victory  to  proclaim  his  con- 
version to  Mohammedanism.  In  the  churches,  which 
are  supported  by  the  state  (and  the  state  claims  to 
be  neutral),  German  propaganda  takes  the  most  as- 
tounding forms.  Belgium  destroyed  and  martyr- 
ized deserves  her  fate  for  having  raised  in  Brus- 
sels a  statue  to  Ferrer;  France  invaded  is  being  pun- 
ished for  having  separated  Church  from  State; 
Italy  is  condemned  for  holding  the  Holy  Pontiff 
prisoner  after  having  robbed  him  of  his  temporal 
power;  and  the  slaughter  of  innocents  everywhere  is  a 
punishment  of  God.  A  medieval  spirit  animates  this 
propaganda  to  such  a  point  that  the  ideals  of  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  find  even  more  echo  in  the  little  towns 
of  the  Iberian  Peninsula  than  in  his  own  country. 
It  is  evident  that  another  factor  besides  the  similarity 
of  ideals  has  been  at  work,  and  over  which  no  one  in 
Spain  makes  any  mystery — bribery.  Later  it  will  be 
possible  to  confirm  the  rumor,  for  German  statesmen 
do  not  cover  up  these  acts  any  more  than  they  con- 
cealed the  gifts  they  put  into  the  full  hands  of  Spanish 
statesmen  when  trying  to  place  a  Hohenzollern  prince 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  301 

on  the  throne  of  Spain — an  aspiration  which  led  to  the 
Franco-Prussian  war. 

The  Spanish  army  has  been  an  army  of  pronuncia- 
mientos  or  insurrections.  The  whole  last  century  was 
one  of  successive  changes  under  the  influence  of  mili- 
tary meetings.  Those  popular  revolutions  of  which  the 
rest  of  Europe  saw  an  abundance  never  triumphed  in 
Spain.  One  day  it  was  a  general  who  assumed  the 
government,  the  next  day  a  group  of  generals,  the 
next,  even  the  sergeants  had  their  revolutionary  move- 
ment. This  cycle  appears  to  have  closed  forever, 
thanks  to  the  organization  which  put  Alfonso  XII  on 
the  throne ;  but  nevertheless  there  has  always  remained 
a  political  factor  in  the  army,  and  the  military  disasters 
which  preceded  the  loss  of  the  colonies  appear  to  count 
nothing  against  the  prestige  of  the  body. 

When  the  present  war  burst  the  Spanish  army  like 
the  clergy  was  instantly  seized  with  an  epidemic  of 
Germanism.  Over  the  military  mind  the  Kaiser  ex- 
erted an  influence  almost  divine;  for  them,  Germany 
hardly  existed  and  still  less  Austria,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey — only  the  Kaiser,  the  expression  of  force  and 
grandeur,  who  overshadowed  his  country.  In  him  they 
saw  the  Emperor  Charles  V  come  back  to  life,  and  for 
them  German  power,  as  in  the  sixteenth  century,  was 
Spanish  power. 

Moreover  the  attitude  of  the  army  has  been  threat- 
ening in  the  last  few  years.     The  so-called  juntas  de 


302  THE  WORLD  WAR 

dejensa  (defense  leagues)  organized  within  the  army 
interfered  with  the  established  military  discipline. 
They  began  to  show  a  restless  spirit;  they  became 
exacting;  they  dictated  new  rules  and  regulations  and 
insisted  that  their  demands,  which  it  must  be  admitted 
were  just,  be  recognized.  Moreover  they  forced  the 
presentation  in  the  senate  of  a  new  and  well  drafted 
military  law.  This  reform,  however,  has  the  grave 
defect  of  going  too  far  for  a  country  determined  to 
remain  neutral  at  any  price,  and  falling  short  of  the 
requirements  for  a  country  which  might  be  about  to 
enter  a  war. 

The  state  of  mind  we  have  indicated  must  have 
given  rise  to  profound  resentment,  the  full  expression 
of  which  we  are  prevented  from  knowing  by  the  ex- 
cessive prudence  of  the  Spanish  censor.  In  London 
and  Paris,  and  later  in  Washington,  there  was  no 
mystery  as  to  Spain's  attitude;  therefore  the  limited 
allottment  of  coal  and  the  restrictions  on  her  exporta- 
tions.  Furthermore  certain  incidents  regarding  sub- 
marines and  espionage  were  well  known  to  the  Allied 
governments.  As  to  these  last  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment has  cleared  itself  but  without  putting  in  its 
promises  any  of  that  good  will  which  alone  could  make 
them  efficacious. 

One  such  incident,  when  it  came  up  in  the  French 
Chamber,  evoked  a  brief  speech  from  ex-Premier 
Ribot.    "I  willingly  admit  the  question/*  he  said,  "and 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  303 

reply  that  it  is  not  admissible  that  enemy  submarines 
should  find  refuge  and  protection  in  the  ports  of  a 
country  which  calls  herself  neutral  and  friendly  to 
France ;  we  therefore  protested.  The  Spanish  Govern- 
ment has  signed,  somewhat  tardily,  a  decree  prohibit- 
ing German  submarines  to  enter  Spanish  waters  in  the 
future.  The  espionage  organization  should  also  have 
been  prohibited  but  let  us  not  ask  too  much.  .    "  * 

It  appears  that  the  international  policy  of  the  past 
has  not  been  acceptable  to  Spain,  and  that,  banished 
from  America  in  the  manner  which  her  own  lack  of 
flexibility  imposed  upon  her,  her  new  political  orienta- 
tion in  Europe  and  Africa  was  not  looked  upon  with 
much  cordiality.  To  admit  this  much  is  mere  justice; 
but  it  must  be  added  that  the  lack  of  success  in  new 
ventures  is  due  to  Spanish  cabinets  rather  than  to  those 
countries  who  were  more  skillful  than  she  in  defend- 
ing their  own  interests.  To  do  so  was  their  duty, 
and  even  Germany  herself,  though  far  removed  from 
Spanish  concerns,  imposed  her  will  on  the  Madrid  cab- 
inet regarding  the  Caroline  Islands. 

Today  there  opens  before  Spain  a  whole  road  of 
political  renovation.  She  has  a  chance  to  follow  a 
path  which  will  unite  the  interests  of  the  moment  with 
the  best  traditions  of  her  past.  She  can  shake  off  the 
reactionary  demagogism  which  has  always  swayed  the 


*  Session  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  July  31,  1915. 


304  THE  WORLD  WAR 

people  and  can  hand  over  the  directing  of  public 
affairs  to  more  able  minds.  At  this  moment  the  in- 
stinct for  scenting  out  such  a  path  and  following  it 
would,  if  she  possessed  it,  lay  the  foundations  of  fu- 
ture rehabilitation.  But  Garcia  Prieto,  Marquis  of 
Alhucemas,  says  that  he  has  again  accepted  the  posts 
of  premier  and  foreign  minister  in  order  to  maintain 
Spain's  neutrality;  in  other  words,  to  follow  in  the 
footsteps  of  his  predecessors  and  allow  dogmatic  neu- 
trality to  be  his  policy. 

In  the  present  crisis  an  alliance  with  France  and 
England  could  revivify  the  international  life  of  the 
land,  stimulate  commerce  very  considerably,  obtain, 
very  likely,  compensation  for  the  French  occupation  of 
Morocco,  and  heal  forever  the  wound  left  by  the  Span- 
ish-American War  of  1898. 

Any  public  man  who  knew  how  to  formulate  an  ade- 
quate program  along  these  lines  and  impose  it  upon  the 
people  could  soon  win  them  over  by  the  demonstration 
of  its  utility ;  but  he  would  first  have  to  exclude  from 
Spanish  politics  those  two  deep-rooted  forces,  the 
Army  and  the  Church.  Only  thus  could  he  rouse  the 
people  who  for  centuries  have  been  sleeping  narcotized 
by  a  religious  regime  which  refused  to  confine 
itself  to  the  moral  sphere  and  insisted  on  invading 
politics.  Only  thus  could  he  bring  about  that  "revo- 
lution from  above"  which  Don  Antonio  Maura,  enam- 
ored of  the  phrase  rather  than  what  it  means,  has 


SPANISH  NEUTRALITY  305 

talked  about.  Any  public  man  wise  enough  and  strong 
enough  to  do  this  would  be  the  second  founder  of  the 
Spanish  nation. 

Thus  throwing  off  isolation  and  feeling  the  stimulus 
that  comes  from  active  contact  with  the  world,  Spain 
would  be  materially  and  morally  renovated.  Such  an 
attitude  would  give  the  lie  to  the  repeated  affirmation 
that  her  moral  solidarity  with  Germany  in  the  present 
conflict  is  due  to  the  identity  of  their  psychology; 
that  the  ideal  of  might  oppressing  right  inspired  both 
in  their  respective  periods  of  hegemony;  that  both 
nations  have,  at  intervals  of  three  centuries,  conducted 
themselves  in  the  same  manner  in  the  regions  now  so 
cruelly  martyrized.  When  these  statements  are  dis- 
proven  by  a  radical  change  of  policy,  the  high-sound- 
ing prophecy  of  a  certain  conservative  newspaper  in 
Madrid,  "The  hour  of  peace  will  be  Spain's  hour" 
will  have  meaning  as  well  as  sound. 

All  who  know  the  vigorous  and  industrious  Iberian 
character,  the  highly  personal  artistic  genius  of  the 
people,  their  extremely  interesting  literary  efflorescence 
in  latter  years,  love  Spain  and  wish  her  well.  They 
hope  she  may  succeed  in  conquering  her  parasitic 
classes,  and  that  the  more  wholesome  forces  of  Span- 
ish life  may  have  free  play  and  establish  a  sound  and 
respected  international  policy. 


CHAPTER   XXVI 
Greece's  double  attitude 

AFTER  Greece  refused  to  fulfill  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions toward  Servia,  the  King  and  the  Cretan 
statesman  Venizelos  became  two  opposed  foci  of  pub- 
lic opinion.  The  abandonment  of  Servia  was  exoner- 
ated by  Athens  on  the  grounds  that  the  Greco-Servian 
Treaty  was  eminently  a  Balkan  treaty  and  that  the 
war  just  broken  out  had  assumed  far  more  ample  pro- 
portions than  those  provided  for  in  the  compact. 
Servia,  already  involved  in  the  struggle,  had  no  choice 
but  to  admit  its  rapid  propagation,  and  the  successive 
presidents  of  Greek  councils,  not  omitting  Venizelos 
himself,  never  reminded  the  people  that  an  ally  who 
had  kept  her  faith  with  them  was  in  the  throes  of 
death. 

Both  Constantine  and  Venizelos  were  resting  on  the 
laurels  of  recent  Balkan  triumphs.  These  triumphs, 
still  vivid  in  the  public  memory,  being  claimed  by  both 
men,  their  inability  to  satisfactorily  divide  the  glory 
changed  the  two,  who  had  stood  so  solidly  for  un- 

307 


308  THE  WORLD  WAR 

limited  national  expansion,  into  bitter  enemies.  Con- 
stantine  especially  was  obdurate,  and  after  his  dis- 
course at  Potsdam  which  he  was  forced  to  rectify  in 
Paris,  the  breach  between  the  two  was  beyond  all 
bridging. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  King,  still  flushed  with 
victory,  went  to  visit  his  brother-in-law  the  Kaiser 
and  his  former  comrades  in  the  German  Military 
School.  Carried  away  by  his  cordial  reception,  no 
doubt,  he  told  them  that  the  Greek  victories  were  due 
to  the  study  of  German  methods.  This  statement 
could  not  but  produce  resentment  in  France  where  it 
was  well  known  that  French  military  commissions,  the 
only  ones  of  importance,  in  fact,  that  had  ever  trodden 
Greek  soil,  had  taught  the  Greek  armies  the  tactics 
which  had  enabled  them  to  conquer  not  only  the  Bul- 
garians, but  also  the  Turks  in  1898.  Furthermore,  all 
France  knew  that  it  was  the  defeated  armies  that  had 
been  instructed  by  Germany. 

It  had  been  arranged  that  Constantine  was  to  go  to 
Paris  from  Berlin,  and  thither  Venizelos  had  to  pre- 
cede him  and  announce  that  his  king  would  rectify  his 
wild  statements.  This  he  did,  but  with  the  natural 
result  that  the  enmity  deepened  between  sovereign  and 
premier. 

But  in  spite  of  these  personal  differences  the  two 
were  bound  by  a  common  political  purpose.  Both 
dreamed  of  unmeasured  greatness  for  Greece ;  both,  at 
different  times,  cast  longing  eyes  on  Constantinople; 
both   outlined   a  vast   empire   in   Asia   Minor;   both 


GREECE'S  DOUBLE  ATTITUDE         309 

planned  for  Greek  supremacy  in  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean including  possession  of  Albania  and  with  it  the 
key  to  the  Adriatic.  However,  while  the  objective 
point,  or  rather  points,  were  the  same  for  both,  the 
means  of  attainment  were  differently  understood.  Con- 
stantine  believed  that  Germany  would  prove  to  be 
Greece's  best  champion;  Venizelos,  France  and  Eng- 
land. Venizelos  even  claimed  a  positive  indebtedness 
on  the  part  of  his  country  toward  the  Allies,  and 
urged  that  Greece  would  run  great  danger  in  ignoring 
the  obligation.  In  France,  Greece  had  met,  for  cen- 
turies, with  such  helpful  moral  support  that  it  is  hardly 
an  exaggeration  to  say  that  Greek  independence  was 
conceived  in  the  brains  of  French  authors  even  before 
it  was  formulated  in  the  brains  of  Greek  leaders. 
Moreover  France,  with  the  hope  of  balancing  the  ever 
increasing  Italian  power,  wished  to  elevate  Greece  into 
a  first  class  power,  and  friendship  of  this  scope  should 
not  have  been  despised.  England  too  had  favored 
Greek  interests  ever  since  Hellenism  crossed  the  Chan- 
nel. With  so  much  coast,  so  many  islands,  so  many 
maritime  interests  to  safeguard,  England's  protection 
was  not  to  be  esteemed  lightly;  and  though  a  king  of 
Danish  origin  might  underrate  it,  not  so  a  true-born 
descendant  of  Gorgias,  like  Venizelos. 

And  yet  the  fact  is  that  Constantine,  not  Venizelos, 
won  out.  French  ascendancy  waned  speedily  while 
Baron  Von  Schenck,  the  Berlin  envoy,  began  his  Ger- 
manizing work  with  unlimited  audacity.  Nearly  the 
whole  of  the  press  was  put  at  his  service;  Zaimis  and 


3io  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Skoudolis  were  replaced  by  ministers  of  the  king's 
choice  without  regard  to  constitutional  procedure,  and 
Venizelos  and  his  adherents  were  persecuted. 

All  this  was  a  shock  to  the  devotees  of  Hellenism. 
One  disappointed  admirer  wrote  "After  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century  Hellenism  made  a  noble  and 
judicious  effort  as  manifested  in  the  constitution  of  the 
Greek  state,  the  occupation  of  different  territories,  and 
the  whole  expansion  of  the  race  outside  of  Greece 
proper;  but  unfortunately  in  recent  days  Hellenism 
has  not  evolved  in  accord  with  the  political  exigencies 
of  modern  Europe."  *  And  with  as  much  disappoint- 
ment, but  less  openly  expressed,  the  author  of  Europe 
on  Fire  says  "We  all  love  and  admire  Ancient  Greece, 
and  that  is  one  thing;  we  respect,  and  ask  nothing 
better  than  to  love,  Modern  Greece,  but  that  is  an- 
other thing."  f  In  France,  England,  and  Italy,  the 
newspapers  opened  a  rude  campaign  against  the  Greek 
monarchy,  for  treason  was  in  the  very  air  and  though 
there  was  as  yet  no  proof,  the  public  felt  intuitively 
that  Greeks  were  preparing,  outside  of  Salonica,  some 
plot,  in  miniature,  like  the  legendary  one  which  Ulysses 
and  Menelaus  prepared  outside  of  Troy. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  same  powers  who  created 
Greek  independence  had  to  oblige  King  Constantine 
to  abdicate  and  permit  the  irregular  succession  of  his 
second  son.  Venizelos  was  made  arbiter  of  the  public 
destiny  and  began  his  difficult  task  in  as  hostile  an 
atmosphere  as  could  be  imagined. 


*  Andre  Duboscq ;  "L'Orient  Mediterraneen,"  page  90. 
f  Charles  Benoit;  "L'Europe  en  Feu,"  page  14. 


GREECE'S  DOUBLE  ATTITUDE         311 

To  the  anti  constitutional  activities  of  the  court  there 
had  been  no  limit.  The  railroads,  private  codes,  army 
courriers,  all  were  put  at  the  disposal  of  Colonel  Fal- 
kenhausen,  Germany's  military  attache  in  Greece. 
Among  the  most  zealous  spies  were  the  sovereigns 
themselves.  Queen  Sophia,  sister  to  the  Kaiser,  gave 
vent,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  telegrams  to  her 
brother,  to  inelegant  bitterness.  The  correspondence  in 
cipher  between  Berlin  and  Athens  is  about  to  be  pub- 
lished, but  much  of  it  is  already  known  officially.  The 
queen,  for  instance,  telegraphed  on  December  2,  1916, 
to  the  Greek  ambassador  in  Switzerland,  who  was  to 
transmit  the  message  to  the  German  Emperor,  "I  be- 
lieve the  game  is  lost.  War  (by  Greece)  on  the 
Entente  must  be  given  up  for  the  present."  *  She 
had  previously  wired  "I  am  in  despair.  I  must  have 
your  opinion  which  is  the  only  thing  that  can  better 
the  situation."  In  fact,  she  kept  repeating  that  she 
was  in  despair,  and  on  January  10,  191 7,  she  com- 
pletely lost  the  royal  manner  and  became  an  irritated 
German  woman.  "How  I  suffer !"  she  wired  again. 
"May  those  infamous  pigs  receive  the  punishment  they 
deserve!  I  embrace  you  with  all  my  heart.  Your 
lonely  and  afflicted  sister  who  hopes  for  better  times." 

The  court  of  Athens  was  hoping  that  the  assault 
made  on  Sarrail's  soldiers  in  Salonica  would  provoke 
an  attack  on  the  Greek  troops,  which  would  have  made 
the  French  general's  position  extremely  difficult.     In 


*  This   correspondence   is   obtained   from   the   Stefani   Italian 
Agency  and  is  of  unquestioned  veracity. 


312  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  beginning  the  Greek  army  tried  to  act  by  itself  but 
soon  the  lack  of  artillery  and  ammunition  took  all  the 
enthusiasm  out  of  it.  In  vain  the  German  agents, 
who  hoped  at  least  to  plant  future  discord  between 
Greece  and  the  Allies,  insisted.  At  court,  up  to  the 
very  day  of  the  monarchs'  flight,  they  kept  urging  the 
Bulgarians,  Turks,  and  Austro-Germans  massed  in 
Macedonia  to  plunge  into  Greek  territory  and  make 
war  on  the  intruder.  Even  Constantine  was  under 
Hindenburg's  orders  if  we  are  to  judge  from  his  tele- 
gram to  the  German  generalissimo  about  the  handing 
over  of  certain  artillery  should  the  Entente  demand  it. 
"His  Majesty  the  King  of  Greece  to  Hindenburg  with 
regard  to  his  proposition,  which  is  accepted.  The  fol- 
lowing measures  will  be  taken  to  prevent  said  material 
from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Entente:  Armed 
resistance  against  a  possible  attempt  to  take  it  by  force, 
or  its  destruction  if  necessary,  in  which  case  it  would 
be  replaced  by  Germany  at  an  opportune  moment." 

The  Greek  cabinet  followed  the  lead  of  the  court. 
It  treated  secretly  with  the  Berlin  cabinet  and  offered 
to  destroy  war  material.  The  Greek  minister  in  Ber- 
lin received  orders  from  his  king,  queen,  and  cabinet 
alike. 

As  all  know,  there  were  organized  in  Greece  armed 
bands  whose  object  was  to  keep  attacking  the  Allied 
forces  and  doing  all  the  damage  possible,  but  without 
compromising  the  Greek  government.  The  following 
telegram  dated  January  n,  1917,  shows  how  directly 
this  was  the  work  of  the  court.    The  message  was  sent 


GREECE'S  DOUBLE  ATTITUDE         313 

via  Berne,  and  took  a  long  and  roundabout  journey 
before  reaching  the  person  destined,  who  was  no  other 
than  Falkenhausen,  now  in  camp  in  Macedonia.  ''In 
case  the  post  should  be  late  in  reaching  Presna  I  beg 
you  to  await  it.  It  is  most  important  that  you  should 
speak  personally  to  Frankhizco,  an  officer  of  the  re- 
serve, concerning  the  future  organization  of  the 
bands." 

These  and  many  similar  episodes  explain  fully  the 
last  act  of  the  drama — the  journey  of  Constantine  and 
his  whole  family,  except  the  second  son,  out  of 
Greece;  also  the  leaving  behind  of  the  second  son,  he 
being  considered  the  least  dangerous  of  the  family  to 
place  on  the  paternal  throne. 

Greece's  whole  mistake  has  been  her  inordinate  de- 
sires for  expansion  and  her  willingness  to  court  what- 
ever power  may  favor  those  desires.  If  imperialism  is 
a  dangerous  path  for  strong  nations  to  follow,  it  is 
even  more  so  for  weak  ones.  To  have  accepted  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  offers  and  ceded  the  port  of  Cavala 
to  Bulgaria  who  needed  an  outlet  on  the  Mediterra- 
nean, would  have  been  the  policy  of  wisdom.  Bul- 
garia would  then  not  have  entered  the  war  on  Ger- 
many's side,  and  Greece  would  have  remained  one 
with  the  Balkan  block.  This  cession  would  have  been 
in  accord  with  two  letters  written  by  Venizelos  to 
the  king  on  January  11  and  17  respectively,  in  the 
second  of  which  he  said  "to  give  up  Cavala  is  cer- 
tainly a  great  sacrifice  and  one  that  it  grieves  me  to 
the  depths  of  my  soul  to  advise;  but  now  that  I  see 


3i4  THE  WORLD  WAR 

what  national  compensations  our  sacrifices  will  bring 
us,  I  do  not  hesitate.  I  feel  that  the  concessions  in 
Asia  Minor  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  indicated 
could,  especially  if  we  submit  to  other  sacrifices  in 
favor  of  Bulgaria,  assume  such  proportions  that  an- 
other Greece,  as  large  and  certainly  no  less  rich,  would 
be  added  to  the  Greece  already  doubled  as  consequence 
of  two  recent  victorious  Balkan  wars." 

But  at  that  time  the  voice  of  Venizelos  was  not 
the  voice  of  Greece.  Greece  saw  two  adversaries, 
Russia  and  Italy,  opposed  to  her  future  aspirations. 
The  first,  by  moving  toward  Constantinople,  was  bar- 
ring the  road  by  which  she  hoped  to  reconstruct  the 
Eastern  Roman  Empire  under  the  sceptre  of  Con- 
stantine ;  the  second,  by  occupying  the  narrow  entrance 
of  the  Adriatic  was  preventing  her  expansion  in  that 
direction.  These  two  logical  limitations  appeared  like 
spectres  that  made  her  forget  what  a  grave  danger 
the  Austrian  expansion  would  be,  with  its  necessary 
seizure  of  Salonica  and  possibly  a  hinterland  as  well. 

In  addition  to  what  has  been  described,  dynastic 
interests  and  all  the  petty  squabbling  between  indi- 
viduals and  parties  played  their  role  in  the  recent 
drama. 

Greece  was  on  the  point  of  perishing.  Today  a  new 
era  is  being  initiated.  Let  us  hope  that  she  will 
understand  that  it  is  her  favorable  historic  moment, 
and  that  favorable  historic  moments,  like  the  wheel 
of  Fortune,  never  turn  back. 


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